

# **Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Racism in European Perspective**

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Arbeitsstelle  
Rechtsextremismus  
und Fremdenfeindlichkeit

The Center for the Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism and Xenophobia is part of the Halle branch of the German Youth Institute and is subsidized by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth.

### **Acknowledgement**

This publication was made possible by contributions and by the support of many colleagues. We want to express our particular gratitude to the authors for their cooperation and for the patience they had in the process of common work. Special thanks are going to Alexander Harmsen, Jason F. Ortmann, Adam Blauhut, Ellen Russon, Elena Hahn for editorial work and for translation and also to Anna Schnitzer for transliterating an interview. Renate Schulze deserves our thanks for supporting the work on this publication in many ways.

Halle, August 2006

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Internet: <http://www.dji.de>

Layout/Design/Production

omniphon GmbH Leipzig

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MICHAELA GLASER

## Introduction: Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Social Counter-Strategies in Present-Day Europe

Xenophobia, right-wing extremism and anti-democratic ideologies continue to be a virulent problem and an ongoing challenge for European democracies. For years, right-wing populist and openly right-wing extremist parties have been a permanent part of the European political spectrum. Although in most countries they do not pose an acute threat to the democratic system, they have repeatedly succeeded in mobilizing significant numbers of voters.<sup>1</sup> In the societies of the European Union, xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes extend far beyond these voter groups. Furthermore, since September 11, 2001, anti-Islamic sentiment has risen sharply in the immigration countries of Western Europe, and at times manifests itself in violent attacks against Muslims (see Birsl et al., 2003: 139pp.). According to recent studies, a significant increase in violent acts with a xenophobic background has been observed in several countries in Western and Central Europe, including France, Switzerland, Austria and parts of Germany (MuB-Newsletter, 2005). In the young democracies of Central Europe, right-wing extremist, nationalist and populist ideologies are also experiencing a renaissance since the collapse of the socialist system (see Minkenbergh, 2005a). Finally, events such as the death of the Dutch filmmaker van Gogh, the rioting in the French suburbs, the skirmishes over the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, and the repeated proclamations – triggered by these events – of the “end of the multicultural dream” all show that conflicts based on (actual or purported) ethnic divisions in present-day Europe are highly charged.

What all these trends have in common is that they can be interpreted within the context of expanding globalization – that is, they can be seen as attempts to make sense out of and to cope with the social, economic, political and cultural transformation processes taking place throughout the world. These processes include the disintegration of traditional structures and values, as well as international migration movements and the resulting changes in the immediate socio-cultural space of societies. However, these societies are also characterized by specific historical backgrounds and basic social conditions that not only determine the forms of right-wing extremism and xenophobia in individual countries, but also lead to different perceptions of the problem and different counter-strategies.

Over the last few years, a number of research papers and essay collections have been published about right-wing extremist and xenophobic phenomena in a range of European countries. These publications focus primarily on ideological and party developments as well as on different manifestations of right-wing extremism – including electoral successes, crimes and approval ratings in different countries (Greß, Jaschke & Schönekeß, 1990; Husbands, 2002; Merkl & Weinberg, 2003; Mudde 2005). Others review the current state of research on

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1 The countries in which right-wing populist or right-wing extremist parties have enjoyed noteworthy support over the last years include Norway, Holland, Belgium, Italy, France, Denmark, Germany and Austria (see Downs, 2002 and Ehrke & Witte, 2002).

these developments (Minkenberg, 2005b). In contrast, the discourse on the strategies being employed to *prevent* right-wing extremism and xenophobia is largely dominated by a national perspective. If authors choose a comparative perspective, they usually focus on legal and legislative means in dealing with right-wing extremist parties (von Donsellar, 2003). Other, unorganized manifestations, such as right extremist and xenophobic youth cultures, as well as the preventative strategies relating to these, have so far attracted little attention in comparative European approaches.

The current collection, which contains accounts from select European countries, aims to fill this gap. Against the backdrop of pivotal right-wing-extremist and xenophobic developments, these accounts take a look at their social treatment and the strategies that exist at different levels of society to counter them. A special emphasis is placed on both the forms of right-wing extremism and xenophobia that exist among young people, and the approaches applied in educational and social work. Of special importance are the experiences people have had working in this field and the ways the topic of evaluation is handled.

The comparative approach of this volume is intended to show the similarities and differences that shape preventative practice in these countries. By examining neighboring European states, this collection also aims to uncover successful approaches and identify needs for further development in the respective national strategies. Furthermore, it offers inspirations for enhancing these strategies.

This collection contains contributions from seven European countries, with a focus on the societies of Northern, Western and Central Europe. The concentration on this region seemed most promising since research on and preventative approaches to right-wing extremism and xenophobia have established themselves most firmly in these parts of Europe. In contrast, in the young democracies of Eastern Europe and in the southern Mediterranean region, academic and professional work on this topic is often just starting out, or the issues are not accorded any great importance.<sup>2</sup> This runs counter to the fact that right-wing extremist and xenophobic tendencies in these countries often represent a substantial problem (see Minkenberg, 2005a on Eastern Europe; Ehrke & Witte 2002 on Italy, Thalheimer et al., 2000 on Greece and Birsl et al., 2003: 141pp. on Spain). We originally intended to cover both regions in this collection, but the above-mentioned reasons made it considerably more difficult to acquire contributions. For this reason, countries from Southern Europe are not included in the selection.

The authors included in this collection work in different fields and research contexts and this diversity is reflected in positions and priorities of the individual essays. At the same time, the essays reveal country-specific differences as well as distinct overarching similarities in the treatment of right-wing extremism and xenophobia in Europe. They demonstrate inte-

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<sup>2</sup> According to Westin (2003), Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have so far developed very few strategies to deal with immigration and related questions. This also seems to be the case regarding the topics discussed in here, as we experienced whilst seeking contributions for this publication. The situation in Eastern Europe is still characterized by the need to reestablish political, civil society and academic discourse in these post-socialist societies (see the Hungarian essay). Another possible factor in both regions is that state-financed initiatives such as youth work are frequently less developed than in the welfare states of Northern and Western Europe.

resting perspectives, inspiring approaches and opportunities for further development of this work.

What initially catches the eye is that both the educational and socio-educational discourse is dominated by approaches that target young adults and adolescents. This is justifiable insofar as (male) youth commit the overwhelming number of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist or xenophobic background. However, both the educational debate and research findings on these perpetrators repeatedly point to the great significance of early influences and learning processes for the subsequent development of right-wing extremist and xenophobic modes of behavior (Rieker, 1997; Wahl et al., 2001; Möller, 2006). The assessments in this collection therefore suggest that there is still a need, and a potential, for developing the field of early prevention in European efforts to counter right-wing extremism and xenophobia. The essays from the Netherlands and Germany report on some approaches and initial attempts in this field.<sup>3</sup> Among the agents of socialization that play an important role in this regard, parents also need to be more fully integrated into preventative work than in the past (Rieker, 2004b; Möller, 2006). The Norwegian essay presents an interesting approach to doing so.

It is also noteworthy that the activities described clearly focus on the level of primary prevention – that is, they center on general efforts to educate and sensitize all youth and to counter right-wing extremism and xenophobia at a very early stage. In contrast to this, approaches that specifically target young people who openly display right-wing extremist or xenophobic attitudes do not exist in most countries, or they are few in number and lack continuity and support – a fact that is viewed critically by several authors in this collection (see the essays dealing with the Netherlands, Switzerland and Hungary; for a discussion of England, see Runnymede, 2005). The Scandinavian countries and Germany are an exception. Over the last few years, they have developed and tested different approaches to preventative work with these target groups. The essays from Norway and Germany, which present examples of these approaches, show that, while the work is often demanding and difficult, it can also be rewarding and lead to success.

The analyses on the following pages also make clear that concepts for preventing right-wing extremism and xenophobia must not be confined to educational or socio-educational intervention. Approaches are required that integrate the immediate social context as well as macro-social conditions. It is no coincidence that the essays that describe successful work mention, as a key criterion, the incorporation of additional local players into the analysis and resolution of the problem (see the contributions from Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and France). In addition, the contributions from the United Kingdom, France and Switzerland point out that focusing on individual attitudes and actions is too narrow an approach since it ignores other aspects of racism in our societies. The example of the United Kingdom shows how racism can be structurally defined to include these aspects. Even though the authors of the British essay offer a rather critical assessment of British anti-discrimination policy, the legal and

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<sup>3</sup> The pioneer role played by the Netherlands, in particular, was confirmed by an investigation on elementary educational programs in Europe, commissioned in 2004 by the Center on Right-Wing Extremism and Xenophobia of the Deutsches Jugendinstitut (see Rieker, 2004a).

institutional framework of this policy, when compared to the rest of Europe, can be considered fairly advanced (see Hormel & Scherr, 2004; Westin, 2003).

The essays also show that across Europe, xenophobia and racism are attracting attention in both scholarly circles and society at large, and that the debate on prevention is primarily centered on these phenomena. In contrast, the essays from Hungary and Germany remind us that other dimensions of right-wing extremism, particularly anti-Semitism, continue to be virulent and in need of examination as well.

Finally, it is essential to keep in mind that while a very broad range of strategies and activities exist to counter right-wing extremism and xenophobia in the countries examined in this collection, there is hardly any scholarly insight into the conditions under which this work is implemented and the results that are being achieved. But this insight is necessary to make a sound assessment of the chances and limits of the different approaches. The only essay to report on large-scale efforts to evaluate strategies is the one from Germany, yet the author considers the evaluation process in his country to be inadequate as well. The essay's conclusion can be applied to all the national examples presented here: We need to document experiences, to develop evaluation designs that are suitable for educational and social processes, and to establish criteria for good or successful work against right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism and racism.

### **On the individual essays**

In the first essay, the Norwegian author Yngve Carlsson describes the strategies used to deal with violent, organized right-wing extremism in his country. Although right-wing populist and xenophobic parties enjoy a great deal of support in the Norwegian population, violent groups represent only a limited problem. Norway is a “small-scale society” marked by a high level of social transparency and a well-developed state infrastructure, and these conditions have enabled the country to successfully fight emergent right-wing extremist groups using a combination of measures. Of great importance are both situational analyses of concrete problematic developments and early coordinated responses to violent right-wing extremist groups. The activities of agents in civil society play an important role alongside the work of the different state authorities.

The authors Eser Davolio, Gerber, Eckmann and Drilling describe social conditions in Switzerland, which differ considerably from the Norwegian situation. Although right-wing extremism and xenophobia lack a historical foundation in the country and economic motives can be ruled out due to the general prosperity, right-wing extremist and xenophobic incidents are encountered on a wide scale. The authors believe that the political, academic and educational communities have not sufficiently paid heed to these facts. Furthermore, in the Swiss system of direct democracy, central intervention is unusual, and it is usually left up to the municipalities to cope with problematic developments. According to the authors, experiences in preventative educational projects show clear perceptual differences between the participants from German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland, which in their view demonstrates the

need for a stronger context-orientation in preventative work. Their observation that right-wing extremist Swiss youth are usually “entirely normal”, socially integrated adolescents, also underlines this need.

At home and abroad, the Netherlands for decades have been considered a model society in terms of tolerance and anti-racist policy (see also Westin, 2003: 108). Efforts to end discrimination have been an integral part of Dutch politics since the 1980s, and for the longest time, right-wing extremist and xenophobic attitudes among the Dutch were considered a minor problem. According to Ge Grubben, the author of the Dutch essay, this is the reason that research on and preventative strategies against present-day forms of right-wing extremism and xenophobia are still relatively underdeveloped in his country. The death of the filmmaker van Gogh and the racist responses it provoked shook up Holland’s self-image and prompted a questioning of the previous ways immigration and integration issues were handled. Ge Grubben joins the calls for optimizing and reorienting existing educational approaches, which are based primarily on the principle of a multicultural society and the acquisition of the requisite skills. He sees new prospects in more recent educational concepts revolving around “active citizenship,” which focus on teaching respect and tolerance as central values of Dutch society.

The essay by Peter Rieker provides an overview of the situation in Germany, where, due to the country’s Nazi past, society remains highly attentive to right-wing extremist developments, and the debate on prevention is fairly sophisticated. A special feature of this debate – one that is shared by the German-speaking region of Switzerland – is the treatment of terminology: in contrast to the rest of Europe, official statements and professional circles avoid using the term racism to describe current phenomena since it is too closely associated with the biological conception of race espoused by historical National Socialism. Right-wing extremism has been followed more closely since the early 1990s, when there was a dramatic rise in xenophobic violence in the wake of reunification. Since then, different preventative strategies, supported by special national programs, have been developed, primarily for educational work with young people. However, these approaches do not focus on the learning environment provided by schools, where, the author finds, there are only hesitant attempts to tackle the problem. Activities are more concentrated on youth work and out-of-school youth education. Whereas earlier programs centered on working with (potentially) violent criminals, current efforts now seek to develop counter-forces in civil society.

The debate in the United Kingdom has been profoundly influenced by the country’s national history. In this former colonial power, the largest migrant groups come from its one-time colonies, and skin colour marks one of the central lines of social conflict. For this reason, the essay by Momodou Sallah and Rod Dacombe deals primarily with the topic of “race relations” and the creation of “race equality”, which dominate the way British scholars and politicians view the problem. Exclusion and discrimination are primarily seen as the consequence of institutional racism and not of individual prejudices. One expression of this perception is the state anti-discrimination policy, which requires all public institutions to actively promote equality of opportunity for all ethnic groups in their organizations. Educational policy revolves around the institution of the school, where attempts to come to terms with racism are part of the curricu-

lum. In addition, schools are required to develop corresponding school policies that, among other things, include the commitment to take rigorous action against racist attacks.

The Hungarian authors György Ligeti and Tamás Nyeste provide a glimpse of the situation in a post-socialist society where the traditions of civil society are relatively weak. According to the authors, the continued existence and reemergence of revanchist ideologies espousing a Greater Hungary, as well as a strong orientation to the state and an underdeveloped democratic culture, have created a breeding ground for right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism and a virulent form of xenophobia that primarily targets the minority group of Roma in the country. The most important counter-strategies they introduce include the promotion of responsible action and a democratic consciousness. The authors see a need for reform, especially in schools, since previous teaching methods did not provide enough freedom for students to form opinions in a reflective and discursive manner. Also, as institutions, schools often implement authoritarian and anti-democratic practices themselves.

In the last contribution Charlez Rojzman describes the pronounced segregation of French society, which he views as one of the primary causes of the violent, racist conflicts in his country. According to Rojzman, these conflicts have attracted little attention because of the formal principle of equal treatment embedded in the French conception of the state: since differences relating to a person's origins are not permitted to play a role in how that person is treated, it is difficult to address any problems associated with them. In Rojzman's view, French anti-racism is primarily political in nature and expressed in manifestations and campaigns rather than in social and educational work. For his part, Rojzman created the concept of a *thérapie sociale* and actively implements it in neighborhoods that have a high percentage of migrants. The core idea behind this approach is to bring together the parties to a conflict. Through an open discussion of resentments, they are encouraged to develop both a more complex perception of the conflict and joint ways to effect change, even on an institutional level.

By looking beyond national borders, we aim to encourage others to expand their frame of reference when reflecting on the respective national preventative practices. Despite all the differences in the countries presented here, the contributions reveal the shared experiences as well as the overarching challenges that we will face in our future efforts to come to terms with right-wing extremism and xenophobia. In addition, they describe alternative analytic and coping strategies that we hope will provide stimulus for optimizing this work.

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## Violent Right-Wing Extremism in Norway: Community Based Prevention and Intervention

This article presents strategies and measures for preventing violent right-wing extremism in Norway<sup>4</sup>. The purpose of such a presentation is to inspire and make suggestions as to how this specific problem may be met. It is then up to the readers to find out whether they can include them in their problem-solving repertoire in their respective contexts. One cannot and shall not uncritically transfer problem-solving strategies from one context to another. I will therefore begin by emphasising the situation in Norway regarding violent right-wing extremism. The guiding questions here are: what kind of problems are the described strategies an answer to? And, under which societal conditions both the problem and the problem-solving strategies have been developed? I will then present some key strategies and measures to deal with such problems. In the end I will discuss their results and limitations.

This article focuses on intervention, especially when the problem with violent extreme groups is limited and potentially manageable. There are two reasons for this:

First, one important experience in Norway has been that local communities have been shocked, confused and uncertain as to how to respond when confronted with aggressive and violent right-wing extremism. This has revealed a need for a toolbox of intervention strategies and methods.

Second, it would be a very complex task to present the full range of a nation's strategies of preventing racism, intolerance, undemocratic values, aggressiveness and violence – even if this nation is a small one. Most of the work to prevent whatever is defined as a problem (bad health, drug-abuse, behaviour-problems, racism etc.) is done through kindergartens, schools, the health-service, the child-care system and youth work units in 432 Norwegian municipalities. Because local municipalities enjoy great freedom as to how to organise their preventive work and can thus decide which methods and measures to use, preventive work cannot be described through nation-wide programs. Moreover, preventive work is often hidden in the daily activities of public institutions, and there is probably a wide variety of ways to prevent the kind of problems discussed in this article. It is reasonable to assert that nobody has access to comprehensive and in depth information as to what is being done in this field in Norway. It is also reasonable to believe not only that good preventive work is carried out by municipal units (schools, youth clubs etc.), NGOs like political parties and their youth organisations, anti-racist organisations, sport clubs, and religious organisations etc., but also that some of this work will be superficial and even counterproductive.

It is easier to provide an overview of intervention strategies and measures when an extreme and violent group is about to develop. One reason for this is that interventions in those Nor-

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<sup>4</sup> Thanks to Professor Tore Bjørgo at the Norwegian Police University College for valuable comments and contributions to this article.

wegian communities that faced the greatest challenges during the last 12-13 years have either been evaluated or at least described (Carlsson, 1994; Carlsson & von der Lippe, 1997; Carlsson & von der Lippe, 1999; Carlsson & Bjørgo, 1999; Bjørgo, Carlsson & Haaland, 2001; Carlsson & Haaland, 2004).

Since the Norwegian welfare state has this municipal structure, I will mainly deal with local strategies and measures to intervene in emerging right-wing extremist groups.

### **The situation of right-wing extremism in Norway**

Violent right-wing extremist activity has been a minor problem in Norway (4,7 mill. inhabitants) compared to its Scandinavian neighbour Sweden (9,5 mill.). While there are approximately two to three thousand active and well-organized right-wing extremists in Sweden, there are probably not more than 150-200 in Norway.<sup>5</sup> The scene reached its peak in 1995-1996 with about 300 participants. It reached a small peak again in 1999/2000. After that the size of the scene stabilized at a somewhat lower level. Norwegian right-wing extremists have until the last couple of years been poorly organised, and the pool of talent and skill has been limited. Few have had more than a basic education, and many of the participants have a problematic and criminal background (Bjørgo, 1997; Bjørgo, Carlsson & Haaland, 2001).

Though the problem on the national scale has been minor, right-wing groups have been active in a few Norwegian communities, attacking immigrants and threatening political opponents. Immigrant shops and asylum centers have been attacked by arsonists with bombs. Several immigrants have been attacked and injured. The most serious incident was when a 15-year-old boy with black skin-color was stabbed to death in January 2001 by two boys who participated in the neo-Nazi movement in Oslo. Two years earlier a 17-year-boy was chased into a river by two aggressive young men crying “kill the nigger” in the small-town of Sogndal in the western part of the country. The boy drowned. Both these boys were absolutely innocent, and had not in any ways triggered the violence.

The capital Oslo and Kristiansand on the south-coast have seen violent conflicts between neo-Nazis and youth groups with immigrant background in which people have been injured. Such conflicts always have the potential to result in fatalities.

From the mid 1990's until 2005 approximately 20 Norwegian communities have experienced groups that have been labelled racist, right-wing extremist, or neo-Nazi; but only a handful of these communities have hosted visible violent groups for more than a few years.

During the last couple of years the neo-Nazi movement in Norway has become better organised as a result of inspiration and assistance from Sweden. The Swedish Resistance Movement has a counterpart in the Norwegian Resistance Movement. This movement predominately organizes boys and young men who have already participated in the violent skin-head group

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5 A few years ago the Police Security Service assessed the Norwegian right-extremist scene to consist of 150-200 persons who belong to organisations or groups that encouraged violence. Today they are much more reluctant to provide such numbers, but they claim that the situation has not changed during the last few years. So it is still fair to claim that the number is between 150-200.

Boot Boys. They emphasize physical training, are more ideologically oriented than earlier, and are not as visibly uniformed as some years ago. There is also another organisation called Vigrid – lead by the 62 year old Tore Tvedt who is inspired by William Pierce who is the founder of the National Alliance, the largest and most active neo-Nazi organization in the United States. Vigrid praises old Nordic Gods like Odin, glorifies Adolf Hitler and denies Holocaust. The organisation does not directly encourage violence, but it promotes a racist and violent ideology and opposes the “zionist occupation regime” in Norway. The organization with its old father-like leader actively tries to recruit youth all over Norway. “Blood and Honour” has during the last year also tried to gain a foothold in Norway, so far with limited success.

I have been using the concepts “violent right-wing extremism” and “neo-Nazism”. Right-wing extremism is a broader concept than racism, and implies some elements of political ideology and organisation. “Everyday racism” and “racist violence” are commonly used to describe social practices that do not necessarily involve any element of ideology and organisation (Bjørngo, 1997: 21). There are of course more than two hundred Norwegians with racist attitudes. And there are people outside right-wing extremist groups whose violence acts or harassment of people with a minority background are motivated by racism or xenophobia.

Right-wing extremist groups in Norway have during the last years also been labelled “neo-Nazis”. This is because some of the groups have adopted a clearer neo-Nazi orientation. They have links to neo-Nazi organisations in Sweden, Germany and the USA, they to some extent wear nazi symbols, they celebrate the 17. of August (the anniversary of Rudolf Hess’s death) and crystal-night, and they have marched in the streets with Nazi-flags and symbols.

Even if the right-wing or neo-Nazi groups in Norway have changed their mode of operation during the last years, the most striking aspects of the situation up till now have been the following:

- The total number of participants in violent right-wing extremist or neo-Nazi groups during the last 10 years has probably not exceeded more than 300, and has been lower than that most of the time.
- Local groups have been few and they have disintegrated after a short period of time in most locations.
- Even in most of the localities in which such groups have been fairly permanent (Bøler in Oslo, Hokksund and Kristiansand), the size of these local groups has decreased. The most visible group in the Kristiansand area (100.000 inhabitants) has shrunk from 40 participants in 2000 to about 10-12 in 2004 (Carlsson & Haaland, 2004).
- So far Norway has not experienced violent football-supporter groups to the same extent as Sweden and Denmark. The by-far biggest supporter group, Vålerenga in Oslo, and the national Norwegian Supporter Alliance, have a clear anti-racist profile.<sup>6</sup>

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6 There are some signs that this violent and racist soccer fan culture is starting to grow in Norway, and these signs are being taken very seriously by the Norwegian Football Association, the Norwegian Supporter Alliance and the police.

There are some important contextual explanations for this rather stable and controlled situation in Norway.

## **The historical, political, economical and geographical context**

### *The historical explanation*

Norway suffered a lot from the five year German occupation (1940 to 1945) in collaboration with the Norwegian national-socialist party Nasjonal Samling. The Norwegians took on a very active confrontation with Nazism after the war. Those with nazi-convictions and those who collaborated with the enemy were exposed to both legal sanctions and informal bullying and harassment. There has hardly been anything more stigmatising in Norway, both for individuals and local communities, than to be connected with nazi ideology. The Norwegian population was vaccinated against Nazism. This vaccination is still in effect, but is probably waning among some youth.

### *The political explanation*

The immigration of guest workers and refugees from non-European countries into Norway started late, in the late 1960's. Today nearly six percent of the population have non-western origins. In Oslo nearly 20 percent (and 30 percent of the children) have such a background. The process of integrating of immigrants has produced some tensions and problems. And these problems have been very clearly articulated by the Norwegian Progress Party. It is not fair to call it a right-wing extremist party. It is a populist party. But prominent party leaders, both on the local and national level, have during the last 20 years articulated xenophobic views. The party obtained 22 percent of the votes in the election of the Norwegian parliament in September 2005. It is the greatest opposition party to the new "red-green" government. The party's current success is due more to its economic and social policy<sup>7</sup>, than to its anti-foreign sentiments. Even though the xenophobic rhetoric has been moderated the last few years after having expelled some of the most outspoken party-leaders, the party still has a rooted credibility among people holding xenophobic views. The party has made it acceptable to express xenophobic and even racist views in public debate. While the party has most probably channelled some people with such views into a more "decent" political direction rather than into more extreme groups, such a party may legitimate attitudes that make discrimination and hostility towards immigrants more acceptable in the long run.

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<sup>7</sup> The party wants to use the enormous Norwegian oil revenues both to lower taxes and to increase public spending especially for the elderly ("those who built this country"). Most economic experts (and the other political parties) claim that this will create huge inflation thereby undermining the Norwegian economy in the long run. The answer from the progress party to such allegations is that the economic theorists have made so many mistakes in the past that they have no credibility left. A lot of both young and old voters believe this.

### *The economic explanation*

Norway is no longer a typical industrial nation. Today only 22 percent of the work force is employed in industry. During an economic recession between 1988 and 1993 when a lot of factories either reduced their staff due to technological improvements or were forced to close down, the national unemployment rate rose to six percent, which was still low compared to the rest of Europe. In typical industrial communities, the unemployment rate was much higher, especially among young people. Young working-class lads whose job-aspiration was to work in the local paper-mill, pulp-factory or sawmill, suddenly faced closed gates. Anti-foreign sentiments grew during this time, as people blamed refugees for their own miserable situation. Both individual refugees and houses for refugees were attacked. Although many of the attacks were clearly motivated by racism, the perpetrators neither had deeply rooted racist convictions nor neo-Nazi-sympathies. However, such communities were visited by leading racists or neo-Nazis trying to exploit the situation and add fuel to the fire (Carlsson, 1994; Carlsson & von der Lippe, 1997; Bjørngo, 1997).

During the last 10 years the Norwegian unemployment rate has stabilised at 3-4 percent (3.3 % in the summer of 2005). The economy is fertilised by some of the oil income, and there is a demand for labour power within the building and construction, health service, trade, logistics and transport sectors. It may still be difficult to get a job, but for young men, even those with little education, the labour-market is probably better in Norway than elsewhere in Europe. The experience from intervention-projects both in Kristiansand and Oslo has been that it is even possible to find jobs for marginalised youth belonging either to the violent right extremist scene or to violent immigrant youth groups<sup>8</sup> (Carlsson & Haaland, 2004; Carlsson, 2005).

### *The geographical explanation – “transparency”*

Compared to most European states Norway has huge geographical dimensions. It is about 2800 km by car from Kristiansand in the south to Kirkenes near the Russian border in the north-east. Even though there is a concentration of people in the Oslo-area, most of Norway's 4.7 million population lives in small towns and rural districts scattered all over the country. There are only four cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger). Except Oslo (520.000 inhabitants in the municipality and 800.000 in the urban area) and maybe Bergen (250.000 inhabitants), all other cities, towns and villages are very transparent. Local individual and group right-wing extremist-activity will normally be detected very rapidly either by the local police, the local branches of the security police, political opponents, youth-workers, or the local media. Since neo-Nazism and violent racism are hot topics

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8 This does not mean that immigrants in general have easy access to the Norwegian labour market. The unemployment-rate for immigrants was 9.0 % in the summer of 2005 (Source: Statistics Norway: [www.ssb.no/innvarbl/](http://www.ssb.no/innvarbl/)) which is nevertheless lower than the over-all unemployment-rate in some other European countries.

for the media, local incidents will normally also reach the national news media, and as a result will incite both local and state action. This small-scale society with its close interpersonal ties among people in different agencies and organisations on the municipal level has a lot of advantages when it comes to prevention and intervention.

This being said, one should not make Norway more exotic than necessary. There are of course many cities, towns and rural districts e.g. in Germany that share many of the characteristics of their counterparts in Norway. Oslo can be compared to cities like Dresden, Hannover, Leipzig and Nürnberg. Kristiansand with its 77.000 inhabitants and Brumunddal with its 8.000 inhabitants are in many ways comparable to numerous European cities and small towns. The most important difference when it comes to geographical conditions is that many German cities and towns are generally integrated into more densely populated areas, entailing short travel distances. This is a fruitful condition for building up extremist groups, organisations and networks. Moreover, the size of the population makes both formal and informal social control much more difficult. Consider that Berlin has 75% of the Norwegian population on 900 km<sup>2</sup>, and that Nordrhein-Westfalen has an area 10% of Norway's and a population roughly the same as that of Norway, Denmark and Sweden combined.

### **Problemsolving pit-falls**

Racist or neo-Nazi groups and their violent acts have received a lot of media-attention in Norway. The threshold for being given attention in the national media in Norway is probably lower than in most other European countries, due to the small size of the country. Since being labelled a "racist-place" or a "Nazi-community" has such a stigmatising effect (Bjørge & Carlsson, 1999), local municipalities are clearly motivated to neutralise such a reputation. Since most municipalities that meet this problem for the first time lack any experience or a developed strategy, there is a danger that they will fall into one of the following pit-falls:

#### *Denying or belittling the problem*

In some communities where immigrants have been exposed to violence, local authorities have tried to deny a possible racist motive. When there has not been any clear racist or neo-Nazi ideology behind the acts, it has been easy to interpret the acts within an established scheme for categorising such acts. They have been explained as a result of "drunkenness" or as "boyish pranks". In doing so they have sometimes not been able to recognise that the acts, or the establishment of new groups, may have taken on new and more serious dimensions (Eidheim, 1993).

It is also tempting to belittle or deny a problem more *consciously*, because to do something about the problem implies recognising it. In some communities the local authorities have thus consciously tried to sweep the problem under the carpet. Since small violent groups may dissolve and disappear by themselves, and since there is always a chance that the latest violent act is the last one, such a "sweep-it-under-the-carpet-strategy" may sometimes succeed. The

danger is of course that the problem may grow when not counteracted by the police, civil society and/or the local municipal authorities.

### *Inability to take action*

Recognition of a problem with right-wing extremist activity and violence is of course not a guarantee for adequate action. Those municipalities that meet this problem for the first time will probably neither have the necessary competence to properly analyze the situation, nor the right tools to intervene. The result may be that nothing is done, or that it takes years to do anything. Irresolution may also be the result of disagreement between key actors as to who is responsible. In the small town of Brumunddal in the late 1980s municipal leaders claimed that this was a matter for the police and the police claimed that this was the responsibility of municipal agencies like schools and social services (Carlsson, 1995). In the meantime little action occurred, and the problem grew to a size never before seen in Norway or even in all of Scandinavia so far. In the 1990s Swedish towns like Klippan (Wigerfelt & Wigerfelt, 2001), Karlskrona (Rundquist, 1999) and Trollhättan, Vänersborg and Uddevalla (Blomgren, 1999) experienced right-wing extremist activity that was even more serious than that in Brumunddal.

### *Moral panic and visible action*

The attention in the national media given to violent acts and violent group behaviour in specific communities has caused genuine shock, disgust and moral panic. Moral panic tends to lead to over-reactions or misjudged responses to (alleged) incidents of racist violence or manifestations of neo-Nazism. Strong public reactions against racism may however be of great value in themselves. The problem is that the “diagnosis” may sometimes be misjudged or exaggerated. What on the surface appears to be racism or neo-Nazism may sometimes be an expression of something else – e.g. real conflicts between individuals or groups that happen to be divided along ethnic lines. In such situations, one cannot always assume that the ethnic minority side is an innocent victim and the ethnic majority side by definition racist aggressors. Quick responses may address only symptoms, thereby failing to address the causes that are the real problem. This typically takes the form of symbolic measures that are highly visible without having any effect on the problem itself – e.g. deciding to build a new community-youth house. In wealthy Norway it may be fairly easy to “throw money at a problem” in order to symbolise a willingness to act. Such responses are usually decided upon without an analysis of what actually constitutes the problem. The causes of racist motivated violent acts or the establishment of a neo-Nazi group are normally much more complicated than the lack of a youth house.

### **Knowledge support – a foundation for community action**

One lesson learnt from communities with violent racist or neo-Nazi groups in the 1990s, was that problems of xenophobic violence should be considered as responsibility of the entire

community. A second lesson was that it was highly useful to involve experienced advisors competent in dealing with such problems, since almost all municipalities meeting this problem for the first time are uncertain and thus waver. As a consequence, the central government decided in 1996 to establish a pool of experts, “The Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action against Racism and Xenophobia”. This advisory service consists of a dozen researchers and practitioners, including police officers, social workers, pedagogues and conflict mediators. Together, they provide complementary forms of expertise to municipalities and local agencies that have to deal with problems which they do not know how to handle. Usually a team of two advisors will help the municipal agencies develop an adequate analysis of the problem, ascertain the magnitude of the problem and give advice as to which responses might be effective.

### **Basing joint intervention on knowledge: How to produce an analysis of the local problem?**

Both research and more experience based knowledge of racist and violent youth groups in Norway show that the root causes for the emergence of such groups, and the ways these problems manifest themselves, may be very different in different communities (Bjørge & Carlsson, 1999). It is therefore important to describe the character, magnitude and seriousness of the problem, and also to try to identify both the manifest and underlying factors that have caused the problem in each community.

It is also advisable that those agencies that have some kind of responsibility to do something with the problem take part in the process of describing and analysing, as well as proposing solutions.

Depending on the model of mapping, participants in this process should include the police, relevant municipal departments, schools, voluntary organisations, and representatives from the youth population.

Three different models for mapping and analyzing a local problem have been used in Norway:

- An inter-agency working group with knowledgeable representatives (5-10 persons) from relevant agencies work together to collect and analyse information, and on this basis produce a report or action plan. They normally also discuss the individuals participating in the group, their roles, and how to deal with them as individuals. Most Norwegian municipalities are small (half of the 432 municipalities have less than 5.000 inhabitants) and are thus very transparent. Even bigger municipalities like Kristiansand (77.000 inhabitants) are transparent, so that information on individuals is rich. However, sharing information about individuals is not unproblematic because of the confidentiality act in public administration.
- A “mapping seminar” (one or two days) with 20-40 participants representing different agencies and perspectives. It is useful to bring in an external expert who is experienced in running such processes, and a person who has in depth knowledge of racist and neo-Nazi groups and their mode of operation. This is a “quick” method, but may be “good enough” to assess the problem. In some cases the analysis will show that the problem at hand has little to do with racism or extremism, and that it must therefore be dealt with tools from other

“tool-bags”. In other cases the analysis will reveal a minor or nascent problem that can be addressed with fairly simple measures. In some Norwegian communities such a “mapping seminar” has taken place within a few days after a violent episode where racists motives were suspected or where those involved were part of a racist group. Due to confidentiality rules, however, such seminars are not appropriate for discussing the role of individuals and how to handle them. But this may be done in a more limited group after such a seminar.

- A research project by external researchers providing a description and analysis of the problem. While incorporating their knowledge, the researchers will probably do this from a different perspective than the local agencies. Four municipalities with such problems have received research assistance (Brumunddal, Nordstrand in Oslo, Vennesla and Kristiansand). A fifth community (Bøler in Oslo) received consulting from an experienced researcher for three years, without being subject of a research project.

Such methods may of course also be combined. A “mapping seminar” may be arranged a few days after a serious episode as a foundation for immediate action. This may be followed by a more thorough analysis as a foundation for more long-term prevention and intervention if the problem seems more rooted, complex, or grave.

The goal of such local mapping and analysis is to improve the accuracy of interventions. Asking a lot of questions about what, when, how, how many, and why etc. will reduce the risk of wasting resources on measures that probably will have no effect or, if they do, may even be counterproductive. Two examples: One should use different strategies if the group is well organised, has connection to foreign organisations, and has well educated participants between 20 and 30 years old, compared to a group consisting of aggressive boys age 14-16 mized up in an on-going fight with a group of aggressive immigrant kids. A local scene with 100 participants must be met in a different way than a scene with only a handful of activist. In most Norwegian communities such groups or scenes will be small. This means that individually oriented measures of intervention will play an important role.

### **A competent, experienced advisory service**

The Norwegian advisory service was established for the same reasons as the German “Mobile Beratungsteams”. Since the problem with racist or neo-Nazi groups is fairly limited in Norway, the advisory service is of course not staffed with permanently employed advisors. They are permanently employed by the police, research institutions, or municipal units, but are willing to assist municipalities when they are in need of expertise.

To establish a team with fully employed members to handle such problems is probably not a good idea. It will most likely be difficult to get those with the most experience and expertise to accept full time employment in such a team. Teams with fully employed members run the risk of not having the necessary competence, thereby raising the risk that they may mislead those they are meant to guide. The team-members in Norway are among the most competent in the particular problems at hand in the country.

In 2000 Denmark established an “emergency team” with permanently employed advisors. The team’s function was to advise communities with violent and troublesome youth groups (especially those with a minority background). The team was hardly used, probably because the advisors did not represent any prominent expertise in the field, and it was dissolved after four years. It was an expensive solution to have a full team just sitting there waiting. The Norwegian team has not had many call-outs either (3-4 each year) because the problem has been so limited in Norway. But maintaining this readiness for action does not cost the state any extra money. The costs are only running when some part of the team is in operation.

Norway has avoided using younger and less experienced advisors who may be led by a strong political interest and who lack the necessary professional distance and awareness required of an advisor. According to Lynen von Berg (2004) this seems to have been a problem with some of the “Advisory Service” in Germany.

### **A combination of suppression, social control and social prevention/intervention**

The rich and developed states in Europe and North-America possess an impressive array of means to prevent crime and violence. Community based strategies, methods, projects and programs are continuously being developed to deal with all forms of deviance (Cohen, 1985). This is of course also the case with measures to prevent racist violence and to intervene into violent extremism. In an affluent and well-organised welfare state such problems will not be met by a single measure, but by a combination of many. Such measures mostly fall into two different strategies. One is police suppression and different measures of social control. The aim of this strategy is to deter violence and to signal that ideologies that dehumanise refugees, homosexuals and political opponents, thereby legitimating violence towards them, are unacceptable. The other strategy is social intervention and integration, which is a “constructive approach” aimed at integrating participants in extreme groups and perpetrators back into the community. In plain words – the first strategy uses the stick, the second uses the carrot. Below I shall restrict myself to those measures that have been most directly used against racist violence and right-wing extremist groups in Norway and whose epicentre has been the municipality or community. I will not mention strategies to foster tolerance and a democratic spirit, since such strategies have a much longer time frame and their goals extend beyond preventing right-wing extremism. I also cannot discuss in detail what is done by the Police Security Service since my knowledge of their work is restricted.

### **Police suppression and other forms of social control**

#### *Police intervention*

Ideological extremists who threaten political opponents and local political representatives are a matter for the The Police Security Service. Extreme right-wing groups are monitored by the police security service both at the national and local level. Since extreme groups are few

and Norwegian communities are transparent, the local branches of the security police are well informed.

The local police are responsible for preventing violence through patrolling the streets, intervening in acute situations, investigating illegal action and bringing perpetrators to court. Leading (violent) right-wing extremists are usually closely monitored and thus have little leeway to commit crimes without being caught. In Brumunddal in the early 1990s both the police and court administration gave high priority to the issue of racist violence. Violent acts were quickly investigated and brought to court within a few weeks (Carlsson, 1995). Unfortunately, under normal conditions the Norwegian criminal procedure works very slowly (especially compared to Sweden), and years may pass between a violent act and its perpetrator being sentenced in court and sent to prison. The sluggishness of the process makes it difficult to use quick sentencing and imprisonment as a means to neutralize leaders and detach them from the rest of the group (Carlsson & Haaland, 2004).

### *The Handbook on right-wing extremism and racism*

The local police in Norway are by and large unfamiliar with right-wing extremism, violent racism and neo-Nazism. To prevent irresolution and inertia among the police, the Norwegian Police Directorate produced in 2001 a Handbook on illegal right extremist activity – in both an open and a restricted version. The handbook contains both information about the phenomenon and detailed guidelines on how to handle local problems and situations. The open version of the handbook contains:

- a presentation of the right-extremist groups and organizations operating in Norway and their characteristics;
- the kind of threats these organizations and groups pose to national security, political opponents and immigrants in general;
- their mode of operation and their activity on the Internet;
- a presentation of the symbols they use and the occasions they mark;
- a discussion of the freedom extremist groups enjoy according to the constitution to speak, gather and demonstrate, and the provisions in the penal code that limit this freedom;
- a presentation of illegal acts that are particularly connected to right-wing extremists groups;
- a presentation of the investigation procedure in cases where racism is suspected;
- the coercive measures the police are entitled to use;
- a presentation of the role of the secret police/the counter-intelligence compared to that of the local police.

### *Preventive police officers and the empowerment conversation*

Small Norwegian police stations will normally have one or two preventive police officers, bigger stations (covering 50-100.000 people) normally have a small department with 4-10 preven-

tive police officers. Preventive Policing has played a major role in intervening in violent and extreme groups in Norway. One important tool in the preventive police-officer's tool-bag is the empowerment conversation. Both the young person (below 18 years) and his or her parents are obliged to meet at the police-station (warranted by an article in the Police law) if the police are informed that the young person is engaged in unlawful activity or becoming involved with a problematic and criminal youth group. The purpose is partly to warn the youngster and his/her parents about the consequences of committing crime and/or being associated with a destructive group, and partly to discuss what can be done to prevent the youngster from sliding deeper into the group or into a criminal career. If the young boy or girl and his/her parents are motivated towards positive change, the police can also call for assistance from the municipal services to help the young person onto a more positive track.

For some youth this warning and access to help is a sufficient means to get them out of a violent group or scene. But for others the problems are so deeply rooted and complex, that such a conversation is of limited use. Such a cheap and simple measure is of course no panacea.

In 2003 the Police Security Service ran a nationwide campaign against the Vigrid organization. At the time the organization was attracting young people, including young girls, with its mystic rituals (baptism, confirmation-rituals and even marriage in the name of the old Nordic God Odin). In collaboration with the local preventive police, 95 youth known to have contact with the organization were called to the local police station for an empowerment conversation. They were informed about what Vigrid really was, and about the consequences of further involvement in the organization. Half of them expressed an immediate intention to break with the organization.

### **Public demonstrations and informal social control**

Public demonstrations are of course not part of a uniform state strategy, they are more a spontaneous way for communities to react to violent attacks on immigrants or to the presence of local racist and right-wing extremist groups.

In Brumunddal in 1991, 4.000 persons (out of a population of 8.000) attended a public meeting at which a prominent right-wing extremist leader, who wanted to add fuel to a local fire, was going to speak. When he started to speak, they all turned their backs without saying a word; first those in the front directly in front of the speaker's platform, then those in the second row and so on. This demonstration was carefully planned and it was preceded by a massive "mouth-to mouth" mobilization campaign in the community. Oslo's autonomous anti-racist movement had been told to leave the confrontation to the local population, and they complied. As a result, this silent and non-violent protest spread to other parts of Norway, and has since become an important alternative both to protest marches and more militant confrontations.

In 2001, after the racist murder of a 15-year-old boy of mixed African and Norwegian origin, 40.000 persons marched through the streets of Oslo in silent protest against racism and neo-Nazism. Marches were held in other Norwegian cities and towns, and even in Copenhagen where 1.000 persons took part in a local demonstration.

The effects of such demonstrations on youth in the extremist groups are uncertain. Although they may stigmatize and isolate them further, they show that racism and neo-Nazism has little public support, and this may deter those flirting with such groups. In Brumunddal the immigrants expressed that this local demonstration signaled that they had a lot of sympathy and that they were under the protection of the local population (Carlsson, 1995). For some immigrants this demonstration persuaded them not to leave the community.

### *Soft informal control over contested terrain*

Since the early 1990s probably more than a thousand Scandinavian cities and small towns have parents walking in the city/town center, in the suburbs or in other “hot-spots” on Friday and Saturday night to prevent heavy drinking, drug use, and violence among young people. In a mid-sized town with 25- to 50.000 inhabitants there will probably be three or four groups of five to six parents walking around in visible yellow waistcoats or reflector vests. The “night raven movement”, sponsored by the Vesta Insurance Company, organises walkers in about 450 Norwegian communities. These walkers are mostly recruited from parent-organisations in local schools. The Norwegian Red Cross has night-walkers in 120 communities in Norway as part of their “Stop the violence” campaign.

To be a night-walker is a voluntary task and most participants do this not more than once or twice a year. Their mission is just to be visible, thereby bringing a sober adult presence to arenas dominated by youth. By walking around and talk to the youth in a friendly manner they exercise a soft kind of social control. Confronted with violence or difficult situations they are not to interfere directly, but to call their liaison-officer in the local police force. The police will then quickly arrive on the scene.

The neo-Nazis in Norway have not proclaimed “national befreite Zonen” (no-go areas). But in some communities they have been able to mark territory by making it unpleasant and unsafe for immigrants, and even local citizens in general, to pass through. In most of the communities with a visible racist or neo-Nazi group, the “night-walking” has been strengthened for a period of time by mobilizing more parents into the night.

In the late 1990s in the Oslo suburb of Nordstrand, some local neo-Nazis maintained a highly visible presence in the suburban center on weekends. They had out-door parties in the spring and summer that in addition to local youth, also attracted neo-Nazis from other parts of Oslo and its surrounding areas. In groups of 15-20 the night-walkers started to walk through the center and either talk with the youth in the scene or stand silently amongst them. They had police back-up some hundred meters away if the situation should get out of control. This visible presence of adults in their yellow coats made this area less attractive as a rallying ground for both local youth with racist sympathies and more prominent neo-Nazis in the Oslo-area. The most active neo-Nazis moved their activity to another Oslo-suburb (Bøler). Most of the local youth did not follow. In this way the core group in the neo-Nazi scene was split from those flirting with the scene.

In communities with emerging violent and visible groups, one of the first measures to think of is to mobilise more parents as night walkers. This tool lies at the top of the tool-box.

## **Social intervention and integration**

A fundamental perspective that characterizes Scandinavian crime-prevention policy in general is to combine suppression and formal and informal control with measures aimed at integrating the perpetrators back into society. This perspective has also characterized the intervention into neo-Nazi or racist groups in Norway. Most youth are not violent racists or neo-Nazis once and for all. Their identity is flexible and subject to change, especially if their situation is changed (Fangen, 2001). In the moral panic that may occur after a disgusting episode, it may be easy to forget this constructive perspective (Eidheim, 1993). The result may be that one cuts off all communication with those belonging to the racist and neo-Nazi scene, and that one tries to kick them out of the community with illegal and brutal means. Exclusion, however, tends to make people inaccessible to integrative forces and will probably strengthen their extremist identity.

The lesson learnt from the communities with racist or neo-Nazi groups is that one should try to reintegrate the participants into the community. Such reintegration must proceed step-by-step, through a combination of different measures.

### *Parents groups*

Parents often feel helpless and perplexed when their children take part in the activities of an extreme group. They suddenly have few people to discuss their situation with because it is so stigmatising to have a child in a neo-Nazi group. In both Oslo and Kristiansand parent groups were established in the late 1990s to support parents faced with this situation when the local problem was at its peak.

The parents in these groups shared information about the situation and then discussed and set reasonable rules for clothing/uniform, music, and out-door activities. One important goal of such groups is to support the parents in not turning their back on their children, even if they have disgusting attitudes and commit violence. If the parents turn their back on their children, they will probably have no other alternative for consideration and care than the extreme group. An evaluation shows that such groups played a major role in the parent's struggle to get their children out of the groups (Olsen, 2001).

Parental groups not only presuppose parental interest in the welfare of their children, but also that parents possess some fundamental qualities, resources, and values.<sup>9</sup> It must, however, be said that not all parents have this. This is one reason why it may be useful to have an outsider facilitate the discussion. In both Oslo and Kristiansand the groups had such a facilitator.

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<sup>9</sup> The discussions in such groups may be very tense if some parents share the racist views of their children. This was a challenge in one of the Norwegian groups until these persons withdrew from the group by themselves.

### *Building personal relations as a stepping-stone into education and jobs*

A study of the neo-Nazi group in Kristiansand (Bjørge, Carlsson & Haaland, 2001) revealed that some of the most active neo-Nazis had suffered from severe lack of care in the family, some have parents with severe drug- and psychiatric problems, and some had deceased parents. It is useless in such cases to try to use the parents as a “stepping-stone” back into the community, as is the case with adult extremists above 18 to 20 years of age. An alternative “stepping-stone” may be a significant other who is willing to establish ties by listening to them, thereby winning their trust and being able to support them when they are getting tired of being a part of the racist scene or when they start to question the ideology (Aho, 1994).

Sometimes such significant others turn up in the local community. In the small town of Brumunddal it was a prominent local business manager who already knew some of the youth who were involved, and who had a strong wish that they would not end up as local outcasts. He gave some of the boys both care and consideration, and even offered them jobs in his business. According to Eidheim (1993) this business leader played a major role in splitting the racist scene in Brumunddal.

One cannot expect that such significant others will appear in every community. An alternative is the deliberate establishment of projects, units or practices with which to stimulate the building of personal ties to active neo-Nazis, racists or gang-members. In Kristiansand the Church Youth Project (CUP) plays this role (Carlsson & Haaland 2004). This small flexible organisation outside of the huge municipal bureaucracy has been in operation for 15 years. Its three professional social workers and staff of volunteers work with marginalised children and youth in the city. The three professional workers have managed to build personal relations with and acquire the confidence of some of the leading neo-Nazis. They have helped them find housing and work, or they have helped them get an education (this may be as simple as helping them to get a drivers licence which in turn give them access to the labour market).

The intention is that such a positive change in their situation will in the long run either change their attitudes, or at least reduce their willingness to participate in direct violence. It is important that such individuals maintain some ties to the community. This is a completely different strategy than the “kick-them-out” strategy favoured by some members of the anti-fascist movement (Fangen, 2001).

There are also examples in which field workers and preventive police officers became the “significant others” discussed above. Some preventive police officers have been very imaginative and successful in helping young people out of the neo-Nazi scene. They have used their networks to find housing, a place at school (e.g. sport schools, county-college), and/or jobs.

Former participants in the neo-Nazi scene who have left the extremist scene, and who possess the necessary personal qualifications, may play an important role getting others out of a violent and extremist scene. Since the neo-Nazi scene in Norway is limited, it has been difficult to find defectors with the necessary personal qualifications and interests to perform such a function. The idea of using defectors to assist people out of the neo-Nazi scene was launched by Tore Bjørge in 1997. The idea was adopted in Sweden in 1998 with the establishment of an

exit-project staffed with defectors from the neo-Nazi scene. These defectors have since helped young people out of the right-wing extremist scene by building personal relationships, and they have thereby built up a network of defectors for defectors (Swedish Crime-prevention Council, 2001). The Swedish exit-project has also provided assistance to Norwegian neo-Nazis wanting to leave the scene. Through presentation in the Stern magazine, this Swedish exit-project has served as an inspiration for similar exit-projects in Germany.

An important argument behind this "inclusion-strategy" is that many participants, including prominent leaders, in extreme groups want to leave. They sometimes feel paranoid, are tired of conflicts with their enemies and fellow members, long for a more normal life, or start to question the ideology. But they do not know how to break the ties with the group since it fulfils a lot of needs for them. They therefore need help both to see alternative ways out of the situation, and to act on preferred alternatives (Bjørngo, 1997). One important means to achieve this is a person who can establish a personal relationship to them.

### **Small scale problems and simple logic**

The Norwegian strategy towards violent right-wing extremism has been developed in a situation where the problem has been limited. The approach is based on the notion that if one can limit recruitment to a local group or scene and facilitate disengagement, it is possible to bring the group or scene "under a critical mass". A local group or scene with 30-40 participants is becoming a viable group. It is big enough to have interesting parties. Such a group will normally be visible in the community and therefore attract new recruits looking for action. It may also attract visiting "comrades" from other parts of the country or abroad both for parties and training. Before such a group grows too big, it should be possible to dismantle it. This can be done by promoting disengagement through the above mentioned means of inclusion, in combination with sending those who have committed serious crimes through the court-system and into prison. Youth in general may be deterred from flirting with the scene through public demonstrations, and those already flirting with the scene may be deterred from further involvement by empowerment conversations with the preventive police.

In some communities in Norway it has been impossible to dismantle such a group completely. In such cases, however, one may succeed in reducing it to a handful of persons. The group will then no longer be able to make its mark on public space, and the parties will no longer be interesting. In this way it will lose its power to attract new recruits. When the members of such a group grow older, their interest in recruiting new members may also be limited. For adult men between 25-30 it is probably not interesting to bring 14-15 year old boys into the friendship group, unless the men are deeply dedicated ideological activists.

### **Outcome**

It is difficult to provide waterproof evidence that these strategies have succeeded. When problems with violent extreme right-wing groups are limited to the extent that they are in Norway,

there is of course a possibility that most groups will dismantle without intervention from outside. It is, however, a fact that the anti-nazi-vaccine from World War II is expiring, which may make participation in right wing extremist groups more legitimate than earlier. Many Norwegian youth have experienced violence at the hands of youth with an immigrant background, especially robberies, which could lead to counter-mobilisation. This change does not seem to have aggravated the situation, which is currently still under control. First, there are no more right-wing extremists in Norway now than there were during the last decade. Second, the local groups in Kristiansand, Hokksund and Bøler (an Oslo suburb) have all been clearly reduced. And finally, almost all new groups have either been dismantled or strongly reduced. It is most likely that this situation is to some extent connected with the action taken to fight the problem.

### **Limitations**

The presented strategies of course also have their limitations. They do not address the forces that cause racism, intolerance, and a totalitarian world view. To prevent racism and foster tolerance and belief in democratic values is a much more long-term and complex task. Although the school-system plays a major role in this work, the belief in democratic procedures must be trained in a variety of different arenas.

The strategies presented here focus on the community and on intervention. The goal has been to prevent extreme and violent groups from being established, and to dismantle existing groups. Such a community strategy will be of less importance if and when people with a racist and/or neo-Nazi ideology establish networks that transcend community borders. New forms of communication have been established through the use of mobile telephones and the Internet. From every corner in Norway you can communicate with like-minded persons all over the country and all over the world. Instead of belonging to a small and fragile local group, one can join right-wing extremist organisations and networks that administer the feeling of belonging to a wider and more important “mission”. Cheaper transportation (especially airplane-fares) and better roads make it easier for right-wing extremists to meet and generate a feeling of unity and togetherness. This mobilisation of individuals into a nation-wide network is one probable reason why the extreme right-wing scene has not been reduced further. Another limitation to this community approach is that it neither addresses the more developed organisation-structures that are being built, nor attacks the music- and culture-industry that support racist and violent subcultures.

The strategies for intervening in violent and extreme groups on the community level are not silver bullets, but they do cover one important problem-solving angle. The community approach will remain important as long as participants in racist or neo-Nazi groups operate in local communities. Since they live most of their lives in such small communities, they will probably continue to do most of their recruiting there. If they are to be included in the wider society, this should be done there where they already belong and have ties, unless they wish to build up a new identity and a new life in another community.

Such local intervention as used in Norway may be seen as a futile extinguishing of small fires. However, since there are no magic means for preventing racist and totalitarian attitudes and violent behaviour once and for all, it will continue to be a rational approach. But it will not be the only one.

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## The Special Case of Switzerland: Research Findings and Thoughts from a Context-Oriented Perspective

With publications containing contributions for international comparison, there is always the question of how objective an overview the individual authors can produce about specific national framework conditions and national achievements. Although four of us, with our very different backgrounds, including German-speaking and French-speaking Swiss perspectives, collaborated in writing this chapter, it represents a “coordinated” conglomerate of various sources and references that surely cannot be conclusive and fully comprehensive. We set a priority on a context-oriented perspective (see sections 3 and 4) based on our current and previous research projects in the area of xenophobia, racism, and right-wing extremism, which have repeatedly demonstrated to us the relevance and interaction of contextual factors. While this approach is not representative of Swiss research in these areas generally, by choosing this perspective we hope to give the reader, in addition to an overview, an impetus to further develop innovative approaches for countering xenophobia and right-wing extremism.

### Right-wing extremism and xenophobia in Switzerland

Xenophobia in Switzerland seems to be quite a virulent problem. A recent representative study (Haenni Hoti, in press) of Swiss teenagers (15 years old, N = 3104) showed that 38 % strongly agreed that immigrants should assimilate somewhat better to the Swiss lifestyle, and 22 % strongly support the idea that immigrants living in Switzerland should not be allowed to take part in political activities. One quarter of the teenagers agree that immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin when jobs are scarce.

The results of the Civic Education Study, an international comparative study conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald & Schulz, 2001) indicates that Swiss teenagers have relatively more negative attitudes towards immigrants: Swiss respondents ranked 27th out of 28 countries on “positive attitudes towards immigrants.”

The results of the recently conducted project “Monitoring right-wing attitudes, xenophobia and misanthropy in Switzerland: an explorative study” (Cattacin, Gerber, Sardi & Wegener, 2006) recently conducted under auspices of the National Research Programme 40+ and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation are available at the Web site [www.unige.ch/ses/socio](http://www.unige.ch/ses/socio). While the study, the first of its kind in Switzerland, was designed to enable comparisons with several main European surveys, a comparison with the German GMF-Survey (Heitmeyer, 2003, 2004, 2005) is of particular interest. The central idea of the project is to provide an initial in-depth analysis of the data and to give the scientific community open access to the data for the further research.

A Swiss peculiarity is the municipal responsibility for the naturalization of foreign residents. In the context of popular votes and decision-making processes, the rejection of naturalization can be an expression of social exclusion and xenophobia among the Swiss population. Initial results of a study on this topic (see Helbling & Kriesi, 2004, 2005) show that economic factors such as the perceived unemployment rate or the ratio of foreigners living in the municipality do not significantly influence the rejection rates, which can instead be explained by the dominant local understanding of national citizenship, formal decision-making structures, and the mobilization of political actors.

In the early 1990s, the level of right-wing extremist violence in Switzerland reached a level nearly equal to that found in Germany. From 1989 to 1991 there were 13 fatalities in Switzerland per capita, a number higher than that of other European countries (Altermatt & Kriesi, 1995). Moreover, observations revealed a trend towards increased politicization (Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, 2000, 2001) radicalization, and violence in the Swiss right-wing extremist scene (compare Marquis, 1999). In French-speaking Switzerland, where the rise of right-wing extremism is perceived as less of a problem, new organizations are cropping up (Stutz, 2001), and appear to be following the same trend towards politicization. In addition, in many border areas close contacts are being maintained with radical foreign groups.

As of 2000 skinheads have dominated the right-wing extremist scene in Switzerland. Most recently, especially in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, the skinheads have been attracting increasingly younger people, and it is known that some of these groups have offshoots in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Niggli and Frischknecht (1998) reported that two organizations decisively influenced the scene during the 1990s: the Schweizer Hammerskins (SHS), the leading network since its formation in 1994, and the Nationale Initiative Schweiz (NIS), which seeks to politicize the scene by advocating the formation of a political party. A third, particularly militant skinhead group, Blood & Honour Schweiz, operates mainly in the Cantons of Aargau, Bern, Baselland, Vaud, and Zurich according to the most recent report from the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police, Staatsschutzbericht [National Security Report, 2000] (Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, 2001). In 2000 the federal police estimated the hard core in the Swiss skinhead scene to number between 800 to 900 persons, who are active not only in the cantons mentioned above, but also in Lucerne and Eastern Switzerland (D'Amato & Gerber, 2002).

It is important to note that the problem is not restricted to Swiss nationalist right-wing extremist groupings such as skinheads (see Grünberg & Eckmann, 1999), but that it also includes diverse manifestations that while generated in other contexts adhere to comparable right-wing extremist ideologies.

In addition to the “hard-core scene” dominated by the skinheads, the number of other young people who sympathize with and are thus also caught up in the movement is difficult to estimate. According to Eckert, explanations of right-wing extremism cannot be restricted to a social psychological perspective (Eckert, 1993). What is needed is an understanding of a social context that, by trivializing racist discourse and normalizing right-wing extremist discourse (Altermatt & Kriesi, 1995), creates a climate tolerant of right-wing extremism (Balibar

& Wallerstein, 1988). Right-wing extremism is thus not a problem specific to youth. It is a problem of our society as a whole.

### **Public and private strategies and programs against right-wing extremism and xenophobia**

The anti-racist movement in Switzerland is made up of a diverse group of actors, which as the racist problems they are combating represents a Swiss “special case” (Gerber, 2003). For the majority of Swiss people, racism – primarily understood as “skin colour” racism – was for a very long time not considered a problem that directly affected them. The reason given for this is that Switzerland, in contrast to most European countries, was never a colonial power. Thus, it is not surprising that the discrimination of foreign workers and the initiatives against “foreignization” in the 1960s and 1970s are discussed in terms of “hostility to strangers”, or xenophobia, despite the fairly obvious presence of a culturalist and essentialist discourse. That the use of the term racism applied to conditions in Switzerland only gained broad acceptance in the 1980s, when a larger number of people “of a different skin colour” immigrated to the country.

The term racism also has different connotations in the different language regions of Switzerland. In the German-speaking part of Switzerland, for example, the term is associated mainly with the National Socialist politics of Germany’s past, and the idea that this understanding of race-racism is in any way applicable to Switzerland is widely rejected for two main reasons. It is seen that this would downplay the atrocities committed by the fascists, and it is considered incongruent with Swiss history. Things are very different in French-speaking Switzerland, where the term race, as in France and throughout the English-speaking part of the world, is applied much more broadly and associated mainly with colonialism. This makes it difficult to operationalize the term for anti-racist actors across the entire country (Gerber, 2003).

Switzerland is also a special case in that the heterogeneous composition of the anti-racist movement makes it difficult to state its concrete goal. It is composed of a varied group of persons representing a broad political spectrum, from middle-class conservatism to left-wing militarism. Individual motivations also vary. Some people become active because they have been discriminated against as members of a discriminated group (“I have been a victim myself, which is why I want to work for the rights of my group”) or because they are committed to solidarity (“I do not think it is right that ‘these’ people are discriminated against”). Other people become engaged in anti-racist efforts because of their civil and democratic commitments (“I do not want to live in a racist, undemocratic country”).

Because of this heterogeneity, there is little discussion about conceptions of racism. Moreover, some organizations have shifted their emphasis from racism to human rights, which has a more positive connotation. Not only educational interests but also financial interests lead to a preference for human rights discourse over discussions of racism because the former meets with greater approval (Gerber, 2003). In 2000, when hundreds of skinheads disrupted the Swiss President’s address during the annual national celebration day, the public and the gov-

ernment focused their attention on the question of right-wing extremism. In response to the rioting that took place, the responsible institutions sought first to determine the instruments already in place to counter right-wing extremism.

The Federal Department of Justice and the Police formed an interdepartmental working group (REX), which commissioned the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies to prepare an experts report. The report, entitled “Rechtsextremismus und Ausstiegshilfen – Möglichkeiten und Potentiale” [Right-Wing Extremism and Methods to Facilitate Disengagement from the Scene – Possibilities and Potentials] (D’Amato & Gerber, 2002) contextualizes the phenomenon of right-wing extremism and provides detailed models of experiences in Norway, Sweden, and Germany and for the first time reports on the range of existing intervention instruments in Switzerland. Based on the comparison of different approaches and experiences in the European context, the report concludes by recommending ways to proceed in Switzerland that take into consideration the country’s different language regions, the differences among the cantons, and the urban/rural differences.

Securing funding to combat right-wing extremism is particularly important because conspicuous problems with right-wing extremism often arise in rural areas where funding is limited. Due to this limited financial capacity, rural municipalities often put off initiating intervention programs, if they recognize the need for action at all. Private providers, if working without supporting funding likewise face tight financial restrictions when attempting to initiate complex and longer-term interventions.

In addition to the experts’ reports and panels, Switzerland has taken an important step by setting up the Federal Foundation against Racism, which provides funding for projects against racism and for human rights, making it possible for projects to receive support for prevention and intervention. However, the funds have been drastically reduced, so that the mostly private run organizations find themselves forced to redistribute their resources. Unfortunately, this involves the risk that some of the know-how gained so far will be lost.

### **Education and social work approaches to combating right-wing extremism and xenophobia**

In contrast to the above-mentioned finding that right-wing extremism is a problem of the society as a whole, the approaches to combating extremism and xenophobia focus on youth (see Drilling & Eser Davolio, 2004). In Switzerland, while the school and the police are the first contact partners in the case of violent and right-wing extremist youth, professional youth and social workers as well as various advisory centers also deal with the phenomenon of right-wing extremist youth. In the case of violence among young people at school, teachers and parents primarily turn to the Canton’s school psychological services (D’Amato & Gerber, 2002).

Most adolescent right-wing extremists are found in vocational training at the upper secondary level. In Switzerland vocational training is organized such that the young people work in private companies four days a week and attend school one or one and a half days per week. Because student teacher contact is minimal, as the students are taught by several special subject teachers, there are only very limited possibilities for educational intervention.

If younger people exhibit right-wing extremist attitudes during their compulsory education, teachers usually try to talk with them in the hopes of reducing their prejudices. However, in Switzerland anti-racism is not an obligatory part of the curriculum, so that dealing with the problems of right-wing extremism is left to the initiative of individual teachers. Despite various further education courses offered to teachers, there continues to be a need for additional training to help teachers deal with and respond to acts of violence.

While there is often the hope that hiring a school social worker position will provide relief, the resulting expectations of the social worker are too high. There are as yet no tried-and-true social work methods and strategies of combating right-wing extremism and xenophobia.

The task of the police is usually limited to repression, increased monitoring, apprehending perpetrators, and contacting parents. Although concerned parties often turn to the police for help, only very few cantonal police forces have professional advisors on staff to help them. A few police departments collaborate with schools by providing educational material and training. A coordinated and coherent institutional prevention policy remains to be found in police departments (D'Amato & Gerber, 2002).

Social work, social pedagogy, and community work face a challenge in working with members of right-wing extremist groups. They must find access to young people who often have a very different worldview and little trust in both government and non-government organizations. Measures ranging from “voluntary” youth work to penal measures cover a wide spectrum of action models (Grünberg & Eckmann, 1999).

Moreover, the work must include the more immediate social context: peer groups, parents, teachers, apprenticeship and masters programs, trade unions, city districts, and municipalities. This is why a variety of intervention domains are relevant: school social work, district work, community work, street work, homes, youth counselling services, youth centers, and the Internet. Social work has a broad field of action in the face of right-wing extremism, but the available approaches are often insufficiently developed.

Societal responses to the problem of right-wing extremism fluctuate through a range of possibilities, including denial, trivialization, and/or dramatization. What makes intervention particularly difficult is the lack of expert knowledge and background information. This raises the question as to why right-wing extremism is not more often the subject of research. It also points up the need to determine the intervention models from other European countries that could be usefully applied to Switzerland. It bodes well, however, that social workers in Switzerland to a large extent share common training, for this raises the potential for interdisciplinary endeavours that can engender collaboration between social, pedagogical, and community-oriented initiatives.

In view of the considerably strong numerical presence of right-wing extremists in Switzerland, it is astonishing that the issue is treated as rather marginal by social workers. In other countries (such as Germany, Sweden, Norway, and the UK) there is a greater recognition of the problem and a multitude of projects are underway thanks to various federal funding initiatives. This willingness towards innovation has in turn triggered a lively debate about intervention approaches.

New research projects (supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation; for information, see <http://www.nf4oplus.ch>) are seeking to generate important theoretical and practical approaches. The results of a recent study, “Violence raciste en Suisse romande: analyse des actes, des acteurs et de nouvelles formes d’intervention” [Racist Violence in French-Speaking Switzerland: Analysis of Acts, Actors, and New Forms of Intervention] (Eckmann, Salberg, Bolzman, & Grünberg, 2001), provide a scientific basis for including the perspective of the victims of racism and discrimination. In contrast to most other approaches, this study examines the perceptions of victims and their demands for recognition of the discrimination and violence they experienced. This accent on the victim’s perspective also makes it possible to improve our perception of racism in wider segments of society. The many and various forms that racism can take and the central role of the context become visible in a typology worked out by the researchers. The typology shows four types of relationships between perpetrators and victims, ordered by the type of power relationship and the degree of organization of the perpetrators.

### Relationship between perpetrator and victim

<i>Perpetrator’s degree of organization:</i>	<i>Formal power (hierarchical relationship)</i>	<i>Informal power (equal relationship)</i>
Acts in the name of an organization	1) institutional racism (25 %)	2) ideological-dogmatic racism (16 %)
Does not act in the name of an organization	3) racism through abuse of position or power (39 %)	4) interpersonal racism (38 %)

(Source: Eckmann et al., 2001; Bolzman, Salberg-Mendoza, Eckmann & Grünberg, 2000)

The relationship between two actors in a racist incident can take on two basic forms: there is either a horizontal relationship between perpetrator and victim (equal relationship) or a vertical relationship (hierarchical), in which the person in a position of power can abuse his or her position or function.

For a discussion of organizations and movements with a racist character, it is also important to distinguish whether those responsible for racist actions are acting in their capacity as members of an organization or at their own initiative as individuals. This study (Eckmann et al., 2001) revealed that reported racist actions were perpetrated for the most part by adults exploiting power relationships. These findings show how important it is to go beyond the conspicuous right-wing extremism in young people in order to capture discrimination phenomena in the wider environment.

Another research project, “Prävention und Bekämpfung von Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Rassismus und Gewalt bei Jugendlichen” [Preventing and Combating Xenophobia, Racism, and Violence in Youth] and an evaluation of various methods of instruction for racism prevention and intervention (Eser Davolio, 2000) revealed that different parts of the prevention programs

had very different effects on attitude change. The effects, ranging from lasting sensitization to boomerang effects, can be attributed mainly to differing group dynamics. This shows how important it is to take context variables into consideration.


The scientific findings of these two studies were translated into educational strategies in a joint implementation project, “Antirassistische Bildung Theorie und Praxis, Zusammenfließen der Erfahrungen zweier Nationalfondsprojekte” [Anti-Racist Education Theory and Practice: Connecting the Results of Two National Science Foundation Projects] (see Eckmann & Eser Davolio, 2002, 2003). Whereas moralizing and stigmatizing educational approaches often have counterproductive effects, educational approaches such as conflict and experience education utilize conflicts as a potential for change and develop structures for dialogue and mediation (Rojzman, 1998) by incorporating the perspective of the victims. Thus, action concepts can be differentiated into perpetrator-centered, victim-centered, or context-oriented (Eckmann & Eser Davolio, 2002, 2003).

In the framework of the research project “Peergruppenorientierte Präventions- und Interventionsangebote der Jugendhilfe in der Schule” [Peer-Group Oriented Prevention and Intervention Programs Offered by Social Workers in the School], jointly funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Federal Commission for Technology and Innovation (DORE program), issue- and gender-specific prevention and intervention programs offered by social workers to 14- to 16-year-olds were tested (Drilling & Gautschin, 2001; Götzmann, 2002). The program attempts to bring a social focus to the topics of violence and racism and to utilize the methods of social work, paying particular attention to group dynamics, which in young people acts as a balancing and critical corrective. What this means is that whenever possible, socially unacceptable behaviours (such as racist infringements or symbolic glorifications of violence) should be dealt with within young people’s cultural contexts and accompanied, if possible, by interventions in young people’s families (see Drilling, 2004).

Based on a comparison of additive and integrative models of cooperation between social workers and the schools (and also public recreation facilities), it seems clear that such programs, particularly those that go beyond intervention to offer continuing support programs, deserve special attention. The school setting in particular, as an obligatory socialization agent, appears to offer broad opportunities for effective social work and indicates that social work with youth should change in order to work effectively with young people with socialization-related crises and behaviours problematic for society, such as violence against others (Drilling, 2004).

An evaluation of educational projects conducted by the Swiss Refugee Council (Eckmann & Eser Davolio, 2003; ) yielded important findings on sensitizing young people to the problems of asylum seekers by means of experience-oriented forms of teaching that in turn led to the further development of the evaluation instruments. One of the most important additional findings was that there are significant differences in French and German-speaking regions of Switzerland with regard to young people’s reception of educational projects of this kind, which alerted us to the importance of a comparative perspective that considers all of these contextual factors.

A contextual perspective puts the spotlight on very different target groups than previous approaches, which have up to now focused on right-extremist youth with social problems to be treated using psychology-based intervention approaches. In contrast, however, these young people and their behaviour, in interaction with their social environments, are a complex, far-reaching phenomenon that in some cases can be seen as expressive symptoms of their environments. This means that the focus is now on the context, the milieu, and the local and regional manifestations of mainstream local political attitudes. This problematic can be represented graphically as follows (Eser Davolio, Eckmann & Drilling, 2004):



The scheme consists of two axes. The first axis represents the different expressions of right-wing extremist orientations in youth or other actors. The second axis represents the tolerance character of the social environment. The two axes yield four fields of prevention and intervention. The scheme thus shows a basic range of possible situations and educational strategies in regard to the combination of contextual factors and attitudes. However, reality is more complex and occurs in many intermediate situations, as for example, when the classroom-context is a closed environment, but the neighbourhood as a whole an open one. For each specific field, the interaction processes between the two actors, youth and social environment, point to a different intervention approach that takes these conditions into account (Eser Davolio, Eckmann & Drilling, 2004; Eckmann, 2005). Although the typological situations are simplified, the scheme facilitates discussion that opens up perspectives for possible interventions in complex situations.

		<i>Actor variables</i>	
		<i>Right-wing extremist actors or sympathizers without entrenched patterns</i>	<i>Right-wing extremist actors with entrenched patterns</i>
<i>Context variables</i>	<i>Social environment: open and tolerant/in opposition to right-wing extremism</i>	open climate/no entrenched patterns → prevention and dialogue (I)	open climate/entrenched patterns → youth work with accepting stance (II)
	<i>Social environment: approval of racist and nationalist ideas</i>	closed climate/no entrenched patterns → strengthen minorities in the context (III)	closed climate/entrenched patterns → de-escalation and aid to victims (IV)

(Source: Eckmann, 2005)

For each specific field, the interaction between the actor and context point to a different intervention approach that takes these conditions into account. It is important to note that the category of right-wing extremist actors also include adults.

We proceed from the hypothesis that each of the fields I through IV has its own dynamics and thus requires appropriate methods and intervention strategies that follow specific orientations:

- I. In this situation extremists are rather isolated. The preferred strategy is thus a comprehensive approach, focusing on prevention and dialogue, as both young people and their environments are mostly characterized by tolerant attitudes. The aim of this sensitization and information is to see young people distance themselves from xenophobic positions.
- II. As the environment lacks understanding for, and thus rejects right-wing extremist youth, these youngsters are in a minority position. The “accepting” approach is appropriate here, taking the young people seriously and addressing their specific social problems.
- III. In a context of latent approbation or support of right-wing activities, it is difficult to defend the rights of ethnic minorities. This calls for a strategy of strengthening minorities in context, through sensitizing the majority (rather than the youth) in order to achieve increased acceptance of the minorities suffering most in the intolerant climate.
- IV. In this context, the position of educators is the most delicate, for their latent or open support of right-wing extremist youth can make them relatively isolated in the environment. For this reason, the primary strategy is de-escalation, empowerment, and targeted victim support, as it is necessary here to de-escalate violence perpetrated by youth, to mobilize and sensitize decision-makers and “social multipliers” amplifying the influence of the given intervention in the population, while at the same time providing support to minorities and possible victims.

Without doubt, field IV is the most difficult for effective intervention, as both negatively charged components, namely, youth and environment, recharge and reinforce each other. This means that it is essential to examine and analyze the situation in depth prior to taking initial, careful steps towards contacting key, anchoring persons and attempting to raise their awareness of and sensitize them to the problems. There are many different levels that must be included and empowered: social decision-makers and responsible parties, minorities, potential victims, parents, youth, and so on.

Consequently, rather than defining right-wing extremism primarily as a problem of youth, it is better defined as a problem of our society as a whole. Accordingly, intervention must address the entire environment. After precise analysis of the right-wing extremist scene in situ, the responsible political and social authorities, persons, and institutions will be provided with information on the forms of expression, causes, and roots of right-wing extremism. Aids to argumentative competence will be provided in order to strengthen all involved parties’ conflict resolution competence and democratic ability, in the sense of empowerment. Moreover, through including victims and potential victim groups, the spectrum of intervention is expand-

ed and differentiated, which has the potential to trigger the end of solidarity with offenders. The Swiss municipalities with the highest degree of right-wing extremist syndrome are found mainly in rural regions with such a small percentage of foreigners that residents lack experience and confrontation with “foreignness” and the differences that are part of a pluralized world. This makes developing people’s capacity to interact respectfully and empathetically with “aliens” all the more necessary.

### **Achievements and successes to date**

In the framework of the Swiss National Research Programme (NRP) 40+, Right-Wing Extremism – Causes and Countermeasures, we conducted a study on the viability of social work in dealing with right-wing extremism (see Eser Davolio, Eckmann & Drilling, 2004). As the study focused particularly on community work projects, we first conducted a pilot study in nine municipalities that had experienced and responded to problems of right-wing extremism. In the main part of our study, we evaluated six interventions conducted in conjunction with expert consultants. The results revealed a picture of the situation in a total of fifteen municipalities in the German and French-speaking parts of Switzerland and provided insights into the causes of and possible countermeasures to right-wing extremism.

There appears to be a characteristic threshold at which right-wing extremism becomes disruptive and triggers responses by municipal authorities. Although right-wing extremist groupings become conspicuous in small towns and villages because of their paramilitary appearance and provocative behaviour, as long as they do not become violent and do not threaten public law and order, they do not trigger reactions by the authorities. In such cases case, right-wing extremism is perceived as a latent problem. However, if violent incidents occur in connection with right-wing extremist groups, then awareness of the problem and the political pressure to act increase. As the level of unrest turns into deviant behaviour by right-wing extremist groups, such as threatening passers-by or violently infringing others’ rights, and the situation is underscored by a media presence, the problem becomes a high priority issue.


A comparison of right-wing extremist scenes in the fifteen municipalities studied shows a scene dominated by the “recreational” element among right-wing extremist youth in vocational training. There are two exceptions. In one French-speaking municipality, the young people are mainly university prep students at the Matura school, who with their right-wing extremist attitudes and provocative ideology are primarily involved in creating a platform; and in one German-speaking municipality the right-wing extremist scene is made up mainly of youth with alcohol problems on the margin of society. Although our survey results show that massive alcohol consumption is widespread in right-wing extremist groups, this does not normally lead to the social decline (marginalization) of the young people. They are usually described as well integrated and are seldom unemployed or lacking vocational training, so that their public presence is usually restricted to after-work hours. But their public presence usually results in competition with other youth scenes and therefore in a potential for violent confrontations, which unsettle the local population. What stands out is that the municipalities dealing with

the problems of right-wing extremism are mainly small towns and villages. In cities, these groups are probably submerged in the youth culture mix.

In each of the municipalities we surveyed responsible actors in the schools, police force, social services, and local government and politics. The findings crystallized into the following pattern of response, which can be described in the form of a three-phase model using the overarching terms politicization, institutionalization, and professionalization (see Figure 3):

- 1) **Politicization:** Recurrent right-wing extremist incidents in the municipalities create political pressure to take action, to which the authorities respond, either because of their own sense of alarm or because of an image problem resulting from strong media coverage. Discussion is initiated between municipal representatives and affected or alarmed community actors to analyze the problem and to discuss the necessity of working together.
- 2) **Institutionalization:** municipal representatives and the actors network into a politically heterogeneous working group pursuing a broad concept of civil society. There are varying degrees of cooperation between the police, the school, and/or social services. For strategic planning, the municipalities use both their own and some external resources, whereby the use of the latter is usually selective, consisting mostly of consultation and information exchanges. Measures formulated and coordinated on the basis of this work, including intervention and repression as well as preventative measure, are usually implemented across all areas.
- 3) **Professionalization:** working groups monitor the effects of their measures and can quickly call on internal and external resources when deciding on further steps. As a rule, the measures taken lead to the stagnation of the right-wing extremist phenomenon (see the model in the figure). The working groups generally remain in operation beyond the acute phase and are available for intervention when other problems involving violence arise. As a result of having studied and dealt with the topic of right-wing extremism, these groups continue to observe and monitor, and are able to take action when new problems with right-wing extremism arise (see “effects” in the model).

Figure 3: Three-phase model of mobilization against right-wing extremism in Swiss municipalities (Eser-Davolio & Drilling, 2005)



The networking among community actors and the coordinated implementation of measures in surveyed municipalities as a rule resulted in a decrease in right-wing extremist incidents. The three main lines of attack – repression, intervention, and prevention – are taken up on different levels. Repression is shown to be particularly effective at the level of convinced right-wing extremists, who are “withdrawn from circulation” when sentenced to prison, placed in homes for the delinquent, or cautioned for their criminal offences. When these “heads” or ringleaders were removed, the sympathizers as a group lost their cohesive center generated by the leader’s guiding ideological input. Boosting repression by means of increased police monitoring and interrogations, and preventing members from renting meeting spaces also led to a quick decrease in right-wing extremist activities. Moreover, cross-regional collaboration as a rule prevented right-wing extremists from evading control by moving into neighbouring municipalities.

At the level of prevention and intervention, the surveyed municipalities selected very different forms of activities to demonstrate their common commitment against right-wing extremism. These activities included solidarity events, signature collections, travelling exhibitions, and project weeks. Despite these differences they can all be described as conveying the messages “not in our town” or “the values we stand for.” Making this stance against right-wing extremism visible to the public mostly succeeded in sensitizing the population – as measured by the extent to which watchfulness and reporting of incidents to the police increased. The creation of better communication channels both within the municipality and between it and higher levels (cantonal police, competence centers) significantly improved monitoring, which in turn fostered repression and the early recognition of new manifestations of the right-wing extremist scene. However, the instruments created are not only implemented to combat right-wing extremism, but also to prevent violence more generally.

It should be mentioned that those surveyed were generally very cautious about attributing decreases in right-wing extremism to the implemented measures, and thereby did not exclude the effects of other factors. However, other conclusions can be drawn from our study, because no new symptoms and no shifts of the problem to other locales occurred during the survey period of one and half years in the municipalities that had undertaken comprehensive efforts to combat right-wing extremism.

The findings on the response of the population to right-wing extremism are double edged, so to speak. On the one hand, a conservative milieu dominant in rural regions tends not only to oppose increasing the number of immigrants, it also entails that little effort is made to integrate immigrants, thereby paving the way for xenophobia and segregation. In this tense climate, right-wing extremist groups can appear as a form of territorial defence and self-assertion. On the other hand, pressure to conform can be exerted on right-wing extremist youth if violent incidents and deviant behaviour. By marking them as a problem the perpetrators risk being stigmatized and excluded.

The provincial context also affects the willingness to report right-wing extremism and violence to the police. Willingness to report to the police appears low as long as there is little sensitization and public awareness of the problem. Contrary to the assumption that social

control is very strong because “everybody knows everybody” in a village, this very social familiarity often entails that no one says anything for fear of social exclusion. Municipalities can break through this indifference if civic commitment and action is initiated via the formation of coordinated groups against right-wing extremism and violence (“round tables”) with broad-based political support, and if these groups are publicly visible. Sensitized perception and awareness can also be triggered by reports in regional or national media, even if this is mainly because people are concerned to repair the damage to the image of their communities.

In comparison with other countries in Europe, the case of Switzerland therefore seems to supply different initial conditions for right-wing extremism. It neither has a history that would hand down National Socialist ideas to broad levels of society nor a culture of resistance in the sense of the resistance movement in France or Italy. It also does not have an economic situation in which one could speak of youth unemployment as fertile ground for right-wing extremist developments. The unemployment rate among youth in Switzerland is not only considerably lower than in neighbouring countries, but it also mainly affects youth of foreign origin.

That right-wing extremism and xenophobia are first and foremost a rural and provincial problem in Switzerland (see Haenni Hoti, in press) is in line with the principle that the smaller the percentage of immigrants the higher the degree of xenophobia (see Schubarth, 1991). Because right-wing extremist youth in Switzerland are socially integrated and characterized by the normality of their biographies and family environments (see interim results of a study by Gabriel, 2005), they have solid social ties (family, workplace, membership in clubs, and so on) that they as a rule do not want to risk losing. For this reason, civic efforts in opposition to right-wing extremism constitute intervention and sanctioning possibilities. When public opinion becomes sensitized, right-wing extremist groups are seen in a negative light, become a problem, and in some cases experience the withdrawal of social approval. This pressure towards social adaptation, together with increased police repression, usually leads to both a break down of the right-wing extremist scene and reduction of the recruitment potential of right-wing extremist groups.

In sum, right-wing extremism in rural areas and small towns calls for different countermeasures than right-wing extremism in cities. While social control factors act as a brake, latent approval and a lack of readiness to report to the police provide an impetus to the right-wing extremist scene in rural areas and small towns.

### **Further developments needed**

The recommendations of report on Right-Wing Extremism and Help for Exit (D’Amato & Gerber, 2002) are based on expert statements. The experts strongly recommend building structures within existing regional network consisting of schools, police forces, and social workers, while remaining mindful of the federal system in mind. One of the main problems they have encountered is that local expert knowledge is fairly spread over the regional borders. Moreover, Swiss knowledge of right-wing extremism is not very profound on the micro level. As a consequence it is difficult to intervene adequately. Above all, the experts think that street-based social work

could be most successful, because it operates on the micro level and is so able to identify local conditions and develop joint solutions with local actors and authorities.

An institutionalized platform directed by the educational board of a University of Applied Sciences (Fachhochschulen), which oversees social intervention programs throughout the various regions, could take on the construction of low-threshold intervention measures and the coordination of knowledge. In addition, more specific scientific knowledge should be produced on Swiss right-wing extremism through scientific research and the documentation of present experiences, which should then be prepared for educational purposes. Of ultimate importance is the training of police officers and social workers, which should be regularly updated to include newly gathered knowledge (D'Amato & Gerber, 2002).

Swiss municipalities that clearly exhibited the problem of right-wing extremism and yet do not acknowledge it – because of the lack of political will, sensitivity to the problem, public outrage, and media attention – have largely been left on their own. This is because in Switzerland, as a grassroots democracy and federalist country, interference from outside or from above by state agencies is rare. This, however, raises the question whether such intervention, be it in the form of a demand to combat right-wing extremist phenomena or an offer of advisory services, would not be appropriate when right-wing tendencies and the legitimization of paramilitary right-wing extremist groups present a threat to potential victim groups and people with other opinions. In the French-speaking part of Switzerland, official victim support services and expert non-governmental organizations, that are also available to offenders, offer refuge. Insufficient services are, however, available in German-speaking Switzerland, and there is a general need for funding and additional human resource and, more specifically, for low-threshold services and street-based youth work.

Another idea would be for the justice system to make increased use of perpetrator-victim mediation and to invest in sensitization programs.

In Scandinavia and Germany, examinations of services for young persons finding it difficult to disengage from intimidating and dominating youth gangs revealed the services to be quite successful. In Switzerland, greater importance has been placed on services of this kind only in the last four or five years, and there are as yet few coordinated services.

A desirable solution for all of these tasks would be to set up a central competency center for combating right-wing extremism and xenophobia that ensures and promotes knowledge transfer as well as coordinating existing contact points and consultation centers. At present, however, there does not seem to be sufficient political will to do so.

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# Right-Extremist Sympathies among Adolescents in the Netherlands

## Introduction

After the September 11th 2001 attack on the United States and the murder of the columnist and film-maker Theo van Gogh in November 2004, the Netherlands was confronted with a wave of violent acts directed primarily at Muslims or alleged Muslims. The primarily young perpetrators were thought to be right-wing extremists or sympathetic to right-wing extremism. This contribution considers this phenomenon in more detail. The attempt is made to provide insight into the Dutch situation by clarifying the Dutch context.

First, right-wing extremism is interpreted in its Dutch context. To this end attention is briefly given to the very limited politically organized right-wing extremism in the Netherlands. The youths who make up the groups guilty of racist violence qualify as right-wing extremists and are primarily found in the hardcore culture, currently the largest white youth culture in the Netherlands. After a brief presentation of the history of this youth culture, attention is given to its geographic distribution, its causes, and the profile of its participants.

In Strategies for combating prejudice, discrimination, racism and right-wing extremism, the three pillars of Dutch policy are addressed: legislation, a thorough infrastructure, and the conjunction of a concerned government and a social midfield.

We then look at how various actors have reacted to the right-wing extremist boom. Attention is paid to government, police, the judiciary system, the education system, anti-discrimination organizations, the hardcore scene, Lonsdale, the media, and allochtone<sup>10</sup> youth.

In the final section attention is paid to how the educational system handles the matter. Successful methods and projects are presented and a few of them are taken up in more detail.

## Right-wing extremism in the Netherlands

The concepts 'right-wing extremist' and 'racist' are used interchangeably as designations of individuals and groups. This is not a problem when it comes to political organizations because the professional criteria for designating them as right-wing extremist or racist are virtually identical. The concepts are however not synonymous. We must especially take care when considering individuals and small groups. While right-wing extremism is a political concept, racism is a much broader concept.

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<sup>10</sup> "Allochtoon" is a formal concept in the Netherlands for anyone either born outside of the Netherlands to non-Dutch parents or born in the Netherlands to a not Dutch parent. A distinction is made between Western "allochtonen" (EU citizens from the rich industrialized nations) and non-Western "alochtonen" (in particular those from Turkey, North Africa, Surinam and South America, the Dutch Antilles, and refugees). The term is however often used by the media and others to mark ethnic minorities. The word "autochtoon" on the other hand stands for Dutch citizens born to Dutch parents. The term is considered synonymous with "the white, dominant majority."

### *Right-wing extremist political parties in the Netherlands*

While many right-wing extremist groups have come and gone since World War II, reaching their apex in the 90's, they face an intractable dilemma. On the one hand the unrestrained expression of their ideology meets social resistance and numerous legal barriers. On the other hand, striving for societal acceptance by way of taking up a moderate public position alienates (potential) members.

At the moment the Netherlands has a number of small extreme right wing parties, of which only one was able to win a single seat in the last municipal elections. Right-wing extremism is no longer a viable political position and there is little or no expectation that this will change in the near future. This is largely due to the changed position of the other political parties, which has, for example, led to one of the strictest immigration policies in Europe, including compulsory naturalization.

### *Right-wing extremism and youth*

In the last few years the Netherlands has experienced an upsurge of right-wing extremist activity among youth. The problem of right-wing extremist, racist youth culture – the so-called 'Lonsdale-youth' – has reached unprecedented levels. This youth problem is not so much situated on the political level as it is on the social level.

### *Racist violence*

As already mentioned, right-wing extremist youth are often involved in inter-ethnic conflicts. They are not, however, always the initiators of such confrontations. It is often also groups of allochtonen who seek out confrontation. These confrontations are not limited to the street but now and again take place in schools and youth centres. These youth are moreover regularly involved in (violent) criminal offences.<sup>11</sup>

After the murder of the film-maker and columnist Theo van Gogh the Netherlands suffered a wave of violence. Successful and unsuccessful attempts were made to burn down schools and mosques. People were attacked and harassed, and citizens were threatened. It is difficult to determine the exact number of incidents that can be attributed to the murder of Van Gogh. Researchers who claimed almost 200 incidents have since adjusted their numbers, in part because police departments nationwide counted around 800 cases. Similar incidents occurred before and after September 11th.

These attacks provoked reactions. So it was that a number of churches were lit on fire after the murder of Van Gogh. The danger of these violent criminal offences lies not so much in the offences themselves – which are of course unacceptable and must be denounced – but rather

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<sup>11</sup> The perpetrators often remain unknown. It is however remarkable that the perpetrators when known often belong to the right extremist youth culture. This was strikingly the case in the wave of violence following September 11th and the murder of Theo van Gogh.

in the way in which they accentuate the tensions between cultural and ethnic groups. Ethnic groups, particularly Muslims, no longer feel safe, and radical Muslims legitimate their positions and partially whitewash their own wrong doings. Every new incident substantiates the us-them opposition.

### *Right-wing extremism as part of the hardcore culture*

Right-wing extremist statements and points of view can be found in all strata of the population, but they manifest themselves primarily in the segment of the white youth culture called hardcore. This subculture is currently the largest white youth culture in the Netherlands. More than 100.000 youth consider themselves hardcore fans. It must be stated that no connection can or may be made between the majority of these youths and right-wing extremism. While estimates of the size of the problem group differ, they range around a couple of thousand.<sup>12</sup>

Of this number approximately two hundred are directly affiliated with right-wing extremist parties and organizations, the rest is not organized. There are also differing opinions as to whether or not the problem group as a whole can be qualified as right-wing extremist. Those opposing such assessments rightly claim that while the youth have a right-wing extremist attitude they lack a right-wing extremist ideology. These youth should nevertheless be qualified as right-wing extremist.

Among hardcore fans those belonging to the problem group are known as 'Nazis'. And although the unorganized majority are more likely to present themselves as nationalists, they nonetheless flirt with the 'Nazi' title, its symbols and its rhetoric. For its part, organized right-wing extremism reacts with extreme ambivalence towards these youth. On the one hand it tries to recruit them and on the other it explicitly keeps them at a distance. On such web sites as the Stormfrontorganization these youths are considered cannon fodder for the takeover of power, survivors of which are to be executed. Their drug use and the fact that they lack the requisite political unity disturbs the right-wing extremist leadership.

It is highly problematic that the term 'Lonsdale-youth', used both in common parlance and in the media to designate these youth, has come to refer to all hardcore fans. Because rough and tough (sport)clothing is in among hardcore fans, they often wear clothes manufactured by the British boxing label Lonsdale. Extreme right youth have thereby grafted an extra dimension on to the wearing of these clothes. In the beginning it was used to express Nazi sympathies in imitation of their German colleagues. When wearing a Lonsdale shirt or sweater under a jacket the letters NSDA (referring to the NSDAP, the German National Socialist Labour Party during the "3. Reich") remain visible. Over the past few years the Lonsdale brand has thus become short hand for 'As Dutch let us slowly execute the foreigners', thereby being more aligned with nationalistic sentiments.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> According to Police reports, AIVD (National Security Service), Anne Frank Foundation, National Bureau against Racial Discrimination.

<sup>13</sup> Both Lonsdale and the hardcore world resist this negative image.

### *The history of the right-wing extremist youth culture*

Current Dutch hardcore culture is not a revival of the British political skinhead culture of the 80's, but rather of the gabber culture. The gabber culture came to prominence at the start of the 90's, first in Rotterdam and later in the Randstad and other cities.<sup>14</sup> Gabbers distinguish themselves from other house fans by their preference for more and more beats per minute. In this way gabber house was developed as a reaction to mellow house. The gabbers did however draw on British skinhead youth culture. They shaved their heads, thereby fostering the association with the skinheads, dressed in prol (proletariat) clothing (training suits and more expensive brands of runners), and their style of dancing had much in common with that of their British predecessors. While the gabbers had a strong nationalistic orientation, gabber<sup>15</sup> being a Dutch invention, it is also very local: gabbers from Rotterdam wanted nothing to do with gabbers from Amsterdam. Not only the shaved heads, but also the Dutch flags on the bomber jackets were taken by many to signify the extreme right, all the more because the gabbers considered such elements part of their dress code. From the perspective of most gabbers, however, the small flag signified their pride that gabber is a Dutch invention. When the extreme right tried to recruit among the gabbers it turned out that the majority of the youth wanted nothing to do with (extreme right) politics.

At the end of the 90's the gabber culture collapsed. A younger generation, primarily outside of the large cities, took over. The dress code returned to the skinhead look and brands such as Lonsdale and Dr. Martens once again became popular. Although the clothing changed, it remained the expression of the wearer's working class social position. The aura is tough and aggressive for boys and feminine for girls who most often dress in the so-called 'Heidi-look'. The hardcore culture has mostly been taken up outside of the large cities. On the one hand this is because it always takes some time for trends to take root outside the large cities. On the other hand this also has to do with the youths wanting to make themselves known and with their search for an identity. The image of hardcore and gabber as Dutch inventions better express their opposition to the 'multicultural' cities with their urban melting pot of cultural influences.

### *The geographic distribution*

The phenomenon occurs throughout the country, primarily in rural areas and smaller municipalities. There are of course right-wing extremist youth in the big cities, but there they either don't make themselves known or do so to a lesser degree. Although attempts have been made in various regions to assess the various youth groups, this is sadly not always done on the basis of a consistent conceptual framework and often with varying levels of precision and professionalism. Estimates range from between 100 to 150 groups with single to double

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<sup>14</sup> De Randstad is the name for the area including the four largest cities in the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht.

<sup>15</sup> Jiddisch for friend.

digit membership. The mobility of the youth presents an additional problem, especially when groups move throughout a region. While the phenomenon occurs throughout the country, it must be said that the intensity of the violence is not the same everywhere.

### *Causes and motives*

The causes and motives of young person's right-wing extremist attitudes are very diverse. While the general climate in the Netherlands and the youth's adolescence play a role, the decisive factors are the very specific local and/or regional contexts.

It is important here to recall the hardcore culture's nationalistic tendencies. This is most extreme in a particular segment of the youth who link their pride in this 'national culture' to xenophobic attitudes. Opinion makers express themselves in stinging terms and the public follows. He who only knows Moroccans, Antilleans, and Muslims from the media cannot have a nuanced, let stand a positive, image of these groups.

Of considerable consequence throughout the country is the role played by parents. It is thought that young people as a rule acquire their negative attitudes at home. When conversations were held with the parents of problem youths in two municipalities (Aalsmeer and Purmerend), it turned out that half of the parents did not know what their children, primarily boys, were involved in. Of the remaining parents who did know, half claimed not to know what to do and half supported their children's opinions and behaviour (ref: local police reports).

The fear that foreigners, and in particular Muslims, will exert a cultural influence in the face of which the Dutch culture (whatever that might be) will disappear exists in a large segment of the population. This fear carries with it a feeling of not being safe. There is a strong sense that foreigners get preferential treatment from the government and that it is in fact Dutch people who are being discriminated against. The youth at issue and their parents face more competition from foreigners for work, housing and other services than do others.

Problems primarily manifest themselves in rural areas and in smaller communities. This is in part due to the fact that many youth are only then confronted with other ethnic groups when they attend higher levels of education or go out in the larger cities. Thus the first introduction/confrontation takes place in the very period in which they begin to search for their identity.

Very regionally specific situational events also play a role. In one region this may be the existence of a refugee centre, in another it may be compulsory refugee housing despite an enormous housing shortage, and the cause of long term violent confrontations in another might be competition over a girl.

The Internet plays a special role. It has become a free space for airing opinions in which people do not hold back because of the high degree of anonymity. Right-wing extremists abuse this fact. Sites that on the surface only deal with hardcore cultures are in this way abused in order to exert influence on the youth.

## *Towards a profile*

Prejudice, xenophobia and racist opinions are not the sole domain of right-wing extremist youth or those with right-wing extremist sympathies. They are at work throughout Dutch society and generate extensive social problems: discrimination in the job and housing market, and in education. They lead to a harsh political and social climate, each of which of course reinforces the other. This social constellation leads to situations that are absolutely unacceptable. When it comes to violence, however, there is a broad societal consensus for censure and government intervention.

Yet violence and intolerance are not solely the domain of right-wing extremism. There are also reports of increasing intolerance and a diminishing reticence to violent confrontation among certain groups of foreigners. Here too we must distinguish between a core, be it organized or not, in which radical Muslims play a prominent role, and the followers who make use of its rhetoric and symbols. The primary difference between allochtone and indigenous groups is their places of residence, their social status, and their representation in the society. Allochtone usually come from larger, and the indigenous Dutch from smaller municipalities. Migrant youth face almost daily discrimination in, for example, the work and apprenticeship market and in Dutch night-life, and the image of migrants is in general largely negative. Otherwise the two groups have much in common.

At issue are mostly relatively young (14 to 20 year old) boys. The majority of them still in school are in a VMBO-school.<sup>16</sup> Those who are employed, and many are not as there is large scale unemployment among the migrant population, mostly perform manual labour. Their parents are also usually part of the lower social classes. Many of these youths are what are called 'hangjongeren', youth who hang out in groups on the streets, in parks, and in shopping centres etc. Boredom as well as alcohol and drug abuse play a prominent role.<sup>17</sup>

This terse profile is not definitive. Sometimes the picture is not so clear. It bears repeating that there is nothing wrong with the lions share of these youth. They live and do there thing just like other youth.

Estimates of the number of right-wing extremists differ. The lowest estimate being around 1500 youth and the highest being around 6000.<sup>18</sup> Although this is a minimal percentage of the total youth population, it constitutes a large social problem.

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16 Secondary Job Preparation Education (Vorbereidend Middelbaar BeroepsOnderwijs), a collection of the lower levels of secondary education for students aged 12 to 16. 60 % of all youth in this age group attend the VMBO.

17 The vast majority of the perpetrators were under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol (Ref: FORUM – Institute for multicultural development; intervention teams).

18 References: Police reports, AIVD (National Security Service), Anne Frank Foundation (Van Donselaar en Rodrigues: 'Monitor racism en extreem-rechts. Zesde rapportage.' Anne Frank Sichting/Universiteit Leiden, 2004), National Bureau against Racial Discrimination.

## **Strategies for combating prejudice, discrimination, racism and right-wing extremism**

Since the 1980's combating discrimination and racism has constituted an important part of Dutch policy. This policy rests on three pillars: legislation, a thorough infrastructure, and the combination of a concerned government and an involved social midfield. In the following these three pillars are examined and described in more detail.

### *Legislation*

Discrimination has been made punishable in Dutch criminal law. This includes more severe penalties for offences with discriminatory motives. Criminal prosecution is, however, considered a last resort. It is primarily used to set clear standards and to respond to glaring violations and indictable offences. It clearly sets out how the police and the Public Prosecutor are to deal with cases in which discrimination may have played a role.

In addition to these amendments to the criminal law, the same policies have been taken up in the civil law. This law is of great importance because it implies that institutions must protect everyone who falls under their jurisdiction from discrimination. Schools and youth centres for example are thus required to combat discrimination. For schools these requirements are also taken up in the Education Act. Schools are required to have a mediator and a complaints commission. Recently they are also required to report complaints of discrimination to Educational inspectors.

### *Infrastructure*

The Netherlands has an extensive infrastructure focussed on combating discrimination. In addition to organizations explicitly set up for this purpose, numerous organizations consider combating discrimination inherent to their activities and goals.

A number of organizations are active on the national level. The Netherlands has diverse centres of expertise focussed on various grounds of discrimination, such as race, homosexuality, age, sex and handicaps. These NGO's (Non Governmental Organizations) work together closely.

In addition to these centres of expertise, numerous other NGO's actively combat discrimination. There are also special governmental organizations such as the Landelijk Expertise Centrum Discriminatie van het Openbaar Ministerie (The Public Prosecutor's National Centre of Expertise on Discrimination) and the police department's Landelijk Bureau Discriminatiezaken (National Bureau of issues regarding Discrimination). In addition, ministries such as those of education, culture and science, social services, and justice contribute dedicated websites or distribute information on their websites among other things.

On the provincial level the migrant support centres are most active. Their mission is to promote a multicultural society and of which they consider the eradication of discrimination to be an important component.

Large differences are mostly found at the local level. There are at the moment about 40 anti-discrimination bureaus (ADB's) in the Netherlands. Financed by the municipality, they primarily handle individual complaints and provide information. The bureaus are equipped to various degrees and service no more than half of the Netherlands. Work is underway to create a network of well equipped ADB's able to service the whole country.

This diversity at the local level is due to the policy making independence of the municipalities. This independence is mirrored in the way local organizations approach the problem. There are municipalities in which little or no action takes place, and others where a wide array of activities take place. Although demographic differences of course play a role here, discrimination, racism, and xenophobia occur throughout the Netherlands and in particular among youth outside the large municipalities.

The Internet plays a very particular role. The online Discrimination complaints department (Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet) is a place where everyone can report problems that occur on the net.

The National Police Department (Landelijk Korps Politie) facilities have recently been extended. They will mainly focus on radicalization, of which intolerance and racism are a part.

### *A concerned government and a social midfield*

A thorough response to discrimination, racism, extremism and xenophobia not only requires a concerned government but also a concerned social midfield, which in fact exists in the Netherlands. This may seem a strange claim in light of the fact that there are politicians and administrators who contribute to negative representations and a hardening of the society, that one in four employers discriminates in the hiring process, and that there are schools that try to turn away migrant students. The coin, however, has two sides.

Although discrimination is frowned upon throughout all strata of Dutch society, everyone maintains their own understanding of what constitutes discrimination. Only a small percentage of the population holds clearly racist opinions. Discrimination is often less a result of rejection on the basis of for example ethnicity, than an indirect rejection grounded on imagined characteristics. Rather than refusing someone on the basis of their colour, an employer usually does so on the grounds of expected problems. Schools for their part are afraid that too many students of colour will lead others to leave, thereby endangering the school.

### **Reactions to the rise in right-wing extremism**

Youth right-wing extremism has only come to be considered a social problem in the last few years. Prior to this expressions of right-wing extremism were qualified as incidents. Attention to the problem is now being paid throughout the social fabric. What follows is a brief examination of how the different social actors approach the problem.

## *The government*

Right-wing extremism, discrimination, racism and xenophobia are topics that are explicitly taken up as a whole in the government's policies. It is not only clearly stated that right-wing extremism must be combated, addressing discrimination is also seen as a means of countering the radicalization among Muslims. Politicians and administrators also openly express their anti-right-wing extremist positions. The National Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) has prepared a report by order of the ministry of justice (AVID, 2005). The report has been sent to all municipalities with an appeal by the minister of internal affairs not only to take the problem seriously but also to act. The federal government has promised their support. It has convened numerous assemblies around the issue. It finances intervention teams, groups of experts who are to support those municipalities tackling the problem. The intervention teams were put in place by the Minister of Foreigners and Integration in December of 2004.

The position of the federal government is clear. At the local level the problem is, however, much more complicated. While one municipality responds to the phenomenon, the other puts its head in the sand and dispatches with violent behaviour by calling it boyish mischief. We therefore cannot speak of an unified assessment and response.

Luckily there are positive examples, such as the municipalities of Aalsmeer, Helden, and Purmerend. The multiple social actors active in these municipalities form an integrated network: the municipality, the police, the Public Prosecutor, the youth department, social aid groups, and schools. They take stock of the problem, anticipate developments, and intervene directly when required. In Aalsmeer and Purmerend conversations were not only started with the problem youth themselves, but also with their parents. In Aalsmeer one result among many was the offer by one of the parents to provide the use of a shed on his property for youth activities. Municipalities also institute rules as to what will and what will not be tolerated in institutions and organizations (Huygens, 2004).

## *Police and the judiciary*

In a number of regions the police have taken the lead in addressing problems. This has much to do with the fact that many of the youth belong to the so called 'hang around youth' (hangjongeren) who often cause trouble. The general trend is for the police to react to racist violations and offences, that is, there where they had in the past failed to do so. There are however also regions in which the police are going further by trying to act pro-actively. Developments are actively monitored, issues are discussed with partners in the field, thereby increasing the knowledge base and the possibility that intervention takes place before youth go too far.

The judiciary plays an important role in the detection and prosecution of perpetrators of (racist) offences. It has for many years been policy to actively do this. In this the Internet remains a source of concern. Although too little action has as yet been taken on the Internet, it looks as though there will also be more active prosecution of Internet activity.

## *Youth work*

Although youth workers are regularly confronted with right-wing extremist youth, such situations are not handled consistently. While most youth centres and youth organizations have house rules forbidding discrimination and racism, these are often either not upheld or their interpretation is equivocal. Some youth workers consciously choose to work with these youth. Others absolutely do not tolerate certain behaviour and as a result avoid these youth. Yet others totally negate the problem.

Problems also occur in the collaboration with the police. Although many youth workers are prepared to cooperate with the police in the hopes of containing trouble and avoiding problems, they have a problem with passing information on to the police. They consider their relationships with the youth to be based on mutual trust and confidentiality so that they cannot pass on knowledge of the youth's criminal violations.

Many youth workers and institutions have started to consider the matter more closely. The National Bureau for combating racial discrimination (LBR – Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van Rassendiscriminatie) and others have organized numerous workshops and training sessions for youth workers. On the one hand, in order to improve their knowledge of the problem, and on the other to assist in an effective response. A special file on this topic has been placed on the LBR website for youth workers, instructors, and others. Many youth workers make use of products such as exhibitions and films and actively take up such topics as discrimination and intolerance.

Unfortunately these activities seldom or insufficiently take root. They are usually too incidental, lack a solid foundation, barely reach the target group, and suffer from a lack of guiding policy.

## *Education*

Schools as a rule tend to keep problems to themselves, hoping thereby to avoid negative publicity. Nevertheless, much is known about how they deal with the problem. When things really got out of control, a number of schools instituted a dress code forbidding the wearing of clothes by *Lonsdale* and other brands at school. Many schools are more than able to avoid and respond to problems. These integrate the problem in their security policy. The clear position of the ministry is that combating discrimination and unwanted behaviour are part of security considerations. Throughout the secondary school system attention is paid to growing up in a multicultural society, knowledge about prejudices, discrimination and racism, and how to get along with each other.

Schools are thus large scale consumers of products in this area. In the last few years the number of Schools Without Racism and World Schools has grown considerably. School Without Racism and World School are elementary and secondary school projects respectfully with which schools make a stand against discrimination and racism. Teachers are being trained in how to react to racist comments and many schools actively participate in local networks.

### *Anti discrimination organizations*

The whole network of anti discrimination organizations has developed numerous activities. Together with Lonsdale, the AFA (the Anti-fascist Action) has published the *Lonsdalenews* newspaper and launched a website. The website and the freely distributed newspaper provide information about the brand Lonsdale and gabber music and warn against right-wing extremism and intolerance.

A number of local ADBs have also developed initiatives. They initiated research in their region, supplied information sessions in schools and youth centres, participated in the advancement of professional expertise, and participated in local networks.

National organizations were and are also involved in numerous initiatives. FORUM (The Institute for Multicultural Development) coordinates the above mentioned intervention teams. The LBR hosts educational Internet pages on the topic on its website, has researched the nature, extent, and reaction to the phenomenon in four regions, and variously organized and taken part in topic specific discussions.

### *Hardcore scene*

The hardcore scene has taken to heart the negative publicity to which it has been subject. Initiatives against discrimination and racism, such as the *Gabbers against racism*, were already present in the hardcore scene. There are now also strict entrance policies at hardcore events. Discriminatory expressions in the form of slogans, symbols and buttons are strictly forbidden. Patrons who publicly use the Hitler salute are removed. In June of 2005 the hardcore scene organized a large United Hardcore Against Racism & Hate party. All the big names in the hardcore world volunteered their time and a number of special tracks were released. All proceeds were donated to the LBR. Initiatives have also been taken by local groups of hardcore fans, such as the youths who had a poster made on which they stand in Lonsdale clothing brandishing an anti racism sign.

### *Lonsdale*

Importers of Lonsdale gear saw their turnover plummet by 50%. They were severely affected by the labels negative image in the Netherlands. The company is doing all it can to counter this negative image. It offers its support and has itself realized numerous initiatives. The first of its kind was the Lonsdale Loves all Colours campaign. Coloured T-shirts and buttons with the slogan were put on sale. Unfortunately the campaign had little effect. The aim of the second campaign Tough is to re-associate the label with the sport of boxing. As part of this campaign the town of Uden, where an Islamic elementary school was burned down after the murder of Van Gogh, was covered with the campaign's posters. The label's problem is that the media and the vernacular speak of "Lonsdale youth", thus putting it in a negative light.

## *Media*

Not only has the media fostered Lonsdale's negative association with right-wing extremism, they also deserve credit in a number of cases for getting the problem on the political agenda. This is especially the case when it comes to attention at the local level. Unfortunately the media coverage has not always been balanced.

While the media attention has led many youths to leaving their Lonsdale clothes in the closet, it has led others to take up wearing the clothing, thereby risking reactions from migrant groups.

## *An effective response*

The preceding examination and the gathered experience lead to the conclusion that an effective response requires that local authorities take the lead by initiating networks in which all partners participate effectively, that these partners are attuned to each other, and that they take stock of the problem in concert. It is moreover necessary not only to focus on the problem group but to also include all parts of the society, including parents and other (migrant) youth. The federal government has called on municipalities to develop policies leading to an effective response. Unfortunately only a few municipalities have heeded this call. Usually municipalities only take action when acts of violence have made national news. Local authorities are only moved to action by pressure from the media, public opinion, and from higher political levels. As soon as things quiet down things return to the status quo. The municipalities of Aalsmeer, Purmerend and Helden are positive exceptions that permanently monitor and work to keep the created networks intact.

One of the biggest problems is that assessments by various local authorities differ greatly. One municipality brushes acts of violence and tensions aside as boyish pranks and adolescent behaviour, the other speaks of incidents, and only a few recognize the structural nature of the problem. To this must be added the fact that authorities and others are currently exclusively fixated on radical Islam.

What is more is that the proposed solutions are thoroughly too limited. Usually a two track policy is proposed. The role of the police and the Public Prosecutor being to repress and that of the education system to prevent. The role of the society as a whole remaining in this way unaddressed. This despite the fact that policies should extend wide enough to address the full breadth of the society. The Internet has become a free zone for hate and racism. One in five employers is confronted with undesirable behaviour in the workplace. On Saturday afternoon parents yell the most disturbing things from the sidelines of the soccer field on which their child is playing. Migrants, particularly Muslims, are continuously stigmatized in political and public debates. To be effective, rather than focussing exclusively on 'problem youth', policy should focus on the society as a whole.

An effective response is only possible when enacted on all levels: on the level of both institutions and organizations, and on both the local and national level. Unfortunately there is a

shortfall of thorough research and methods based thereon. The education sector is currently the most progressive.

In the next chapter responses to discrimination and racism in the education sector are considered in more detail.

### **Combating racism and discrimination at school**

Many schools have taken up such topics as racism and discrimination, either as an expression of their social role or as a reaction to events in and around the school. Education is thus an important partner for other anti-discrimination actors. Recent developments, such as the murder of Theo van Gogh, and its societal consequences, have again driven the topic of racism to the forefront of current affairs.

The December 2003 National Action Plan against Racism emphasises the important role of the education system in combating racism. The education system can foster awareness through knowledge transfers and heightened vigilance.

The schools, however, need to be supported in this. The LBR and a few other organizations, such as the Anne Frank Foundation and the Foundation for Peace Education develop appropriate reading material. In this vain the website Dutchkids (see appendix) has recently been launched. These organizations also attribute their expertise to advising teachers and the organization of projects.

#### *Knowledge transfer*

Material about racism and discrimination is available for all age groups. It is not the case that these topics are far removed from the lives of young children and that they therefore need not be raised at this age. From a very young age children are aware of individual differences and similarities and often personally experience what it means to be rejected or to be called names on the basis of their skin colour or how they look.

Much of the anti racist material for young children, such as the Anne Frank foundation's 'This is me' ('Dit ben ik'), reflects on the similarities and differences between individual children. In this material the individual – every person is unique – is usually placed in the foreground. At the same time the similarities and difference lead to our identification with a certain group or of our being placed in a certain group by others. Even children are conscious of this.

The material also pays close attention to the senses. To what extent is what you think you see affected by your expectations? For example, 'I am otherwise very normal' ('Ik ben anders heel gewoon') explains the role that your expectations play in your experience by way of a very playful visual exercise. A link is then made to the role that prejudices play when we look at other people.

Recognizable themes such as teasing and exclusion are also often addressed. With a little older children associations are made between group processes that they can see all around

them and comparable past and present macro processes. At the level of secondary education this can be taken up in more detail and related current affairs topics can be discussed in class. It is important to hereby stimulate students to formulate their own opinions. A DVD such as “Border cases, where do you stand?” (see appendix) is well suited for this.

### *Traps*

Over the years different researchers have pointed out a number of traps in anti racism education. Certain British programmes for example fostered the opposition between ‘white’ as potentially racist and ‘black’ as anti racist. This opposition does little justice to the diversity and complexity of the problem. This opposition is not present in the current Dutch material.

Much attention is paid in the education system to knowledge about different cultures. In such teaching modules the emphasis is mostly placed on the ‘other’ culture, the Dutch culture being relegated to the margin. The Dutch culture is thereby either considered as self evident or as very diverse and difficult to define. That this is of course just as much the case for many other cultures is thereby often neglected. The ministry has ordered to take up the theme of ‘citizenship,’ thus entailing that more attention be paid to the Dutch culture.

The image generated of various cultures is often too static and relatively little attention is thus paid to a cultures’ internal diversity. By stressing the diversity inherent to a culture the apparent difference between cultures becomes more diffuse. This also engenders a greater sensitivity to the similarities between different cultures and to a person’s individuality and their individual relationship to their cultural context.

Insight into the structures and mechanisms in our society that lead to and sustain prejudice, discrimination, and racism is much more important than rote knowledge of other cultures. Differences between societal groups are not just traceable to different cultural backgrounds, but also to socio-economic positions themselves potentially to some extent the result of discrimination and racism. Social oppositions can be stubborn and this can obstruct both a person’s individual development and their chances. Students gain an insight into these obstacles when they become aware of their own position in the society and its attendant advantages and disadvantages. Mechanisms such as discrimination and racism need to be considered in their context.

Knowledge transfer remains an essential aspect of education. This is not to be limited to knowledge about racism and discrimination but must also be extended to the possible presence of stereotypes and prejudices in the teaching material. The Pearl<sup>19</sup> Foundation has included a check-list with which the teacher can screen their teaching material for such things in their guide to intercultural teaching material entitled ‘Picky’ (Kieskeurig).

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<sup>19</sup> A foundation that until recently screened educational material.

## *From intercultural education to active citizenry*

Schools are legally required to prepare students for the multicultural society. The project group Intercultural Education (Interkultureel Onderwijs – ICO) was launched in 1994 to support schools in this. One of the goals of the ICO is combating prejudice, discrimination, and racism. Through the course of the last decade the ICO has shifted its focus from separate projects to a self-explanatory fundamental leitmotif translated into all educational activities. That is, in theory. In practice many schools apparently find it difficult to make their daily teaching activities intercultural.

In future the fight against school racism will primarily take its form from new concepts such as active citizenship and social cohesion. In the revised core goals for elementary education emphasis is put on directing attention towards respect and tolerance as symptoms of important values and norms in Dutch society. In the new course for secondary education integration is to be fostered by turning attention to citizenship and mutual respect.

The new approach, focussed on active citizenship, raises the probability of also bringing the formation of one's own identity and the acquisition of insight into society and one's own position therein to the foreground of anti racism education. Alongside this, the interculturalization of education remains essential to sufficiently preparing students for the multicultural society. The experience gathered from the introduction of the ICO is well suited to structuring the integration of citizenship into the curriculum.

## **Conclusion**

For decades the Netherlands considered itself a leader in combating racism. This positive self image was fuelled by the collective mantra “the Netherlands is tolerant”, the fact that right-wing extremist groups were of little or no concern, good legislation and an anti-discrimination infrastructure of which many neighbouring countries were jealous. A country in which right-wing extremism is collectively abhorred and where right extremists are always declared outcasts to be extracted from society, not be spoken with, and to be repressed.

This fundamental Dutch attitude led to the fact that little or no research was done on right-wing extremism and xenophobia. Dutch research was to a large extent limited to cataloguing. A yearly report provided an overview of racist incidences. Only recently do the Security Department (Veiligheidsdienst – AIVD) and NGOs attempt to chart the number of right-wing extremist youth. Well grounded scientific research on motives and development are still lacking. A couple of projects focusing on school safety developed by the educational system, in which thorough evaluations have taken place, are exceptions to this rule.

Educational programs are almost exclusively directed at the multicultural society and the attitudes appropriate thereto. There are no programs for responding to racist behaviour. De-radicalization was until recently barely an issue, and insofar as it is currently being worked on the focus is almost exclusively on radical Islam. Unlike in other European countries there are no services in the Netherlands for those who want to put right-wing extremism behind them.

While the federal government addresses right-wing extremism in addition to radical Islam in its publications on radicalization, these sections are virtually void of proposals for concrete activity. Perhaps the biggest problem is the fact that the different stakeholders evaluate situations differently so that potential partners cannot come together.

Of course numerous initiatives have been taken by different organizations in numerous regions, but whether these generate the desired effect remains doubtful. Good evaluations and scientific research are badly needed and in this the Netherlands can learn much from other countries.

## Appendix – Educational and children and youth work material

### *Nou en?! and So What?!*

The LBR has developed brochures and a website ([www.lbr.nl](http://www.lbr.nl)) in which topics such as prejudices, discrimination, and racism are discussed in a very accessible manner. The brochure *Nou en?* is meant for elementary schools, and the brochure *So What?!* for secondary schools.

### *Nou En?!*

General: The brochure is published by the LBR and is meant for children from 10 to 12 years old. The brochure provides information about culture, faulty representation, prejudices, discrimination, and racism, and clearly and lucidly defines these terms. It is written for elementary school students. Teachers can also use it to guide their students. The brochure refers to other sources of information such as the Project World School and contains a concise address list.

Reactions of the educational panel<sup>20</sup>: The folder has been well received by students, teachers, and academics. It is deemed clear, easy to read, well structured and contains lucid illustrations.

### *So What?!*

General: *So What?!* is *Nou en?!'*s big brother. The brochure is meant for students in lower secondary school classes. *So What?!* tackles the topics of representation, prejudice, discrimination, and racism. In addition, concepts such as 'allochtoon,' 'migrant,' 'immigration,' 'integration,' 'diversity' are addressed in detail. The texts are enlivened with photos and cartoons.

### *The Dutchkids website, 2004 ([www.dutchkids.nl](http://www.dutchkids.nl))*

General: 'Dutchkids' is a website of the LBR whose content deals with identity and growing up in the multicultural Dutch society. The interactive website presents such topics as discrimination, prejudice, standing up for yourself, and others. All this is done on the basis of the experiences of seven students in a school in the fictive town of Nederdam.

'Dutchkids' is appropriate for upper elementary grades and lower secondary grades. Separate pages for teachers provide suggestions for developing the topics in the classroom. The website was launched in 2004.

The educational panel's evaluation: The texts speak to both teachers and students. The topics addressed are interesting and link up with the youths own experiences. The website helps open up discussions about recognizable topics about which it is usually not so easy to talk, such as the love between a Moroccan boy and a Jewish girl. The website would be more interesting if it provided more background information about the characters. While reading the conversations between the characters one can click on topics that require further elucidation. This lends a depth to the topics dealt with on the site.

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<sup>20</sup> The education panel consisting of teachers and students evaluated the material at the request of the LBR. The evaluations are presented as illustrations.

The site is primarily useful for group classroom discussions of various topics. The site makes it easy to discuss certain things and promotes further discussion amongst the students.

### ***Border cases – where do you stand?***

A teaching package published by the Anne Frank Foundation ([www.annefrank.org](http://www.annefrank.org)) accompanied by a DVD and CD-rom, student handouts, source material, and a teachers guide. The material deals with the conflict between the fundamental right to freedom of speech and the right to be protected against discrimination. Students are asked for their opinion on the basis of short films. Target group: Grade three and up in the Dutch secondary school system (from VMBO to gymnasium). Connection can be made to social studies, Dutch, history, and art courses.

Content: The Anne Frank Foundation has developed a reading package that helps teachers initiate classroom debates about freedom of speech. The central focus is on the – possible – conflict between freedom of speech and the right to protection from discrimination. The reading package ‘Border cases – where do you stand?’ challenges students to formulate their own opinions and to engross themselves in the opinions of others.

‘Border cases – where do you stand?’ contains seven current examples of conflicting fundamental rights. The teacher pre-selects three examples. Every example contains provocative positions. Students are assigned a position and prepare themselves for the debate in small groups by gathering arguments for and against the position. To do so they can make use of the accompanying source material. The teacher then shows a short film prior to the debate in which the example is illustrated. Every discussion begins and ends with a vote in order to measure its effect.

The package can also be used effectively outside schools to structure conversations with participants about fundamental rights and the ban on discrimination.

### ***Training ‘Reacting to discriminatory behaviour’***

It is not easy and it takes courage to react to discriminatory statements. The LBR offers training to those wanting to learn how to react adequately to racist comments. Discussions and exercises based on practical examples allow the participants to discover what possibilities there are, which are effective, and which fit the situation and the participant him or herself.

The training is primarily meant for professionals working with youth. Recognizable situations are practised with the help of trainer actors acting them out. The actor and trainer advise participants on effective communication with youth. They teach the participants how to balance goal and method. The trainer suggests which limits to set, clarifies backgrounds, and elucidates the legal framework.

The goal of the training is to help participants to get a grip on a variety of situations, to generate in them the appropriate perspective, and to stimulate the exchange of ideas and policy development.

Experience shows that many participants, although capable communicators trained in pedagogics, are put off balance by discrimination and racism and fail to call on their communicative capacities and knowledge. The training allows them to do so in such situations.

### *DVD 'A joke takes a trip'*

The DVD 'A joke takes a trip and other stories' (see LBR-website: [www.lbr.nl/?node=2666](http://www.lbr.nl/?node=2666)) facilitates free and open discussions about discrimination, misunderstandings, and prejudices, and is aimed at seeking just solutions. The five short films on the DVD raise a variety of questions. When does someone feel discriminated against? What do you do when a colleague tells a racist joke? What can you do against racist comments at work or at school? How do we really interact with one another? The DVD and its accompanying guide available on the website was commissioned by the LBR to help educators and youth workers raise these and other questions. This package can be used for training sessions, courses, and information sessions.

The guide explains how the most use can be made of the short films. The film about the joke can for example lead to a discussion about whether or not every 'joke' is acceptable, the real nature of racism, and the potential effects of racist comments. Another issue that can be raised by way of an illustration is the use of codes of behaviour in schools and organizations.

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## Juvenile Right-Wing-Extremism and Xenophobia in Germany: Research and Prevention

Since the 1980s it has become apparent in Germany that right-wing extremist ideologies and xenophobic orientations are attractive not only to old people, who still glorify National Socialism, but also to a certain group of German youth. Since the 1980s extreme right-wing political parties have succeeded in various elections in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and right-wing extremist organizations and individuals have committed terrorist acts (e.g. the bombing of the Oktoberfest in 1980). Right-wing extremist orientations have become more popular, and corresponding youth cultures, such as skinhead groups and hooligans, developed. Even in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) small groups of right-wing oriented skinheads and hooligans attacked persons expressing different opinions, such as those held by peace activists. The fact that the younger generation was not immune to right-wing extremist ideologies caused great public concern. This might explain why debates on right-wing extremism and xenophobia in Germany concentrate mainly on youth related issues.

The first part of this paper concentrates on the various forms of right-wing extremism and xenophobia among youth on which public awareness is focused. In this section such aspects as political parties and elections, political and xenophobic violence, and political orientation are discussed. In the second section central developments in countering and preventing right-wing extremism and xenophobia among youth are presented, focussing in particular on pedagogical and social work programs. We then summarise efforts to document and evaluate such pedagogical programs. Finally, challenges for the further development of prevention and intervention are described.

### **Aspects of right-wing extremism and xenophobia**

#### *Political parties and elections*

In public debates right-wing extremism is linked to right-wing political parties and their electoral successes. In the years following the foundation of the FRG, the SRP (Sozialistische Reichspartei) emerged, aiming to carry on the ideological traditions of the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei). It was eventually declared unconstitutional by the highest German court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1951. Since the late 1960s the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) managed relatively spectacular success in regional elections in various German states by gaining more than the 5 % of the vote necessary to win a seat in parliament. In the late 1980s the newly founded party REP (Republikaner) achieved their first electoral success. This party competes with the NPD and the DVU (Deutsche Volksunion) – another right-wing extremist party – for the extreme right vote (Pfafl-Traugher, 2001: 21pp.).

Reliable information on members of these parties is not available so that we don't know exactly what role young people play in these organizations. However, some reports indicate that the number of young active members is marginal. On the other hand, these parties have gained remarkable support from younger voters in recent elections: In the 1998 state election in Saxony-Anhalt the DVU was elected by 13.5 % of all voters, 25.4 % of younger voters (age 18 to 25) and 31.7 % of young male voters; in the 2004 state election in Saxony the NPD won 9.2 % of all votes, 25 % of male votes and 16 % of female votes in the 18 to 24 age group. These parties, however, have not been able to repeat these successes in subsequent elections. From the fact that their electoral results vary greatly we may conclude that there is no stable base among young people for parties on the extreme right in Germany.

We are left with another impression when we look at more activist groups associated with these organisations such as the "Kameradschaften" or Skinheads. These groups are quite attractive to young males in that they represent an action filled and exciting counterpart to parents and schools. The same period of time saw the rise of various youth cultures primarily aesthetically associated with right-wing extremism by way of their own fashion labels (e.g. "Thor Steinar") and music (so called "Rechtsrock"). New forms of disseminating right-wing extremist ideologies palatable to younger people were also developed for the Internet and other media such as school magazines. In rural areas where the structures of social services for youth are weak, youth clubs and homework support groups organized by activists in the right-wing extremist scene are particularly attractive. Some reports, however, indicate that traditional right-wing parties are not attractive for young people. These reports show that most youngsters tend to leave right-wing parties as soon as they try to integrate them more strongly into their organization by way of training sessions, requests for services to the party, or attendance at meetings. It is nevertheless remarkable that these parties – especially the NPD – increasingly try to present their messages and activities in a way that is acceptable and attractive to young people. One way to attract young followers is by "Rechtsrock"-music: hundreds thousands of so-called "schoolyard-CD's" were distributed by party activists during the last few years.

### *Political and xenophobic violence*

As the decade after the German reunification saw a significant increase in crimes committed by right-wing extremists, skinheads and hooligans, political and xenophobic violence became, and remains, one of Germany's most urgent problems. The years 1991 to 1993 and 2000 showed especially dramatic increases in incidents officially categorized as "crimes with proven or suspected right-wing extremist background". Until 1990, about 250 of these crimes were registered per year. In 1991 the figure had already risen to 2.427 crimes. In 1992 it rose to 6.336 crimes and it reached a peak in 2.000 with 15.951 registered crimes, 998 of which were categorized as violent offenses. The last few years have seen a slight decrease in the figures. In 2004 12.553 crimes were registered in the category "politically motivated criminality – right", 832 of them were considered violent acts. Most of these (12.051 cases of politically motivated

criminality, 776 violent acts) were considered “extremist” (Bundesministerium des Innern, various years). It became apparent, that officially registered criminality increased dramatically after very severe attacks gained widespread media attention – e.g. the attacks at Hoyerswerda (1991), Rostock (1992), Solingen (1993) or Düsseldorf (2000), (Willems, 1993: 100).

Officially registered “crimes with proven or suspected right-wing extremist background” cover a wide range of offences: 6 % to 25 % of the officially registered offences during the last few years were categorized as violent hate crimes, including arson attacks on the homes of refugees and physical attacks. The remaining offences include verbal attacks, threats, and propaganda offences (e.g. graffiti swastikas and the showing of other forbidden signs and symbols) (Bundesministerium des Innern, various years; Willems, 1993: 101). Most of these crimes were committed by groups of young German males (95 % in 1992/93, 91 % in 1997): 35 % of these offenders were 16 years old or younger, 64 % of them had not reached the age of 19, and 97 % were under the age of 30 (Schneider, 2001; Wahl, 2003: 212pp.; Willems, 1992). Victims of physical violence are mostly migrants (especially refugees) and members of minorities (e.g. homosexuals) or weak social groups (e.g. homeless people).

Analyses of police and court records show, that right-wing extremist criminality is often committed by inconspicuous groups of young people or groups of young skinheads. This violence mostly develops spontaneously and is often committed under the influence of alcohol. Asked for their motivation, young offenders sometimes report that they are looking for fun or a special thrill by enacting extreme violence in group contexts (Heitmeyer, Müller, 1995: 153pp. & Willems, 1993). On the basis of these observations and reports, scientists concluded that the search for satisfaction through violent behavior is the crucial motive for right-wing-extremist criminals. Political or racist ideologies often seem to be rationalizations developed later (Möller, 2000: 194). Only a minority of offenders are ideologically trained members of extremist organizations.

Various problems attend these official hate crime statistics. It has to be kept in mind that these numbers are based on the work of the police and not on independent information. We therefore have to take in account that a vast number of hate crimes go unreported in Germany due to: a) fear of victims to report offences to the police, b) witnesses unwilling to report to the police, and c) the range of subjective interpretations concerning the background of crimes by the police. Different modes of counting are used to compile statistics in the individual German states, and a fundamental insecurity concerning the definition of politically motivated crimes, cast further doubt on the quality of the official figures. These doubts are confirmed by independent investigations. In their documentation of homicides with right-wing extremist background, two German newspapers counted 93 victims between 1990 and 2000 instead of the 26 indicated in the official statistics (Jansen, 2000).

### *Political orientations*

Opinion polls and research on political orientations regularly reveal right-wing extremist tendencies within the German population. In the early years after World War II this was attributed

to sympathy with the National Socialists; in 1955, 48 % of Germans agreed with the statement “without the war Hitler would have been one of the greatest German statesmen ever”. These years were also marked by notable sympathies with anti-Semitic positions. In the last decades we have a stable potential of attitudes containing anti-democratic, xenophobic and nationalistic aspects. In 1980 the Sinus-study found a right-wing extremist attitude in 13 % of adult Germans (Sinus, 1981).

Since the late 1980s research on political orientations in Germany has concentrated on young people regarded especially at risk for politically extreme tendencies. In 1998 a research report found right-wing extremist attitudes in 13 % of Germans older than 14 years of age – 12 % in West Germany and 17 % in the East (Stöss & Niedermayer, 1998). According to another report only 2 % to 6 % of young people (depending on the measuring instrument) expressed right-wing extremist attitudes (Schroeder, 2004). Differing results are also to be found in studies concerning single aspects of right-wing extremism. Analysis of the ALLBUS-Survey – one of the most important German household surveys – revealed that moderate xenophobic and ethnocentric tendencies among adults consistently decreased in Western Germany between 1980 and 1996 (Rosar, 2000). According to the 1997 youth-survey of the German Youth Institute, 18 % of young people in West Germany and 36 % in Eastern Germany expressed xenophobic attitudes – thus indicating a decreasing tendency towards xenophobia when compared to the 1992 results (Gille & Krüger, 2000). On the contrary a growing tendency to support xenophobic attitudes (about 60 % of the German population in 2005) is reported by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and his colleagues (Heitmeyer, 2006). Because these studies are designed differently and use different conceptions and definitions of right-wing extremism and xenophobia, their results, and this is a general problem in this field of research, cannot be compared to each other.

Although it can be shown that older Germans agree with positions of xenophobia (Heyder & Schmitt, 2002) and anti-Semitism (Endrikat, 2006) to a higher degree than young people, young people remain the focus of scientific interest. Presumably this is not as much a result of the actual attitudes of young Germans but of the attention that some activities of extremist youngsters are given by the public and the media. This evidence supports the position that information and research concerning right-wing extremism and xenophobia tend to be shaped by emotions and selective perceptions, which are also influenced by the media.

### **Fighting and preventing right-wing extremism**

Political and public debates about preventative and counter measures against right-wing extremism in Germany can be found in various contexts, especially in politics and in the media. Sometimes these debates focus on options and consequences of banning extremist parties (e.g. the German National Democratic Party – NPD) or violent organizations (e.g. Blood & Honor). Banning certain organizations is, however, highly controversial in Germany. On the one hand it is supposed that such bannings will weaken the right-wing extremist scene by removing opportunities to attract potential followers. On the other hand it is feared that activities

from right-wing extremists will thereby become more difficult to make out and thus to monitor if and when these organizations go underground.

Public discussion also focuses on the possibility of more severe penalties. Critics have stated that police prosecution of xenophobic criminality is too weak, that the success rate in solving these cases remains low, and that legal proceedings are often abandoned. According to this position, this lackluster handling of hate crimes by official authorities is one reason for an unwillingness to report right-wing extremist criminal activity to the police. Furthermore, while aggressors might as a result feel confirmed, the fear of victims of xenophobic attacks will be increased (Schneider, 2001). Against this background, the effectiveness of more severe penalties has to be judged as doubtful or even counterproductive. As statements by violent aggressors show, these people tend not to calculate the consequences of their violent behavior. It therefore seems unlikely that the severity of the penalty to be expected will act as a deterrent to further violence (Heitmeyer & Müller, 1995: 176p). Critics of more severe penalties demand increased opportunities for offender rehabilitation in order to prevent further criminal acts.

### *Pedagogical programs and social work*

It is tradition that the German school system was addressed when prevention against right-wing extremism, racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism was demanded. Various opportunities and links for preventative work exist within schools, especially in the fields of history, social studies, and philosophy, but also in other subjects. However, most schools concentrate on imparting knowledge, and they thereby neglect aspects of social learning. Hence, the development of a democratic school-culture and instilling a tolerance of minorities is not a systematic part of the German school curriculum. Recent years have seen debates on the social responsibilities of schools, in response to which some approaches to democracy, tolerance, and non-violent conflict solutions in school (supported for example by the “Demokratie lernen & leben” [“Learning and living democracy”] program) were developed. Because these developments started late, and the fact that progress is difficult in schools, discussions around options and chances for preventing right-wing extremism and hate crimes among young people in Germany concentrate mainly on extra-curricular education, youth work, and social work. Since the 1980s various forms of pedagogical and social work in this field have been developed. In recent years these discussions have focused on national programs trying to stimulate the development and implementation of new preventative approaches with financial and structural support.

One type of activity against right-wing extremism and xenophobia that was developed quite early were educational programs and approaches to general prevention. These programs mainly concentrate on explaining the historical facts and processes that made National Socialism and the Holocaust possible in Germany and determining the parallels between historical and current events (Paul, 1980). A problem with these historical learning approaches is that young people who feel themselves attracted to, or who already participate in right-wing

extremist activities cannot be reached by these programs for various reasons. Right-wing extremist activists and their sympathizers usually belong to social groups with lower aspirations to, and capacities for formal education. They therefore need special motivation to learn at school and to participate in voluntary educational programs. Furthermore, they are sometimes not allowed to participate actively in these programs because their attitude and behavior is seen to be politically incorrect. These experiences do not show, that programs of political education necessarily cannot reach right-wing extremists, but they indicate the need to develop special, more effective programs. For example it became apparent that educational programs should include the perspectives and problems young people face in their social settings and should offer opportunities for the participant's active involvement on the cognitive, emotional and behavioral level (Nickolai, 2000; Scherr & Träger, 1995).

Encouraging approaches of pedagogical prevention and intervention against right-wing extremism and violence were developed in the following years in various youth work projects. These approaches acknowledged feelings of disintegration, indifference and neglect that young people experienced in their families, at school and in other social settings, and they emphasized the necessity of enabling them to experience acceptance, confidence, and recognition. To give these young people positive experiences in social relations is considered as a chance for the development of their attitudes and behavior (Krafeld, 1992). Throughout the 1990s, various concepts and their resulting projects for social work with right-wing extremist and violent young people were developed and realized in Germany: action- and adventure-centered activities (e.g. climbing, sailing, and survival camps), sport related projects (e.g. soccer, and American football), "classical" youth work, and various cultural projects (Breymann, 2001; Fromm, 1992; Klose et al., 2000; Krafeld, 1996 & Steger, 2000). From 1992 to 1996 the development of youth work with these groups in the former German Democratic Republic was supported by the AgAG – a special federal program to fight and prevent aggression and violence (Bohn, 2000).

Another measure against violent behavior consists of approaching the aggressiveness of criminals and right-wing extremists on the emotional and the cognitive level of the personality by impulse control training. These programs can be imposed by the court. Various positive consequences of these programs have been reported on the emotional level. However, the effectiveness of such behavioral training on the cognitive level seems doubtful – especially the goal to enable criminal offenders to overcome racial prejudices and hate (Schneider 2001: 27). The deep roots of hate and violent behavior may well not be reached by such measures.

Due to the success of preventing right-wing extremism and violence by working with young people in various contexts these projects became an important part of the spectrum of social services for youth in Germany. However, the last few years have also revealed problems and challenges of this kind of preventative work (Pingel & Rieker, 2002; Scherr, 2000). Youth workers involved in this work require special qualifications and training because the existing qualifications do not suffice. Projects aiming to stabilize young people depend on solid basic conditions. But existing projects often lack future prospects and they are often neither adequately financed nor adequately staffed. For successful prevention, youth work requires

cooperation with other social institutions (e.g. families, the police, schools, and businesses), and occasions for the exchange of experiences and networking. Existing projects often lack these conditions. When youth work fails due to these shortcomings it fuels the reproach that youth work promotes rather than prevents right-wing extremism. The result is exited and controversial discussions not only among experts but also throughout the general German public.

The last few years saw a change in the pedagogical efforts in this field: instead of working with young people whose problematic behaviour attracted attention, attention turned to promoting the ideals of civil society and democracy, and the youth who embodied them, as well as supporting the victims. In 2001 the German government started the “Youth for tolerance and democracy – against right-wing extremism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism” program. This program consists of three parts entitled “Civitas”, “Entimon” and “Xenos”. “Civitas” focuses on developing a democratic and civil culture in the former East German states by supporting mobile advisory teams, services for victims of politically motivated violence, and small local initiatives. “Entimon” supports projects of political education, intercultural learning, and networks countering right-wing extremist tendencies in all parts of Germany. “Xenos” supports projects that counter ethnic and religious discrimination in vocational training and the work place. In addition there are various programs organized by individual German states or private foundations (Möller, 2002; Rieker, 2002).

With the support of these federal, state, and privately funded programs, and stimulated by the experiences of other countries, various approaches to prevent right-wing extremisms, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism in youngsters by way of political education and training have been developed. One type of projects concentrate on preventing violence, others focus on intercultural or historical learning and on political participation. New approaches were developed on various fields:

***Social work with right-wing extremist youth:*** Protagonists who originally emphasised an approach that accepts young people with extremist opinions on a personal level (as described above), have recently developed new approaches that concentrate on “justice” as a core-concept (Krafeld, 2000), aiming to thereby generating opportunities for critical reflection on attitudes and activities that promote inequality and repression. Training programs that integrate elements of confrontation were also developed for youngsters already affected by right-wing extremist ideologies and organisations (Osborg, 2004). Reports show that such training programs can stimulate reorientations in young participants. Nevertheless, youth work programs based on voluntary participation have to keep in mind that youngsters might leave when confronted with opposing positions advocating democratic values (Pingel & Rieker, 2002).

***Community orientated social work:*** Approaches focussing on community related aspects try to analyse the needs and movements of the various groups in a social field. These analyses enable social workers to support xenophobic youngsters, democratic groups, and victims of right-wing extremist violence coping with their desperate problems. The challenge of these approaches is to maintain a balance between the conflicting needs of the various groups. To

do so, social work not only has to support clients but it also has to set limits to activities that claim dominance and thereby restrict the life of other groups too strongly. Such a balance can only be reached through cooperation with professionals from other institutions, the regular exchange of information, and by networking (Pingel, 2004).

*Early prevention:* Various projects in kindergartens and elementary schools try to impart abilities and activities that are missing in youngsters showing xenophobic or violent tendencies such as participation in democratic processes, contact with minority members, acquiring knowledge of their backgrounds, non violent conflict resolution, and a balanced view on gender related issues. Some pedagogical projects therefore support transparent decision making processes and participation. Others use children's experiences to identify common grounds and differences among children with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Discrepant opinions and conflicts are then discussed to promote acceptance and empathy among the children. Some institutions and projects specialize in gender-related aspects by supporting the needs and activities of boys and girls that cannot be satisfied in a mixed group. Analyses of these activities showed that it is crucial for projects trying to promote children's social skills that they also aim towards strengthening the professionals in kindergarten and schools who often work under bad conditions (Rieker, 2004a).

### *Results of pedagogical programs and social work*

Questions concerning the results of pedagogical and social work are difficult to answer because of limited insights into pedagogical processes and the lack of evaluative studies. Sometimes rather general results with respect to social learning are reported but we don't have indications of results of specialised prevention against right-wing extremism, xenophobia or racism towards which the project was striving. In most cases we only have descriptions of rather vague developments: such as acceptance and interest for certain thematic points was developed, the capacity to reflect or verbalize specific aspects was supported, or the atmosphere in the community/institution became more open-minded. In some cases more specific results are reported. Impulse control training can contribute to increased self-confidence and self-awareness, increased empathy for victims and an ability to reflect on personal feelings and behaviour. In some cases impulse control training contributed to decreasing of violent behaviour (Cladder-Micus & Kohaus, 2000), in other cases no specific effects of these trainings could be found (Ohlemacher et al., 2001). Reports from pedagogues who worked for years with youngsters sometimes indicate, that these measures helped them to get out of right-wing extremist organisations (Pingel & Rieker 2002). However, a systematic overview of the results of pedagogical work against right-wing extremism, xenophobia and racism is still lacking. Reliable information is only available on a limited number of projects in this field and has not yet been coordinated. It is therefore as yet unsettled whether, to which extent, and on which level specific approaches are effective among young people. Nor is it as yet clear which conditions must be met for successful use.

One reason for this confusion is that practical pedagogical programs addressing right-wing extremism and xenophobia among young people are difficult to evaluate. Unresolved questions remain as to how to best measure effectiveness in the field of social and pedagogical work. Other problems arise from insufficient resources and skills. Pedagogues and social workers for example most often concentrate their capacities on their pedagogical work with clients. Moreover, most of them have not received training in documentation and evaluation. The situation is quite different when it comes to special governmental programs. Although such recently implemented programs are documented and evaluated, it is still too early for valid results. However, one issue that already stands out is that the heterogeneity of these programs makes it difficult to compare particular projects, thus making it impossible to acquire results about programs as a whole.

Another reason for the lack of reliable information is the fact that pedagogical and social work strongly depends on the particular conditions and needs in the institutions and the community where they take place. An important role is also played by the personality of pedagogues and social workers as projects are shaped by their particular capacities and limitations. This fact severely limits the ability to transfer certain approaches to another context. This is the reason why the capacity of numerous collections of “good” or “best” practice to guide the development of prevention and intervention of right-wing extremism and xenophobia among youngsters is sorely limited.

### **Challenges for the future**

A comparison of past and present pedagogical efforts to curb right-wing extremism and xenophobia in Germany reveals various aspects in which there is room for improvement.

1. Conditions of pedagogical work: Professional management of right-wing extremisms and xenophobia depends on substantial knowledge of these phenomena as well as the presence of preventative and interventionist methods in the education and training of social workers, teachers and other pedagogues. It is necessary to provide professionals working in this field of prevention with better working conditions in order to increase the retention of experienced pedagogues to this difficult field, thereby fostering continuity and stability in the work with youngsters. Finally we need special programs both for the development of new forms of pedagogical and social work as well as stable continued support for established approaches to prevention and intervention.
2. Implementation of new pedagogical approaches: it became apparent in various fields that effective prevention requires new approaches. We need special measures for young males who suffer through unreliable relations with men and therefore lack stable masculine role models. We need intercultural encounters that promote cooperation and contact between members of the majority and members of the minority – especially in regions where such contacts face substantial difficulties such as is the case in East Germany. Pedagogical work with disadvantaged youth similarly demands special methods and at the same time should

not neglect content-related dimensions of learning: we need concepts that fit both of these requirements.

3. Information and Cooperation: It would be extremely helpful if projects and institutions implementing different approaches or working with different groups of youngsters would inform each other and would cooperate more effectively. A higher degree of cooperation and coordination should also be established between regular institutions of pedagogical and social work and special programs that tend to develop parallel structures. The interprofessional cooperation between pedagogues and professionals from other fields seems to be very productive and should be developed systematically (Rieker, 2004b). A need for better information and cooperation also exists between scientific research and those involved in the prevention of right-wing extremism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and racism.
4. Documentation and Evaluation: We need the documentation of experiences gathered in preventing and intervening in right-wing extremism and xenophobia in order to store and communicate practical knowledge and to develop an empirical database on which to base further developments. Moreover, evaluation designs should be developed that are suitable to educational and social processes and to the complex context of conditions in which pedagogical and social work is situated. To perform such evaluations it is also necessary to establish a set of base criteria for good or successful pedagogical work against right-wing extremism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and racism.

By improving the conditions of pedagogical work, by implementing new pedagogical approaches, by acquiring better information, improving cooperation, generating more effective documentation, and by evaluating projects and programs more systematically, prevention and intervention will become more professional and transparent. These are crucial conditions for garnering the necessary support and to develop successful ways of handling right-wing extremist, xenophobic and racist tendencies.

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## Racism and Young People in the United Kingdom

### Introduction

To glance at the headlines, or to listen to the soundbites of the political classes, it might be easy to imagine the United Kingdom (UK) as a hotbed of racial tension, with disquiet centred on the nation's youth. Take the comments of Trevor Phillips, Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), who recently suggested that Britain may be 'sleepwalking to segregation' (Phillips, T., 2005), warning of the dangers of perceived increases in racial polarisation.<sup>21</sup>

In recent years, race riots in Bradford, Oldham, Burnley and in 2005 in Birmingham, show a physical manifestation of the racial tensions felt by young people in Britain. It could be said that the events of the 7th July 2005 seemed to compound these debates. Soon after work on this chapter began, four young Black and Asian men, all practising an extreme form of what they claimed to be Islam, brought the nation to a standstill by detonating bombs on the London transport system. Many died, including the bombers themselves.

Needless to say, these events were seized upon by the extreme right. During the local council by-election in Barking, soon after the bombings, the British National Party's (BNP)<sup>22</sup> campaign literature carried aerial photographs of the bus destroyed by one of the bombers. The electoral (and political) gains made by the BNP in this environment might seem to indicate an increased dissatisfaction amongst the electorate with the approach taken by the mainstream political parties to issues of race.

But does this image fit with the reality of life in the UK? Recent evidence has suggested that Trevor Phillips, at least, may be wrong. The issue of racial segregation seems far more complex when given a second look, with socio-economic factors apparently far more divisive than race (Simpson, 2004). Equally, recent statistics show that perceptions of racism in Britain are complicated, with a decline in perceived levels of racism amongst some ethnic minority groups (Zimmeck, 2005). We need to consider this evidence critically; there is ample evidence to suggest that racial discrimination has, in fact, grown more subtle and more structurally engrained. The use of stop and search powers by the Police has increased over the past couple of years by 300 % for Asians and 250 % for Africans and Caribbeans (Black Manifesto, 2005).

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21 Although this is an extreme scenario, it should be noted that there is a risk of cultivating parallel multiculturalism in the UK as detailed in the Cantle (2001) Report where there is physical, social, economic and political separation of opportunities and interaction.

22 In recent years the BNP has become the dominant electoral force amongst extreme right parties in the UK, replacing the National Front (NF), which enjoyed some success in local politics during the 1970s before declining in popularity after the 1979 General Election.

Black people<sup>23</sup> are a lot more likely to be the victims of racially motivated incidents; 2.2 % for African and Caribbean, 4.6 % for Bangladeshi and Pakistani, 3.6 % for Indian as opposed to 0.3 % for white people (National Statistics Online, 2004). It is interesting to note that 41 % of African Caribbeans, 45 % of Indians, 82 % of Pakistani and 84 % of Bangladeshi origin have incomes that are less than the national average in comparison to only 28 % of white people (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit Report, 2003).

In recent years the monitoring of racially-aggravated crime, and violent racial crime in particular, has become more sophisticated, and government figures (although far from perfect) suggest a growing problem of hate crime. Indeed, most broadly-conceived ‘hate crime’ (including racially-motivated, religious and homophobic crime) is not reported, with the Metropolitan Police estimating that up to 90 % of such crime goes unreported (ACPO, 2005). For the purposes of this chapter it is important to note that overwhelmingly, it seems racially-aggravated crime is committed by young men – we can conceive of hate crime as primarily a problem of the young.

Within this context, recent years have seen a shift in the fortunes of the extreme right across Europe, with racist political parties gaining footholds, and perhaps more significantly, influencing the political agenda. In the UK, the mainstream political parties have shifted their policies and rhetoric in response to electoral and political gains made by the extreme right in recent years. Although it is important to not exaggerate the electoral power of the BNP (British National Party) in the UK, it has made gains since the mid-1990s. At the 2004 General Election, it contested 119 seats<sup>24</sup>, compared with 33 in 2001. Although it was not successful in electing any Members of Parliament (MPs), it did increase its share of the vote in some areas<sup>25</sup>.

To an extent, this has been a result of attempts by the party to legitimise itself since 1999, borrowing from tactics that have proved successful elsewhere in Europe, and particularly in France (see, for example, the BNP’s leader, Nick Griffin, sharing a platform with Jean Marie Le Pen during the 2004 election campaign). This process has had a palpable effect on the mainstream political parties, with issues around asylum and immigration high on the political agenda. So what kind of nation are we?

The chapter is in two parts. First, it conceptualises the problem of racism in the UK, outlining some of the distinguishing features of the changing approaches to the issue in the policy arena, and identifying some of the factors that mark out dialogue around racism and young people in the UK. Following this diagnosis, the chapter moves on to discuss the approaches to dealing with racist attitudes amongst young people, focussing on the role of the schools

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23 For the purposes of this chapter, we will use black in its political context (Robinson, 1998; Patel & Chouhan 1998; Chouhan et al., 1996), meaning all non-white people suffering from oppression. This is a contested notion (Modood, 1988; 1990) but encapsulates a community of shared identity without trivialising the differences which exist within society.

24 In the UK, electors vote in one of 651 electoral constituencies, with the party winning the majority of these forming the government.

25 Notably in Barking where it gained 16.9 % of the vote, its highest ever in a General Election, despite failing to unseat the former Minister, Margaret Hodge.

system and youth work. Overall, the focus of this chapter is primarily on the racism, rather than the effects of right-wing extremism. This reflects the nature and development of these issues in the UK, where the idea of racism as a social phenomenon dominates public policy and legislative approaches to dealing with the resulting social problems.

### **Conceptualising racism in the UK**

The idea of race as a social construct is dependent on the attachment of “human meaning making” (Rogers, 1989: 26) to ideas and ideologies that transform them from mere skeletons to palpable cultures that breathe and discriminate. In the UK, the dividing line of race has always been colour and perceived biological differences which have been used over centuries to implement the dual mandate of the British Empire; to ‘civilise’ and christianise the colonies.

For us to understand the present context in which racism is defined or anti-racist work with young people is undertaken, it is pivotal that we examine how the dual issues of race and racism have been constructed. It is essential, therefore, that we contextualise racial discourse. Although Jews, the travelling community and the Irish have long suffered racism in Britain, it has been non-white people of ‘colour’ – mainly immigrants from the ‘New Commonwealth’ – who have borne the brunt in the second half of the 20th Century: “Within the space of a few years, from the early 1960s on, the terms of the debate on ‘race’ in Britain had been set, a common language developed in which that debate was conducted, and its fundamental assumptions established. Blacks were the problem; fewer blacks make for better race relations; immigration control was the answer; social control would follow” (Sivanandan, 1982: 99).

### *Exodus into Babylon*

Black people, especially those from Africa, started settling in the UK as early as the 15th century, either as willing immigrants or (mostly) as slaves plucked from their motherlands, transported across the Atlantic or forcefully sold. Some were imported: “to serve as valets and manservants to the planter aristocracy”. (Cashmore & Troyna 1983: 43) but others were not so fortunate and eventually ended up being used as human machines to develop the plantation industry in the ‘New World’. Attempts to curtail the movement of black people into Babylon<sup>26</sup> have been going on for the past four centuries. In 1601, Queen Elizabeth 1, “Tendering the good and welfare of her own natural subjects, issued a royal proclamation ordering the expulsion of all Negroes and black moors from her kingdom” (Walvin, 1971: 64).

Despite this, by the end of the 18th Century, there were about 14-15,000 Blacks in Britain, mostly living in London (Cashmore & Troyna, 1983).

More recently, the economic ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors after the Second World War were significant in the mass exodus of black people from the mid-1940s to the late 1950s – the point taken by most recent literature as its starting point. The ‘push’ factors refer to the circum-

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<sup>26</sup> This refers to the West but more specifically the UK.

stances that encouraged members of the empire to come to Britain. In this case, as Sivanandan (1982) argues, the combined effects of slavery and colonialism perverted the economies of the colonies. This resulted in emigration being seen “as one of the main ways of escaping from the twin problems of overpopulation and under/unemployment” (Cashmore & Troyna, 1983: 46).

The ‘pull’ factors have also proven strong. Post-war Britain underwent a programme of reconstruction generating a great demand for labour. A number of ultimately inadequate efforts were made to recruit labour from Europe, and it was almost in desperation that Britain turned to her colonies and ex-colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and India from where a “vast reservoir of cheap labour could be attracted into the country” which came to be known as the “reserve army” (Cashmore & Troyna, 1983:47). A 1949 Royal Commission Report estimated that for Britain’s labour shortage to be solved, especially where the white population were not prepared to do certain types of jobs, 140,000 would be needed to migrate into Britain annually (Miles & Phizacklea, 1984).

The late-1950s saw a shift from “labour import” to “capital export” (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1983: 13). The need for labour had been satisfied and the practice of “absorption and exclusion” once practised during the industrial revolution took place again. Legislation began to distinguish between citizens of the UK and colonies and citizens of the Commonwealth (The Runnymede Trust and the Radical Statistics Race Group, 1980). This culminated in the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act which introduced the “close connection” clause mainly aimed at “de-passportizing” Kenyan Asians holding British passports.

### *Another Culture?*

Concerns around the impact of immigration on Britain have persisted throughout the post-war period, from Tory rhetoric of the late-1950s to the denouncement of a multicultural society by the British National Party, to the infamous speech by Margaret Thatcher: “If we went on as we are, then by the end of the century, there would be four million people of the new Commonwealth or Pakistani here. Now that is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people with a different culture” (Daily Mail, 31 January 1978).

This built on the established fear of domination by a foreign culture raised in the 1949 Royal Commission Report that large scale immigration can only be welcomed if the immigrants were able to be assimilated.

In the late-1950s, early-1960s government policy shifted from what Sivanandan (1982) calls a “laissez faire” policy towards immigration to a restrictionist one. Saggat (1992) and Jacobs (1986) put a case that the 1958 “race riots” in Nottingham and Notting Hill ushered in a new dawn of immigration policy.

Saggat (1992) further suggests that the fiasco over the Suez Crisis and the “wind of change” resulting in the agitation for nationhood from British colonies marked the breaking of the British Empire. These processes questioned the wisdom in continually importing ‘coloured’ labour

especially given the explosive ‘race riots’ in 1958. Consequently, the 1962 Immigration Act restricted the entry of “coloured” people through the voucher system.

Additionally, the physical presence of ‘coloured’ people evoked images of being “swamped” or dominated. This tainted political rhetoric. Charles Collet, a Conservative Councillor writing in the Birmingham Evening Dispatch complained, “what a foolish race we are to tolerate the uncontrolled, unhealthy influx of colour immigrants” (Birmingham Evening Standard, cited in Miles & Phizacklea, 1984). The champion of the anti-immigration lobby, Enoch Powell, more aptly captures this mood by comparing the influx of immigrants to the British preparing their own funeral (Powell, cited in Saggar, 1992).

What we can draw so far is that the mood of British immigration policy has shifted for a number of reasons from recruitment to restriction. With the 1971 Immigration Act, these trends moved to control, and later to repatriation.

There were two approaches to the issue of repatriation, one called for the repatriation of “coloured” immigrants for the interest of the British people; even suggesting that immigrants be given £1000 each to grease their return home and the setting up of a Government Ministry of Repatriation (Saggar, 1992). This influenced both Tory and Labour policy towards ‘coloured’ immigration. A more subtle approach taken by the governments in the 70s and 80s was “induced” repatriation. Sivanandan (1982; 1990) defines this as applying measures and practices that make it impossible for “coloured” immigrants to stay in the UK; basically hounding and indirectly forcing immigrants to go home.

Miles and Phizacklea (1984) also point to the discriminatory and exclusionary practices within social policy, alienating black people and delivering unresponsive services. In Britain, discussion of social policy has become synonymous with problematised ‘coloured’ immigration; pigmentation was the basis of discrimination, and of citizenship. This resulted in the application of blanket discriminatory policies and practices across the board to the detriment of black people, such as the ‘virgin tests’ in 1979, where female immigrants were subjected to inhumane and degrading gynaecological examination on their arrival, implying that those who were not virgins were illegal entrants (Saggar, 1992). These measures make it difficult for the immigrants to stay in the UK by restricting their access to housing, education, social welfare and criminal justice.

### *Brixton riots and the aftermath*

The effects of discrimination came to the fore in the Brixton riots of 1981. “The distinctive feature of the riots of summer 1981 ... was the apparent surprise and shock of politicians of all shades of opinion. In April 1981 Brixton exploded into anti-police rioting and in July fierce battles broke out in Toxteth in Liverpool” (Saggar, 1992: 129).

Lord Scarman, who led the enquiry into the unrest, cited the disengagement of black youths and the discriminatory practices meted out by the Police as central to the rioting. This was to lead to a re-examination of policy towards black people. Scarman saw the rioting as: “A protest against society by people, deeply frustrated and deprived, who saw in a violent attack

upon the forces of law and order their one opportunity of compelling public attention to their grievances” (Scarman, 1981: 14).

The Scarman Report brought the issue of racism to the public attention. Brixton in 1981 can be said to be a microcosm of the plight of black people: “Discriminatory and hostile behaviour on hostile grounds is not confined to the area of unemployment, there is evidence that it occurs not only among school children and in the street but, unintentionally, no doubt in the provision of some local authority services, principally housing (Scarman, 1981: 28).

### *Institutional racism*

The Scarman Report was to have far-reaching implications for all aspects of British society – one of its biggest impacts was its realistic depiction of racial disadvantage. However, it only grudgingly acknowledged racism within the institutions of government: “It was alleged by some of those who made representations to me that Britain is an institutionally racist society. If by that is meant that it is a society which knowingly, as a matter of policy, discriminates against black people, I reject that allegation. If, however, the suggestion being made is that practices may be adopted by public bodies as well as private individuals which are unwittingly discriminatory against black people, then this is an allegation which deserves serious consideration, and, where proved, swift remedy” (Scarman 1981: 28).

In contrast, public policy approaches to dealing with issues of race and racism in the UK have been altered fundamentally by the recommendations of the inquiry into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 (MacPherson, 1999). This was set up in the wake of the scandal resulting from the investigation of the murder, which initially failed to find sufficient evidence to charge the suspects, resulting with a groundswell of public opinion criticising the methods employed by the Metropolitan Police.

MacPherson found that the Metropolitan Police (despite their denials) had demonstrated clear deficiency in both its actions, and its concern around the nature of the crime and the feelings of the Lawrence family. It attributed these shortcomings to the existence of ‘Institutional Racism’ within the force. In doing so, the inquiry adopted a definition of racism that reached beyond the police into the broader institutions of society, touching in particular the criminal justice system and education. It suggested that racist practices were deeply embedded within the culture of government institutions so that, sometimes unwittingly, public sector employees discriminated against ethnic minorities. The use of the term ‘institutional racism’ is not new, with its origins in the Black Power movement of the 1960s (Bhavnani et al., 2005), but MacPherson popularised the use of the concept within public life in the UK.

MacPherson’s definition of institutional racism held that it: ‘... consists of the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes or behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people’ (MacPherson, 1999).

On its publication, the inquiry was lauded by the government. In a statement to the House of Commons soon after the Report's publication in 1999, Jack Straw, then the Home Secretary, acclaimed its findings: "I want this report to serve as a watershed in our attitudes to racism. I want it to act as a catalyst for permanent and irrevocable change, not just across our public services but across the whole of our society" (Straw, 1999, HC (series 5) vol.325, col. 393).

Straw continued to outline an action plan detailing the government's plans for implementing the recommendations of the Inquiry. This is indicative of the fact that institutional racism, as defined by the MacPherson Inquiry, has been adopted as the de facto position of the government in the UK, strongly influencing policy, perhaps most significantly, the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, 1999. This placed a statutory duty on all public sector bodies (including schools) to promote racial equality, reforming workforce and employment policies as well as the implementation of public policy.

The position taken by the government on institutional racism is, however, not without its discontents. Bhavnani (2001), for example, has criticised the definition of institutional racism adopted by MacPherson for its exclusion of racism based along gendered and class lines.

### *What kind of multiculturalism?*

The political debate around what to do with post-war immigrants from the 60s to the 80s was underpinned by notions of assimilation and integration; this approach was meant to ignore ideas of separateness and differences and in consequence adopted the „colour blind“ approach which was bent on treating everyone as the same (Phillips, 2002). This meant that base lines of cultural, social, racial and economic differences were ignored. (Ahmed, Cheetham & Small, 1986: 9). Phillips (2002) identifies the development of two schools of thought from the late 1970s to the early 1980s in response to the black presence in the UK. The first was multiculturalism, which recognised that the assimilationist and colour blind approaches have failed black communities. The premise of multiculturalism is that the basis of racism is cultural ignorance and, that by reorienting people's ignorance, racism can be conquered and discrimination decimated. The second approach was anti-racism, which, as Phillips, M. (2002) postulates, was more interested in dismantling oppressive structures: „... anti-racism emerged in the wake of the civil unrest of the early 1980s. ... Anti-racists saw race, and not culture, as the central issue in tackling racial disadvantage. Racism was about unequal access to jobs, housing and education. It was based on social and institutional discrimination on the basis of colour, and not just on prejudiced views about lifestyles and traditions“ (Phillips, 2002: 131).

Multiculturalism, which saw the solution to racism as cultural education and attitudinal change, has been criticised by many as a tokenistic gesture trying merely to appease, whilst anti-racism on the other hand demanded fundamental policy and political changes. In addition, multiculturalism was seen by many local authorities as a safer option to the anti-racism approach as the latter was a political hot potato which few politicians wanted to handle.

What was to follow then were growing trends from the 1980s, to ply the 'multicultural' and 'cultural pluralism' approach and recognise black people as a permanent feature of the British

landscape in contrast to the previous policies, which sought to recruit, restrict and repatriate with the premise that black people are the problem.

It should be noted that discourse around race and racism is no longer based on clear boundaries of black and white; it is beyond that as even the consensus around the political definition of black is beginning to show signs of fragmentation. Faith is also another dimension of racism, especially the alarming growth of islamophobia and religious extremism. A similarly significant aspect is the expansion of the EU and its resultant injection of people of East European origin into the British system; although mostly white, the shift in racism is no longer limited to colour but to culture including language – hence the popularisation of the term “new minorities”. Therefore the multidimensional nature of racial discourse must be deciphered in its entirety, including ethnic, faith and cultural perspectives. Racism towards the travelling community must also be understood from this angle.

So far, this chapter has provided an introduction to the conception and development of discussion of racism in the UK. The rest of the chapter is devoted to discussing, within this context, two areas of intervention focussed on young people; education policy and informal education and youth work.

### **Education policy and anti-racism in the UK**

One of the most significant areas of debate around the issue of racism and young people in the UK centres on the role of schools and the education system. The importance placed by policy-makers on government interventions has ensured that debates around the problems of racism and young people in the UK have maintained a steady focus on the schools system as the primary point of action. This section will begin by reviewing the problem of racism within schools, before outlining the attempts on the part of successive governments to resolve them.

Throughout the post-war era in particular, issues of ‘race’ and education have been strongly debated, and have been treated in different ways by successive governments. At the heart of these issues are the shifting conceptualisations of race, racism and multiculturalism that have driven government policy around the shape of schooling in the UK. Discussion of the (hotly contested) issues of ‘anti-racism’ and ‘multiculturalism’ within education policy has become increasingly complex, with public discourse shifting from a focus on individual pupil attainment towards broader notions around the role education can play in tackling racism in local communities. More recently, the findings of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the subsequent undertakings by the government have ensured that issues of educational equality remain high on the agenda.

This section examines the role of schooling and education in dealing with racism in the UK. It uses relevant empirical data to demonstrate the development of the main areas of debate, before discussing the main forms of intervention taken on the part of recent governments.

## *Racism in schools*

It seems impossible today to think of a time when the very idea of racism existing in the British schools system was contested. However, at the time of its publication, Troyna and Hatcher's (1992) seminal study of the attitudes of children towards their peers was at the centre of a media storm, with a number of studies bringing racist attitudes and incidents between pupils to light<sup>27</sup>, challenging the assumption that schoolchildren were 'too young' to understand racism. Nor were these incidents confined to schools with large proportions of students from ethnic minorities. The 'discovery' of racism in 'predominantly white' schools went some way towards exposing the myth that racial incidents were confined to schools in areas populated by relatively high proportions of ethnic minorities.

The pathology of racist attitudes between schoolchildren is interesting, and challenges our assumptions about the way in which racism develops. A number of studies have suggested that children show signs of racial prejudice at as early as three years of age, that these attitudes peak around the ages of seven and eight and decrease in adolescence. Racial prejudice of this kind may not be obvious to teachers and parents. Rutland (2005) found that children who hold ethnic prejudices become adept at hiding them when they sense that their views are unacceptable to the people around them. Rutland's study indicates that rather than becoming more enlightened and tolerant in their racial attitudes, racially prejudiced white teenagers are simply very skilful at repressing their attitudes when they feel it is in their own interests to do so. Similarly, a number of studies have recorded incidents of racist abuse and violence towards teachers and school staff (Cole & Stewart, 2005).

Racism is also to be found within the institutions and practices of education. A culture of teacher racism was found to be prevalent in the 1980s, as highlighted by the research undertaken for the Macdonald report into the racist murder of an Asian pupil at a Manchester school (Macdonald, 1989). The institutional procedures within schools have also been subject to criticism, including the implementation of inflexible policies around school uniforms and Physical Education (PE) clothes, and problems surrounding school meals. During the 1980s, the lack of vegetarian options, or halal meat, was raised as an example of racist practices within the schools system.

More recently, concerns persist around structural and institutional racism in education in the UK, with some commentators going so far as to criticise its basis as 'white supremacist' (Gillborn, 2005). For Gillborn, the very basis of the curriculum is part of the problem.

Further evidence of this can be found in the data around exclusions from school. Since 1996, black children have been more likely to be permanently excluded from school than children from other ethnic groups. In 2002, black children (African and Caribbean) were three times more likely to be excluded than white pupils (Osler, 2001).

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<sup>27</sup> See, for instance, Gaine, 1987.

## *Dealing with racism in schools*

Having established the existence of a number of dimensions of racist incidents within schools in the UK, it is also important to examine the interventions and policies pursued by governments in attempts to deal with these problems.

From around the 1960s onwards, education policy in the UK intended to assimilate pupils from ethnic minorities into the 'British way of life', very much in line with broader public policies that explicitly viewed Britain as a culturally homogeneous society, with no room for cultural diversity. In keeping with this, there was a broad consensus that it was undesirable for schools to be populated by a majority of immigrant or ethnic minority pupils. As such, a policy of dispersal, or 'busing in' of pupils to schools with lower proportions of pupils from ethnic minorities was followed, despite the inconvenience and stigma this brought to the children themselves. The Secretary of State for Education at the time, Sir Edward Boyle, suggested in 1963 that; '... it is desirable on educational grounds that no one school should have more than 30 per cent of immigrants.' Despite the emphasis of the educational case, Boyle conceptualised the 'problem' in terms of 'natives' versus 'immigrants', and acknowledged the political dimension of the dispersal policy (Boyle, 1963).

Around this time, it was not uncommon for issues around racism in schools to be thought of in terms of educational attainment relative to peers. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s a number of studies focussed on the suitability of IQ as a useful tool for explaining differences in attainment (see Philips, C., 1979 & Tomlinson, 1981). There are clear parallels between the development of the debate throughout this period – and what later became known as the underclass discourse (Lister, 1996 & Murray, 1984) – with the relatively lower levels of attainment of some ethnic minority groups being blamed on inherent racial difference, rather than structural failure of the education system. These studies were often based on a false pathology of black families and culture, with widespread references to 'immigrants', despite the fact that pupils may have been born in the UK, and displayed an ignorance of stigma attached to the culture and language of 'black' pupils, who were more likely to be placed in lower streams as a result (concerns repeated recently by Gillborn, 2005)<sup>28</sup>. In its current form the approach of the schools system to tackling issues around racism in the UK can be traced back to the publication of a number of significant reports which were commissioned by successive governments to address the concerns raised by these studies.<sup>29</sup>

## *Rampton and Swann: reframing the debate*

In 1979 the Callaghan government set up the Rampton Committee to investigate education provision for children of all ethnic minorities, but specifically 'West Indian' 'underachievement'. The Committee (1981) found that, while few incidences of intentional racism were

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<sup>28</sup> For recent work on these issues, see Modood, 2004, 2005.

<sup>29</sup> See also MacDonald, 1989.

evident in schools, ‘unintentional’ racism and stereotyping did affect the performance of pupils.

However, following the publication of the interim report, Lord Rampton was controversially replaced as the chair of the Committee, and the terms of the report were broadened to include the creation of an education system appropriate for a multi-ethnic society. The revised terms of reference aimed at changing the environment in all schools, including ‘all white’ schools, where the ‘problem’<sup>30</sup> of multicultural teaching did not exist. The Swann Report, *Education for All* (1985), provided a broader investigation into the place of ethnic minorities in the UK and reported to the Conservative government in 1985. This built on the Rampton findings, suggesting that Local Education Authorities (LEAs) have a role to play in promoting racial equality, and that more attention should be paid to culturally diverse teaching methods. By the time of its publication, however, the country had elected a new government, and had in Keith Joseph a Secretary of State for Education whose approach was somewhat more *laissez faire* than his predecessor.

The multiculturalist recommendations of the Swann Report were deflated by the actions and ideological basis of the Conservative government of the time; its political heart (if not head and body) smitten by the ideological motives of the New Right. However, it did have a significant impact in shifting the emphasis of educational performance analysis towards the need for broader, multicultural approaches to education. Despite Joseph’s reservations, a fragile consensus was formed around the report’s recommendations.

The Swann Report had more obvious impacts than Rampton, despite the broad position of the Conservative government towards state intervention in schools. Tangible results can be seen in, for example, the broadening of religious education in schools. The form of multiculturalism endorsed by the Swann Report was based upon notions of assimilation and tolerance within schools. It rejected the racist undertones of previous policies that held abstract ideas of ‘Britishness’ as pre-eminent. However, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, tensions began to emerge between the broad acceptance of Swann’s basic elements and the introduction of quasi-market mechanisms into the education system in the UK, with a managerial focus on attainment rather than principles of social justice.

There was a tension here between the broad acceptance of these findings and the legislative position of successive governments. The 1988 Education Reform Act introduced a national curriculum that was largely focussed on promoting educational standards that were predominantly white, ‘British’ (English) and heterosexual (see, for example, the teaching of ‘British’ history during this period). Equally, while the 1993 Act specifically referred to Britain’s cultural diversity, it did little to enforce these ideas in practical policy terms. This further undermined the multicultural ‘consensus’ promoted by Swann.

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<sup>30</sup> Note the stigmatising language, racist incidents were problematised as being the fault of pupils from ethnic minorities.

## *New Labour, racism and education*

In 1997, the New Labour government was elected on a platform of ‘education, education, education’, and embarked on a series of legislative and policy manoeuvres almost immediately after its election. The green paper *Excellence in Schools* (DfEE, 1997) was one of the first policy pronouncements made by the new government, and was swiftly followed by legislation in the form of the *Schools Standards and Frameworks Act, 1998*. At the same time, the government pursued a broader agenda associated with the discourse around social exclusion, with the creation of the Social Exclusion Unit within the Home Office, taking a broad approach to disadvantage within society, including questions around race.

It might seem then, that the new government would herald an era of reappraisal of the role education might play in dealing with racism. However, the priority for New Labour’s education policy was the raising of standards and attainment within schools, focussing in particular on the core skills of literacy and numeracy. Effectively, New Labour remained as stand-offish about the issue of racism in schools as its predecessors.

The advent of the MacPherson Report did, however, provide the impetus for some major policy changes. Its recommendation to provide an education that includes racism awareness and teaching on cultural diversity, coupled with the requirement that every school should have a policy on dealing with racism, and record racist incidents, was taken up by the government. In line with the MacPherson Report, the schools standards body, the Office for Standards in Education (OfSTED), was given responsibility for overseeing the implementation of these measures.

However, on both counts, New Labour can be perceived as falling short of its aspirations. A report by OfSTED (1999) found that despite broad increases in educational attainment across the country, this improvement was distributed unevenly amongst ethnic groups. Significantly, major deficiencies were identified in the way schools monitored attempts to improve ethnic minority attainment, and particularly in the mechanisms to feed information on the attainment of ethnic groups back into policies for improving results.

Gillborn and Mirza (2000) identify a number of factors that, if implemented, might improve conditions within schools for pupils from ethnic minorities, including an emphasis on clear policies for dealing with racist incidents, better engagement of pupils and parents in shaping these policies and strong leadership from within schools and Local Education Authorities (LEAs<sup>31</sup>) on promoting equal opportunities and social justice.

Equally, research on educational participation amongst asylum seekers’ children raises a number of concerns around access and awareness of education provision. While Local Education Authorities are required by law to provide for the education of asylum seeker children, the government’s dispersal policy has meant that different LEAs face different issues in providing for the children of asylum seekers, echoing the previous practice of ‘busing in’. The problems suffered by asylum-seekers are multi-layered. Broader socio-economic problems

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<sup>31</sup> The government body responsible for local schools administration.

suffered by asylum seekers are likely to contribute to problems around their access to schooling.

### *Informal education and racism in the UK*

New Labour has also pursued policies aimed at developing the role of other, 'informal' education approaches to dealing with problems around racism in young people. Institutions and actors not directly participating in the formal processes of education, such as the family, local community groups, and youth workers, are increasingly given a role in providing pedagogical approaches to dealing with racism in young people complementing work by both the statutory and voluntary sectors.

Until relatively recently, most interventions had focussed on the victims of racial crime and harassment. The difficulties of focussing on young people with racist attitudes are clear, with many practitioners concerned about reinforcing notions of divided communities (Connections, 1999). However, it is also clear that this approach can be successful. A report published by the Home Office soon after New Labour's election in 1997 held up one example of an intervention aimed at young perpetrators of racist behaviour (Sibbett, 1997). The Otterley Detached Youth Work Project was funded by the government in response to concerns around the number of violent racial assaults in the Southleigh area of London. The project centred on the work of a small number of youth workers based in Southleigh who worked very closely to challenge the racist attitudes of young people in the area. This involved direct contact with young people, and also educational visits to meet offenders in prison.

Although its success was difficult to quantify, representations from local police and young people suggest that this approach is effective in questioning the underlying assumptions held by young people around race. It also highlighted the importance of sustaining such interventions over the long-term<sup>32</sup>.

A number of further examples of recent practice are worth noting:

***Community Cohesion:*** This is the main government drive covering many discriminatory strands like disability, ageism and sexuality. The relevant point for us here is the focus on race and faith with Local Authorities being encouraged to apply for 'beacon status' – this is bestowed on Local Authorities who demonstrate an overall ability of taking measures to ensure equality. The pathfinder programme, as a part of the overall community cohesion strategy, awarded funds for the delivery of ground breaking work with young people. For examples and more information please visit: <http://communities.homeoffice.gov.uk/raceandfaith/community-cohesion>.

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<sup>32</sup> The report ends with a rather depressing coda, with the end of the government funding (and hence the project) compounding, for some of the young people involved, the problems around a lack of long term security, raising the possibility of reoffending.

**REWIND:** This organisation carries out anti-racist work with young people by deconstructing race and challenging the myths around racism. It uses the ‘Human Genome’ initiative to deliver engaging and entertaining programmes with young people. REWIND has trained peer educators who go into schools and youth clubs to deliver anti-racist work. For more examples and info about their work, please visit: [www.rewind.org.uk](http://www.rewind.org.uk).

**SOFT TOUCH:** This is a co-operative group that runs a number of projects with communities, and mainly young people, using music, graphics and video to address issues of racism and promote greater understanding. The Respecting Others Project undertaken in collaboration with the Leicester Youth Service brought together 25 young people from different backgrounds to develop peer education videos, music and posters for delivery in youth settings. The Divided Union project was a video diary of a dialogue between young Somalians and white working class young people. Because the groups had strongly different views and would not normally come into contact, a dialogue was set up where one group’s view would be recorded and played for the other and vice versa. For more information about the above mentioned projects and more, please visit their website: [www.soft-touch.org.uk](http://www.soft-touch.org.uk).

**Kick It Out/Show Racism the Red Card:** Kick It Out has been in existence over the last decade and works through football, educational settings and communities to challenge racism and “work for positive change”. It works with professional footballers, amateurs and minorities in Britain to support capacity building as well as challenge racism. More information about Kick Racism Out of Football is available from: [www.kickitout.org](http://www.kickitout.org). A similar organisation is Show Racism the Red Card, which also does similar work and in addition develops educational materials; more information is available from [www.srtrc.org/campaign](http://www.srtrc.org/campaign).

Informal education approaches like these are critical in the engagement of young people because of their ability to promote close work with them in informal settings. In addition the principles of youth work – education, empowerment, equal opportunities and participation – as well as the voluntary nature of work with young people makes it a highly desirable vehicle to engage young people.

## Conclusion

Anti-racist work with young people has operated under many guises such as multicultural education, Personal, Health and Social Education (PHSE), Anti-Oppressive Practice (AOP), Citizenship Work and mainly now under the government’s policy of Community Cohesion. Anti-racist work with young people challenges the most deeply rooted views; it is based on deconstructing a young person’s concept of social reality. It is evident that for historical reasons, Britain is now a culturally diverse entity with the non white population amounting to 9 %; additionally, some cities like Leicester have minority groups that constitute about 40 % of the population. In these areas anti-racist work, given the racial tensions discussed in this chapter, is sine qua non for peaceful co-existence.

Because they are normally the most visible and palpable element of racial tensions, anti-racist work with young people in the UK is fast becoming not only a moral imperative but a matter of survival for communities – it is inextricably linked with the social problems of racism. Anti-racist work under many guises is present in most institutions in the UK, even if it is a masqueraded process of ticking boxes in some establishments. In most institutions working with young people informally, there is ample good practice to showcase. The challenge for the government is to recognise and develop this work.

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## Right-Wing Extremism in Hungary

The following article is intended to present the various types of extreme right-wing activities and the extent of anti-Semitism and xenophobia in Hungary. We will also briefly describe a few destructive conflicts affecting Hungarian youth. The article will present some existing pedagogical approaches and their effectiveness, and show how the public and private sphere are handling the problem. Yet the main objective is to outline emerging forms of extreme right-wing activities. Emphasis will be placed on describing various right-wing phenomena and their causes, for it is crucial to highlight how extreme right-wing ideology has been gaining ground in the past fifteen years and that treatment of the issue has not yet started at the collective social level.

We are convinced that right-wing extremism ought to be studied not as an isolated phenomenon, but as a social fact closely interrelated with other observable facts. Consequently, we claim that while extreme right-wing ideology is shared by only a few, unforeseen social changes or events may easily prompt masses to turn towards racism and exclusion. In other words, the social base of right-wing extremism is, in fact, wider than as it may seem at first sight.

### The situation in Hungary

Before going into the forms of post-socialist right-wing extremism, xenophobia, and racism, we have to briefly outline Hungary's history and geopolitical position. Hungary was a nation successively occupied by the Turkish and Habsburg Empires from the middle of the 1500s to 1918, then ruled by Nazi Germany after World War I, only to fall victim to Soviet occupation after World War II. As a result, the past 500 years or so have been more devoted to the attainment of independence from other nations rather than to democratic civilian development. The values and philosophy of the enlightenment were hard pressed to reach this country on the far eastern end of Europe. Capitalist entrepreneurship and the ethos of social responsibility and free individual choice could not take root so markedly as it did in Western Europe and North America.

While Hungary had been used to being an economically and culturally significant multiracial state until the end of World War I, the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 reduced the country to a small, relatively homogenous state. At the end of World War II, Hungary found itself on the side of the losers as the last satellite of Nazi Germany, and – like all other small East Central European states – it built up a Soviet-type social system of planned economy that lasted until the political changes of 1989.

With the sweeping political changes of the late 1980s, however, Hungary had the opportunity to establish a multiparty democracy, build a market economy based on private property, and to lay down the foundations of social, religious, and ideological pluralism, whose first pillar

was the introduction of a free press. The new social order was not however an obvious success story for all; there were many losers of the reforms, long-established social security was replaced by unemployment, and comfortable soft dictatorship was exchanged for the pluralism of values and the freedom of speech. The transition process was finally brought to an end with the accession to the European Union, which has presented Hungary with a number of obligations – in addition to the economic, cultural, and political opportunities – that many have been unable to accept. They do not see accession as an opportunity to draw neighbouring countries together in terms of culture and politics, but rather, they consider European enlargement a modern form of colonisation.

### *Revisionism and anti-Trianon sentiments*

Bringing an end to World War I for Hungary, the Treaty of Trianon left the country with only about one-third of its prior territory. That the treaty was disproportionate and unjust was easy to communicate to the mostly poor and undereducated masses. Right-wing governments – availing themselves of the general dissatisfaction among the people – kept pointing at Trianon and neighbouring countries as the source of all social and economic problems. Consequently, contemporary Hungary is characterised by a special, unique set of attitudes – reminiscent perhaps only of Germany – through which the idea of revisionism, so often harnessed by political powers, has lived on since 1920. The epitome of Hungarian revisionism is that the Treaty of Trianon is an illegitimate injunction imposed on Hungary by others. In this light the peaceful or even forceful revision of national borders, the “recovery” of former Hungarian territories is presented as a legitimate objective and whoever thinks otherwise is considered an “alien-hearted” foreigner. Various anti-Trianon postcards and books are undergoing a startling renaissance. We regularly come across musical evenings where revisionist marches hailing the war are sung or elegies are cited to the ecstatic joy of the audience. The song below was written before the Second World War and is currently being sung more and more.

#### *Transylvania March*

The word has rung out, the march echoes,  
Victorious are again our old colours.  
Look at the mock boundaries disrupted,  
Our long-time crags all await.  
Sweet Transylvania, here we are again, for you we live and die,  
May the Scythian storm, the sweeping horde be victorious again!  
Within our footsteps, up on the Hargita,  
Down in the valleys, towers’ voices ring.  
No more cursed manacles,  
Let the valleys and woods sing!

A multitude of amateur bands have sprung up with an exclusive repertoire of original and revised revisionist songs. These bands attract a loyal audience with concerts in which constant concert dramaturgy, tension, symbols and uniforms are pivotal and compulsory elements. There are also a number of music companies that publish and distribute CDs of these bands while also selling Nazi reliquary, flags, and anti-Semitic books.

The following extract is from a local government-financed newsletter. Anti-Trianon sentiments are very often associated with beliefs in the ancient divine origins of Hungarians and the ideology that the gene pool of a nation is decisive in terms of the successes or failures of a nation.

*Did you, Magyar, know?*

- that Hungary is a partly occupied country. Beyond the present borders of the country in the directions of the rose of the wind millions of Hungarians live on their own soil under the occupation of foreign powers that did not even exist when the land was already a part of Hungary for a long-time. For each Hungarian citizen there are 6.100 square meters of land beyond our present borders, which is not part of Hungary yet occupied by Magyars.
- that the Magyars (just like the Greek) have their own alphabet with a character to mark each Hungarian sound of speech. This is the Hungarian runic alphabet.
- that before Christianity the Magyars had revered light and that current science has proved that life on Earth is almost entirely based on the energy of the sun.
- that in California in the 1960s research was conducted for the purpose of identifying dominant genes in the human gene pool. In other words, scientists were trying to identify genes that were able to oppress others and determine human personalities and abilities by overriding other genes. Scientists had succeeded in isolating two such genes. One was called the Semite gene mostly represented by Jews. The other was not named but, according to the report, the gene is mostly found among the people living in the Carpathian basin who call themselves Magyars. Could this be why the Magyars have always succeeded in assimilating other nationalities so effectively? (...) Think about it! HUN ASSOCIATION (Published in the Journal of Kunszentmiklós City Municipality, January 2003).

Magyar Fórum, the official paper of the MIÉP, one of the most well-known extreme right-wing parties, also regularly treats the Trianon-issue. In its endeavours to discuss today's problems the obligatory scapegoat for our national "tortures" are always the Jews, who – according to the MIÉP paper – maintain a close and secret alliance with New York, Moscow, and lately with Brussels.

The most important festivity of revisionist, anti-Semite, right-wing extremist youth, bands, and public writers has been the annual Magyar Sziget ([www.magyarsziget.hu](http://www.magyarsziget.hu)), an event now in its fifth year. This event was initially created to counter the Sziget Festival – a major musical

event known throughout Europe. Participants in Magyar Sziget include members of the press, writers, journalists, bands, and businesses who constitute the core of extreme right-wing ideologies in Hungary.

**Anti-Roma sentiments**

Based on perhaps the “richest” and most researched system of prejudice, most xenophobia in Hungary manifests itself in widespread anti-Roma sentiments. There are approximately six hundred thousand people of Roma descent living in Hungary and most live under poor social and economic conditions. (These people are all without exception citizens of Hungary.)

The most important study in recent years is a survey prepared by the Minority Foundation on a nation-wide representative sample (Szabó & Örkény, 1998). The study revealed that 57 % of students believed that gypsies were not part of the Hungarian nation (p. 203). These very same students share the following attitudes towards different minorities:

**Table 1:** Percentage of respondents who claimed they would be bothered by the proximity of minorities (%)

	Grade eight students	Technical/vocational school students	Secondary school students	Grammar school students	Adults (1995)
Roma	58	60	61	60	74
Arabs	26	38	28	18	52
Romanians	40	45	41	32	51
Chinese	21	32	23	17	48
Russians	35	38	24	15	40
Jews	28	38	19	10	30
Transylvanians	8	11	9	4	25
Slovakians	31	37	24	15	23
Germans	11	13	7	7	15
<b>Average</b>	28.67	34.67	25.78	19.78	38.78

The most recent anti-Roma incident that received great public attention was the airing of a controversial musical entertainment program by one of the commercial TV channels called My Big Fat Roma Wedding. The forty-minute show, made by a group of very popular musician comedians, presented the Roma in the most sarcastic, humiliating, and commonplace man-

ner portraying all possible stereotypes currently associated with the Roma. Just a few lines of lyrics from the program:

“It’s better not to count us, ‘cause you will no doubt fail, ‘cause we’re reproductive like worms in your mail”; or “Black doll, what’s up? You’ve been knocked up; this is no coincidence, virginity is an offence”.

The internet abounds in the most humiliating Roma jokes. There is practically no internet humour site which does not supply a full range of disgraceful Roma jokes generally unacceptable in 21st century Europe:

Two gypsy kids are talking:

- Hey, your feet are much grimier than mine!
- Yes, but I’m two years older!

### *Anti-Semitism*

Anti-Semitism in Hungary has taken on a much more sophisticated form than anti-Roma sentiments. This, on the one hand, means that (open) rejection of Jews is nowhere near as intense as the rejection of the Roma. Latency, however, is presumed to be very high. Everyday stereotypes and real knowledge sixty years after the holocaust have made the Jews acceptable and even likeable for the majority. However, while information about the war and the genocide increases people’s sympathy, the question of social responsibility arises only in a minority. Stereotypes associated with the Jews (talented, industrious, educated) awaken good feelings and responsiveness in the majority who have a strong desire to identify themselves with western civilisation. Yet, that numerous media personalities and scientists consciously admit and accept their Jewish background makes many believe that Jews are overrepresented in Hungarian public life.

Research can only bring latent anti-Semite attitudes to the surface in indirect ways. Because most people today “know” that it is not nice to express anti-Semitic views, they control themselves in public and tend to hide their true attitudes when responding to research questionnaires. There are, however, signs of latent anti-Semitism when we look at the wider context or examine interviews containing veiled references rather than direct anti-Semitic expressions.

Under the aegis of the Ministry of Education and with the guidance of Mária Vásárhelyi, the Communication Theory Research Team at HAS-ELTE conducted a research project in 2003 on the professional knowledge of full-time history students in state- and church-run universities (N = 500). The project also investigated students’ ideologies, values, predispositions, and opinions on certain major historic events. The rather controversial study established that 21 % of respondents are openly of the opinion that Jews weaken and subvert the nation that has given them a home, and 22 % claim it would be better for all if Jews lived in their own state,

Israel. 49 % of respondents are of the belief that in Hungary the interests of Jews often do not correspond with the interests of others. (The full documentation of the research is not available anywhere.)

Recently the Kurt Lewin Foundation conducted a questionnaire in the Hungarian town of Pécs – population 176.000. The study was based on polling every single 17-year-old student in the town’s secondary schools (N = 1,754). The aim was to map out the civic knowledge and democratic skills of secondary-school students and to shed light on student attitudes towards different social groups.

The following conclusion was drawn from the study regarding the student’s attitudes towards Jews: the lion’s share of respondents would consider a person Jewish either on the basis of self-definition or religion. In essence it was concluded that students primarily defined Jews as a religious minority. The number of those who would identify someone as a Jew on the basis of a lingual definition was minimal. The possible alternatives for identifying someone as a Jew are numerous – for example: Israeli citizenship, attachment to Jewish culture, traditions or external appearance.

**Table 2:** Who would you consider a Jew?

Anyone regarded Jewish by the community	2.05 %
Anyone who claims to be Jewish by self-definition	29.10 %
Anyone who is Jewish by religion	29.08 %
Anyone who speaks Hebrew	0.46 %
Anyone living a Jewish lifestyle	12.71 %
I couldn’t tell	14.94 %
Anyone born Jewish	2.68 %
No answer	8.89 %
<hr/>	
Total	100 %

### *Homophobia*

While there certainly is condemnation of homosexuality today, the vast majority of homophobes consider this particular sexual orientation as some sort of illness or handicap. In recent years homophobe comments in the media have increased considerably and a great many politicians and renowned actors have taken up a position in the issue.

At the February 19th delegate meeting of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance, Zsolt Semjén stated that: “anyone who would like their teenager son to have his first sexual experience with a bearded man should bravely vote for the Free Democrats. I encourage everyone to follow suit as long as they would

like their children to get their first joint in school, or would like to see their kids banging themselves against the floor at the séance of an extremist sect or those who represent the death culture of euthanasia and abortion” (MTI, 3 March 2005).

The Kill Queers computer game was developed by Hungarians and is freely downloadable from the internet ([http://repa.miweb.hu/kill\\_the\\_buzikat/game.html](http://repa.miweb.hu/kill_the_buzikat/game.html)). The essential concept of the game is that the player (a hunter) is attacked by “fags” and if he is not quick enough to eliminate them he is raped.

### *Attitudes towards the extreme right*

According to a research project at the Institute of Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the least popular minorities in the eyes of the Hungarian public are skinheads, drug addicts, homosexuals, gypsies and religious sects. In his study on prejudice in 1994, Ferenc Erös (1998) used a five-grade “like-dislike” scale and requested respondents to classify various minority groups. At the far negative end of the scale were the Roma along with skinheads, homosexuals, and junkies.

Using a sample of 800 15-20 year old young people, the Bar Kochba Institute pointed out about ten years ago that three-quarters of all male, and approximately half of all female respondents had already had some contact with skinheads (Barcy; Diósi & Rudas, 1996).<sup>33</sup> Margit Bordács and colleagues conducted a similar survey in three places in 2000 among teachers, and found that while 40 % of city teachers had already spoken to a skinhead youth none of the rural teachers had ever made such contact. Moreover, teachers had the least contact with skinheads of all the groups listed in the survey.

Although data was only collected from Hungarians living in Slovakia (N = 480) and not in the territory of the Republic of Hungary, the results calculated by the FORUM Institute for Social Studies in 1999 may well be exemplary in that 85.8 % of the respondents consider skinheads dislikeable.

### *Destructive conflicts: fans and hazing*

While the quality of Hungarian football is steadily deteriorating, football fan aggression is becoming ever more tangible. Earlier spontaneous brawls are being replaced by organised acts of violence; hierarchically structured gangs have set up for the sole purpose of causing trouble. The most notorious and feared fans support Ferencvárosi Torna Club (FTC); during and after matches the fans demonstrate unmistakable anti-Semitic and anti-Trianon gestures and acts. The amateur websites run by fan groups report on the brawls and blow-ups in great

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<sup>33</sup> Skinheads were ranked second as the group respondents have had the most contact with. The groups involved in the survey were: ex-convicts, skinheads, ethnic groups, blacks, handicapped persons, gypsies, religious Jews, sect members, the mentally retarded, and homosexuals.

detail. These descriptions confirm that many follow the team for the sake of the scandalous fights that accompany a great many football events.

Although not directly connected to extreme right-wing ideology, hazing (school initiation ceremonies) definitely deserves attention from the perspective of socialisation. In secondary schools senior students torture and humiliate freshmen for months with the knowledge or, at times, even the encouragement of teachers. On the one hand hazing is an initiation process that introduces freshmen to school life and on the other hand it is a means of maintaining discipline – however illegal and informal this may be. Hazing is a typical phenomenon in schools where the principles of legality and democracy are not upheld and where respect for the teachers stems from the intimidation of students by other students. Research has shown that a key reason for aggression among school kids in certain (mostly church) schools is the gap between advocated values and everyday practices. While the institutions promote devoutness and love, everyday practices include the cruel humiliation and blackmailing of children that sow the seeds of dissention. In terms of socialisation, this may easily lead students to be receptive to right-wing extremism.

### *The realm of politics*

In the Hungarian Parliament there is at present no party or faction that would identify itself as an extreme right-wing group. The only such representative was the MIÉP, who, in the 2002 parliamentary elections, failed to win enough votes to make it into the house. Right-wing parties are, in general, reluctant to mark themselves off from right-wing extremist expositions and they do not always make it clear to the public that they are, in fact, opposed to and in no-way support anti-democratic, anti-human groups. A few fresh political organisations (e.g. Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom [Movement for a Better Hungary] – [www.jmm.hu](http://www.jmm.hu)) maintain close relations with and extend their support to the current largest opposition party (FIDESZ).

### *Media and communities*

Xenophobe ideas are present in all kinds of forms in Hungary. The abundance of xenophobic materials including books, musical compositions, and websites may lead the unaware observer to the conclusion not only that there must be strong business interests behind the whole enterprise and that not only extremist groups are used to playing the anti-Semite card, but also that right-wing parties and organisations use this ideology for their own purposes.

While a smaller share of the available books were published in the United States in the Hungarian language and then shipped back into the country, the larger share was produced here in Hungary. Numerous publishers have specialised in the subject; many issue papers, journals, reprints, postcards, and music CDs. Many bookstores – mostly in Budapest – only sell materials saturated with right-wing ideology. After strong repercussions in the press and civil objections, some of them have put other books on the shelves to make the range of titles acceptable. Above the entrance to a district bookshop (Bookstore for Transylvania) flutters

a so-called Árpád striped flag, which is a current symbol of fascist ideology, and which used to be the flag of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party responsible for the genocide of Hungarian Jews in the Second World War. The Scythian Bookstore located directly opposite the Budapest Mayor's Office and the Scythian Bookstore on József Attila street leading directly to the Chain Bridge of European recognition almost exclusively promote anti-Semite views and hail Hitlerism and the Szálasi-Horthy regime.

Complete with colourful illustrations, the anti-Semite publication entitled "Mérgeggomba" (Toadstool) teaches children how to hate. The original German publication was first printed in 1938 but the reprint version is available in Hungarian on the Internet.

"Have a look at those miserable figures", shouts Fritz. "Look at those sinister Jewish noses! Those lousy beards! Those filthy, projecting ears! See how they move their hands, how they hackle! And they call themselves humans!" Karl talks about how Jews regrate goods and then when they have accumulated enough money they change their filthy rags, cut their beards, delouse themselves, put on modern clothes, and walk about as if they were not Jews. In Germany they speak German and behave as if they were German.

Erewhile they came from the east,  
With no money, in rags and with lice.  
But in a few years  
They made what we make twice.  
Today they dress nicely,  
No longer do they want to be Jews,  
So keep your eyes open and remember:  
Once a Jew is always a Jew!"

### *Summary*

In sum, the most crucial finding is that in Hungary rejection and prejudice is most widespread against the Roma minority. We can almost say that there is public agreement that the Roma are themselves responsible for their poor living conditions and their disadvantaged position. In contrast, only an insignificant fraction of the population is openly anti-Semitic; and these are by and large the people who are, by self-definition, social outsiders who reject all things that the majority society considers to be basic values (equal opportunity, security, Europeanism, market capitalism, entrepreneurship and open communication with foreigners).

Moreover, xenophobic tendencies in Hungary are not markedly tangible toward blacks or westerners. Although Hungarian society seems to be less tolerant of people from neighbouring countries, particularly Romanians, Slovaks, and Serbs, it is also the case that Hungarians living in the same (neighbouring) countries face rejection and even xenophobic tendencies. The reason for this latter phenomenon is that many feared their jobs and livelihoods in the economic and social uncertainty that followed the political changes of 1989.

## How does the state and society handle right-wing extremism?

It is crucial to separate how the state and society treat the problem. Since we are talking about a social phenomenon, members of society (democratic citizens) cannot always turn to the state for a solution to existing problems. In Hungary we traditionally tend to define ourselves as a people incapable of making responsible autonomous decisions; instead we think of ourselves as subjects whom the state is obliged to look after and whose problems and conflicts the state ought to resolve or at least patch up. Consequently, Hungarian citizens tend to assign the handling of the vast majority of problems to the state, expecting it to establish an appropriate institution or earmark a budget, and to take up a position on moral issues and the most diverse walks of life. It is our hypothesis that this attitude constitutes the breeding-ground for extremist views because in our view xenophobia and anti-Semitic ideas can only take root among controlled state subjects.

### *State responsibility*

The most important government measure was the enactment of the anti-discrimination act.<sup>34</sup> In addition, the Parliament amended the act banning hate speech in 2003.<sup>35</sup> The birth of the act and its amendment was preceded by fierce social and political debate; the central question in both cases was where the line between instigation and discrimination ought to be drawn. In recent years there have been a number of attempts to change the penalty for hate speech.

Although state-run media make considerable efforts to present ethnic issues, it tends only to surface as a matter of culture or as a social problem burdening the Roma. One of the state-run channels has been airing an extremist anti-Semite programme known as *Vasárnapi Újság* (Sunday Journal) every Sunday for years. In Hungary the role of the government in financing culture is considerable. The film adaptation of the book *Fatelessness*, and Gergely Koltay's *Trianon* were both government financed. According to public opinion, the government intends to favour both sides. This seems to suggest that while the holocaust is a just cause for one half of society, Trianon is the cause for the other half of society, and the two halves do not overlap.

Of all state initiatives, the most notable is the Zita Németh-led Mobility Youth Service, which organises various events, invites grant applications, and issues publications on the subject of democratic socialisation. The institution places great emphasis on managing football fan aggression.

Anti-discriminatory school practices are not only crucial to balancing out unequal opportunities, but also for the democratic socialisation of all students. Below you will find further examples of school programmes and projects.

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<sup>34</sup> Act CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities, commonly known as the anti-discrimination act.

<sup>35</sup> The Act IV amendment of the 1978 Criminal Code stipulates provisions on hate speech and incitement against minorities.

The Holocaust Memorial Center ([www.hdke.hu](http://www.hdke.hu)) in Budapest was established in 2001. In an independent building of its own, the institution houses numerous exhibitions and programs. At the same time, there has been fierce conceptual debate on whether the most horrific genocide of all times, the holocaust, is a purely Jewish cause. The resulting question being whether or not the museum ought to display all acts against humanity and raise awareness in relation to the Sudanese genocide as much as to the extermination of Armenians.

### *Social responsibility*

There is no real tradition of assuming social responsibility in Hungary. Not counting the initiatives of a few civil organisations and private individuals, people tend to rely on the state to provide solutions; and when, as usual, the political parties raise their voices they are often inspired to do so by their own political interests.

On October 15th, 2004, on the sixtieth anniversary of the accession to power by the Arrow Cross Party, an unregistered group calling themselves the Hungarian Future Group held a memorial service in front of the House of Terror.<sup>36</sup> On this day tens of thousands of people marched down the same avenue in protest to demonstrate their anti-racists disposition. First initiated by a few leftist parties, the movement later grew into a mass demonstration.

In February 2005 sculptor Gyula Pauer placed sixty authentic pairs of iron shoes on a stretch of the bank of the Danube between Roosevelt Square and Kossuth Square. The shoes commemorate the deaths of Jewish women and children shot dead by Arrow Cross members on the bank of the Danube sixty years ago. In July somebody defaced the memorial by removing four iron shoes using a steel bar.

### **Pedagogical or social work approaches of prevention**

#### *Expansion of knowledge*

Pursuant to a decree by the Ministry of Education, the 16th of April has been declared a Holocaust Memorial Day. On this day all elementary and secondary schools throughout the country devote some time to remembering the victims of the holocaust. However, a single day of commemoration is just not enough to make up for the deficiencies in educating about the holocaust. Students are insufficiently armoured to resist extremist ideologies in their everyday lives. Although the constraints of this study do not allow us to expound on the underlying causes of this, we can essentially blame the education system because schools run a rat race to convey and check more and more information. No time is left for in-depth analysis, discussions, or critically analysing certain historical events, happenings, or TV programmes.

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<sup>36</sup> The museum is designed to display crimes against humanity committed by both the fascist arrow and cross regime and the communists. The museum is surrounded by a great deal of controversy because while the terror of the Stalinist-Rákosi system is disproportionately overrepresented the few films and pictures of the Nazi era are included more to fulfil an expectation than to maintain a balance.

One year the Association of Hungarian History Teachers announced a call for applications; those chosen visited the Auschwitz museum as part of a five-day tour. The applicant teachers and students were requested to outline in a few pages “how they in their lives, studies, or family past came across the events of the Second World War, what arouses their interests in the victims of the war, be they individuals, families, or even masses, and how Hungary’s role in the Second World War was discussed in class with particular attention to the individual victims, families, or masses, and the personal accounts of their tragedies”. This excluded students who lacked the appropriate writing and expressive skills; what is more, the vast majority of teachers that applied were actively involved in the subject matter anyway and had already been using holocaust-related teaching material in the classroom.

On October 10th, 2002, Imre Kertész’s *Fatelessness* was awarded the Noble prize in literature. He commented, “It is very interesting for me that I receive the prize for my work on the holocaust and anti-dictatorship. Could this carry an educational hint for the East European countries?” (as quoted by the *Frankfurter Rundschau*). This incredibly high recognition of Kertész’s work greatly divided the public opinion of the nation. While at first the vast majority of people celebrated and identified with the success of the book, later – due to the influence of certain right-wing and right-wing extremist parties – many found the “Jewish” author undeserving of the Noble prize, and some began to think of him as a foreigner. The situation is best illustrated by the fact that certain leading right-wing politicians had begun to call the author Imre Kertész (as opposed to Kertész Imre, which would be the original Hungarian order of the name – family names come first followed by second names in Hungarian), thereby indicating that he is in fact not Hungarian and that the prize was not a real acknowledgement of literary performance of a Hungarian author because foreign powers and forces were at play. Nevertheless, the book has been sent out to all school libraries through financing from the Ministry of Education.

The Kurt Lewin Foundation issued a 48-page publication on Hungary’s accession to the European Union on May 1st, 2004 entitled XENO.HU. The aim of the publication was to present xenophobic, extreme right-wing ideologies, bands, websites, jokes, and books in the hope that this would strengthen the defenses of secondary school students against extremism. The XENO.HU booklet’s plentiful illustrations free of didactic approaches is quite shocking. Whereas the first part of the book is no more than a presentation of facts, the second half discusses the underlying reasons behind the facts.

Although an increasing number of social and civic information books are being published in the country, most of them are structured like classroom texts and thus contain a lot of text, and this entails a gap between the message they wish to convey and the masses of students that find reading difficult. One of the best publications in this genre is the booklet entitled *Multiculture* (Rózsavölgyi, 1995) by the Másképp Alapítvány (Másképp Foundation), which discusses human rights, racism, unemployment, and people of different abilities. It also provides students with group assignments that may form the basis of long-term attitude change. One of the special advantages of the book is that it is supplemented with a teacher’s edition, which explains the context and the network of cause and effect that the book is about.

## *Youth work*

### Mobilitas Youth Service

Mobilitas is a Hungarian methodological centre for youth work founded in 1995 ([www.mobilitas.hu](http://www.mobilitas.hu)). Youth work in Hungary is largely based on cooperation between communities, youth groups, and organisations. Mobilitas has coordinated and advanced this method and the general aim of youth work in Hungary for approximately a decade now under the watchful eye of the appointed ministry of the incumbent governments. The aim of youth work it embodies is to integrate youth into social cooperation or, to be more precise, to make it easier for young and upcoming generations to find their place in our rapidly changing world. To reach this aim, mobilitas among other things, organizes tolerance seminars and courses for participating youth groups, teachers and social workers. In addition to this extremely important response to our subject matter, mobilitas also fulfil a part of their mission by developing and maintaining international contacts.

The European Council publication “Compass” is a guidebook on human rights education and Mobilitas has undertaken to publish it in Hungary (this involves translation, proofreading, and Hungarian adaptation). ([eycb.coe.int/compass/en/pdf/o\\_impresum.pdf](http://eycb.coe.int/compass/en/pdf/o_impresum.pdf)).

### Summer-camps with youngsters of different ethnic backgrounds

In the past ten years, numerous Hungarian civil organisations have set up summer camps where Roma and non-Roma, handicapped and healthy students spent a few days together. The main idea behind these camps was that students brought together as equals would necessarily find themselves in natural situations where mutual dependence was a must in order to, for example, solve tasks or cope with everyday camp life. This meant that no single person could solve the problems that might arise without cooperating with others. The result was that normal human relationships characteristic of the given age group developed among students regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. This, of course, does not mean that there were no conflicts or averse emotions, but the positive and negative emotional relations never manifested themselves along the ethnic fault-line.

### Deliberative polling

The method of deliberative polling was first used by Hungarian researchers as a social research and opinion forming tool in the summer and autumn of 2005. The first subject matter was the Roma question. Researchers gathered one thousand people representative of the Hungarian population in terms of age, school qualifications, gender, ethnicity, and domicile to discuss three questions in seventeen groups. The first question was whether decision-makers ought to treat Roma poverty as a separate issue. The second part concerned the boundaries of racial discrimination and in the third section participants were asked questions about segre-

gation: who should eliminate Roma settlements and how; can we ignore the right of non-Roma parents to free choice of school in our struggle against school segregation?<sup>37</sup> The original idea from the US is based on two sets of premises. First, the social sciences have alienated themselves from the subject matter and are often unable to convey the accumulated knowledge in a manner that would be interpretable as usable by the public. Secondly, democracy has become far too indirect as it is virtually limited to participatory elections, and people have insufficient information about and little say in public matters. The Hungarian deliberative poll summed up opinions and then gave respondents the opportunity to discuss their views. Whenever additional information was required, experts were on hand to help. At the end of the process researchers again asked for the opinion of the people on the same issues. According to the first results, people's attitude had significantly shifted toward more acceptance and tolerance as a result of the ideology-free and professional supply of information and the serene discussion of the subject matter.

### Civil organisations

The primary objective of *Haver Alapítvány (Mate Foundation)* is to share information about Jewish culture among students ([www.haver.hu](http://www.haver.hu)). The foundation aims to emphasise the pressing need and opportunity for harmonic coexistence of Jews and non-Jews and the unquestionable benefits this can bring to society. They do so by relying on methods that go beyond that of the simple history class. The primary tool used by the foundation in this quest is the presentation of individual and community accomplishments, everyday Jewish life, Jewish destinies, and the Holocaust.

The *AFS Hungary Intercultural Programs Foundation* provides students, families, teachers, and volunteers with intercultural learning opportunities ([www.afs.hu](http://www.afs.hu)). They provide intercultural learning opportunities for Hungarian secondary and university students abroad. In the last ten years more than five hundred students have been given the opportunity to learn that there are lifestyles and cultures different from those of Central Europe and that they are worth knowing about. The organisation has always encouraged students to be open to new ideas, and to recognise the causes of cultural diversity, real values, and the underlying human dignity that can unite the peoples of the world. They also provide learning opportunities for foreign students from across the globe to visit Hungary either for a year, half a year or just two weeks in the summer.

The *Artemisszió Foundation* has set itself the objective of increasing equal opportunities and promoting social integration among ethnically or socially disadvantaged groups such as the unemployed, Roma, or people living in remote micro-villages ([www.artemisszio.hu](http://www.artemisszio.hu)). Using various methods and a range of diverse tools, they strive to address and involve representatives of these disadvantaged groups and related organisations, institutions, and people in

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<sup>37</sup> The authors of the study relied on an interview with sociologist Antal Örkény in the September 15, 2005 issue of the *Magyar Narancs* on "Democracy – an Exciting Game".

their programmes and projects. Recently they organised an interactive photo exhibition presenting the lives of third-world refugees temporarily living in the Debrecen refugee camp.

The *Foundation for Democratic Youth* is a public benefit organisation aiming to set up a network of 14 to 25 year old volunteers to cement civil society in Hungary and the wider region ([www.i-ida.org](http://www.i-ida.org)). The organisation ensures that young people can learn about democracy in practice mainly by way of voluntary action.

The main objective of the *Közösségfejlesztők Egyesülete (Association of Community Developers)* is to improve citizens' willingness to take initiatives and act in the interest of their communities ([www.kka.hu](http://www.kka.hu)). The means used involve encouraging citizen participation in local matters, improving the conditions of self-management local action, and the building of local democratic institutions. A Week of Civic Participation held on 19-24 September 2005 comprised a whole series of events highlighting the importance of democratic participation to the immediate and wider social environment. The programmes were designed to increase awareness by focussing on public welfare and the importance of local community and civil action and how this was all possible.

### *Changing behavioural patterns*

In an ever-growing number of Hungarian schools democratic education is not only part of the curriculum, but is also present in everyday practice. In Lovassy László high school of Veszprém ([www.lovassy.hu](http://www.lovassy.hu)) the students' union and students' court – which deal with more serious conflicts – are exemplary. During the course of their weekly activities, the students (and their teachers) acquire democratic behaviour. For years Berzsenyi Dániel high school of Budapest has been organizing special weeks during which students are exposed to various forms of otherness such as the Roma minority or homosexuality. The teaching staff of the high school of alternative economics (Alternatív Közgazdasági Gimnázium), ([www.akg.hu](http://www.akg.hu)) centered the entire curriculum on democratic socialisation. Some of its teachers are co-authors of text-books and educational manuals which deal with topics such as the holocaust and civil democracy.

The multi-cultural association – Multikultúra Egyesület – that provides migrants in Hungary with knowledge and special skills that enables them to integrate more easily into the Hungarian society also plays an important role. This association operates with young volunteers whose attitudes change through working and dealing with migrants.

### **Results and outcome**

The evaluation of the majority of programs is still incomplete. Although certain parts of the programs are designed to have their effects measured and other are not, this is not due to a lack of funds and organizational capacity.

Although the FIVE state-funded programs include evaluatory measures, there is no concrete evidence whether the changes in attitudes, such as an unconditional affection and fondness towards popular Roma artists (primarily singers), are due to the programs or to other reasons.

The Kurt Lewin Foundation tries to measure the effectiveness of its programs in every situation using qualitative methods. This way it became obvious during the course of interviews and group discussions that the presentation of the Roma culture reinforced stereotypes. However, some attitude change may have been achieved by discussing the situation of minorities or the topic of right-wing extremist movements in a broader social context.

Such research is important in order to objectively portray Hungarian social prejudice and the spread of right-wing extremist ideologies. Furthermore, it is important to prepare and implement a measuring device that would reveal latency, or, perhaps even the reasons for hidden prejudice.

### **Problems and future requirements**

The leftist approach is being rejected by the majority who see the solution only in punishment or pillory. On May 8th, 2005 a 15 year-old Roma boy was stabbed with a sword on a bus in Budapest.

The Budapest Police (BRFK) are still searching for an unidentified person for attempted murder, as a 15 year old Roma boy was stabbed with a sword on the almost fully crowded bus number 21 in Varfok Street in the second district. The boy and his two friends were on their way to play football, when a group got on the bus wearing “soldier-like” attire, army boots, combat helmets and armed with two swords. The group had one female member as well. One of them asked: “What is it? Is there something you don’t like?” and stabbed his sword into the Roma boy, who has since undergone a number of life-saving surgeries, but his condition is still critical (HVG, 2005/Issue 19, p. 15).

An anti-racist demonstration organized in response by a certain circle of left-wing intellectuals and some minority groups was nowhere near as popular as the one 6 months prior. People did not perceive this as a racist act and many people thought that certain Roma politicians were using it to increase their own political popularity. A week after it had happened, the police found the possible offender who, according to the media, was also of Roma descent. From that moment onwards, this tragedy acquired an ethnic tone, regardless of whether the offender had a racial motive or not. Public opinion regarded the incident as some kind of a Roma domestic quarrel and left-wing philosophers and politicians speaking at the demonstration were forced to back-out.

In Hungary few people deal with youth who follow extreme ideologies. There are as yet no initiatives that would help change their attitudes or facilitate their social integration. While the most rejected group in Hungary are the skinheads, few people think that these youth are victims easily used by adults to commit crimes.

It is necessary to develop the tendency towards a commitment to social responsibility, and people must not only be made aware that they themselves could in fact become targets of

exclusion, but that they would then have to act on their own accord. The anti-racist narrative is not present enough in the public consciousness. It only appears when there is a racial problem, when a racist act is of an extreme right-wing nature, or on certain days such as anniversaries of racist acts. Overall it is necessary to start developing democratic attitudes and activities as early as childhood. Most people still define “Hungaricum” as certain foods and drinks specific to Hungary, certain geographical features, and the uniqueness of the Hungarian language. It would be greatly desirable if other characteristics like tolerance, the practice of a democratic life, and a lack of extremist ideologies would also be considered “Hungaricum”.

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## “Multi-Cultural France is becoming a Multi-Racist Society”

An interview with the French sociologist, psychologist and founder of the transdisciplinary working method “social therapy”, Charles Rojzman about racism, right-wing extremism and the pedagogical debate in France.

The interview was conducted by Silke Schuster.

- S: First of all, I would like to ask you to describe the situation in France, about how this situation manifests itself in France with regards to racism and right-wing extremism?
- R: What should be said about the situation in France is that it has evolved a lot over the past few years. There used to be a fair amount of racist aggressions aimed at people of north-African descent twenty years ago. This has changed a lot because the demography in France has changed. That is, France has become a country with a strong segregation: it is a country where the various societal environments are quite isolated from one another. Most people of African and north-African origin live in specific areas which are clearly separated from those inhabited by people of French or European descent. These immigrants or children of working-class immigrants are very present in highly urbanised areas: the greater Paris, Lyon and Marseille areas. The suburbs are inhabited by a population which can consist of up to 80 % inhabitants of foreign origin. Obviously, in this kind of neighbourhood, racist skin-heads would never dare attack someone: they would be vastly outnumbered! Racism does continue to exist but it takes on different forms.
- S: How is the situation with regards to right-wing extremism among individuals, specifically among the youth?
- R: In France, the youth in the large cities is ever more of foreign origin. The French, like most Europeans, tend to make very few children. Large families tend to be mainly of African or north-African origin. The youth hence becomes multi-cultural. However, in western France, in the more sparsely populated areas, there is an unemployed working-class youth who places little hope in its future. There are proportionately less foreigners and the youth as such expresses its violence mainly through self-destruction, alcoholism and brawling amongst each other. So situation of right-wing extremism in France is difficult to analyse because even if there are xenophobic sentiments among the French population, more so the adults than the youth, this sentiment does not necessarily manifest itself through the membership or vote for the Front National or through aggressions. An example is at work, where an employer may refuse to hire a young foreigner because of his own xenophobic feelings, but this attitude will not necessarily result in a vote for the Front National. There are also xenophobic feelings which exist in public services such as the police. Youth with a xenophobic tendency can join the police and have these feelings reinforced by situations which they will experience in ghetto-towns where they receive a very cold welcome (the rapports between youth of foreign origin and the police are difficult: policemen and

firemen are often greeted by stone throws). As for violent extreme right groups, they exist but remain a very small minority.

S: Has there been any research about this?

R: No. In France, we have a lot of difficulty conducting research on such topics because of taboos. Up until now, we did not have the right to classify individuals according to their origin because it was viewed as stigmatisation. There are no statistics. These young people are French and we don't use an "ethnic" classification. The advantage is that there really is less stigmatisation. The disadvantage is that we then lack precise elements in order to be able to understand the problems. For example: we are not in a position to carry out surveys pertaining to the difficulties that these young people experience in school and pertaining to their over-representation in statistics related to delinquency and deviance in general.

S: What is the importance of racism for the youth in day-to-day life?

R: In most working-class areas, racism exists, but it shoots out in all directions. For example: for children in school, there exists xenophobia between Algerians and Moroccans, racism against blacks, or from the blacks and aimed at the Arabs or from the Arabs and aimed at the whites, Arabs against Jews or gypsies, etc. This racism is also reflected by the white population fleeing those schools and neighbourhoods. It is as such not expressed through confrontation but through segregation.

In France, there are little or no racist insults. A veiled young woman will not often be the target of direct insults. Racism is expressed in private or at the football match but it is hardly expressed in any overt fashion.

S: Are there any anti-discriminatory laws?

R: There are laws which strongly repress racism, which does not prevent discrimination. Racist aggressions in France have become very rare, except occasionally in Alsace, where the situation resembles somewhat more that of Germany. In France, there is racism from muslim Arabs against Jews with burning of synagogues and aggression against Jews. And if there is an Asian child in a mainly African school, he or she just may be the victim of racism from the African children. But can we really call that racism? In my own opinion, it is more like fear or an inter-community apprehension. I believe that a certain kind of xenophobic mentality also exists among youth of foreign origin. Some youth of foreign origin react somewhat like skinheads in Russia or Germany, that is, with violence aimed at the other, the one who is not a part of the group. But this foreigner can just as well be white, Jew, black. In my opinion, there is in modern-day France a xenophobic mentality, but one which involves all communities.

S: What you describe happens mainly in the suburbs or exclusively in the suburbs?

R: A large part of today's working-class France lives in the suburbs. The suburbs represent a lot of people. France has become a country which has ousted the poor from the city centres. As an example, Lyon's city centre has between 300.000 and 400.000 inhabitants but its suburbs count 800,000 inhabitant. In these suburbs, there are many young people

who are in a similar situation to your young Germans in Eastern Germany, who live in poor neighbourhoods, are unemployed, drink beer and commit violent acts.

- S: And they don't necessarily have the chance to go elsewhere, because in Germany, for example, we observe the phenomenon that young people leave for Western Germany in order to find a traineeship, to find work.
- R: No, these are young people who, very often, do not find or do not even look for work. In France, an underground economy has developed in these neighbourhoods. And in any case, there is little non-qualified work in France. If you haven't done any studies, there is no work for you, so all of these areas are affected by the underground economy, which represents a significant part of the French economy. Those who are successful in school leave those neighbourhoods. But what also needs to be mentioned is that violence has become very important. It is difficult to work under such conditions. Working children are persecuted by the others. Some elementary school classes exist, where I myself have worked with the teachers, and where the children are so psychologically ill, that eight-year-olds hit their heads against the walls during class.
- S: And how does the public react and define this phenomenon, politics, the minister of education, the media?
- R: The political and media elite do not know this real situation of France very well, and for a number of reasons, first of all because the people don't speak. In the suburbs where I work, people don't talk about what they're living because they're afraid of retribution or because they are convinced of the fact that no one will listen to them or will be able to do anything for them. And in public services, the police, the teachers are afraid of talking about what's going on for fear of seeming incompetent. So there is as such a silence in France which causes us only to talk about such things when there is a big explosion, just like last November. And then the explosion goes on. At this point, the outside viewer may have the impression that it's all over, but it continues. As we speak, there still are burning cars, there still are aggressions, but nobody talks about it anymore. As such, we are also afraid of talking, for fear of feeding the extremist vote.
- S: In the anti-racist sense, I mean, one is not allowed to speak?
- R: The reality is somewhat censored because people think that if we talk too much about such problems, many French will say "Yes, we have to do something, we need security, we need police, we need a 'Le Pen' government". Fear, in France, in working-class environments of French European origin, is present and can lead to an extremist vote in the next elections, in 2007. So if we talk about prevention now, it is first of all meant for all these groups and communities who do not see each other anymore, who do not even live in the same neighbourhoods anymore. That is France: an Apartheid society. The first thing we would have to do if we want to prevent racism is to set up meetings of people who don't meet anymore. Just from not seeing each other anymore, the other person becomes a part of their fantasy. Youth living in neighbourhoods mainly inhabited by foreigners, who are very isolated, don't talk to adults anymore, they don't talk to whites. The first thing I try to do in my work is to create meeting opportunities for people who do

not want to meet. For example, I'll organise meetings between policemen and youth, or between parents of north-African or African origin and teachers or policemen. So my way of preventing racism is to let groups with whom I work to express their racist feelings. If we let people express themselves without condemning them right away or without patronising them, they will begin to think a little bit more, and if they get to meet other people, it will change their way of seeing things.

Let me supply you with an example: I work in a city where there are a lot of problems with violence. In this city, there is someone working for the city, a gardener. And he begins to speak. Well, actually, at first, he didn't want to speak, and says nothing. So I say: "Why don't you want to speak"? He says: "I don't want to speak because if I do, people will say that I'm racist". So I said: "Of course not, go ahead!" and everyone chimes in: "Go ahead, say what you want to say!" "Well, I have problems because when I work, some African or Arab children throw stones at me and keep me from doing my work." So we tell him: "Go ahead, explain, tell!" And he begins to tell us about his life. He tells us about his difficulties, and, after a moment, says: "I think these children are like that because they haven't been properly raised by their parents. Their parents, those Arab or African parents, don't take care of their children. They don't raise them well. I'd like to meet those African or Arab parents to talk to them and to know why they don't take care of their children." So we organise a meeting between those people and the African or north-African parents. And we discuss. And the gardener says what he has to say. And I help him defend his idea. I don't say: "You, that's good, you that's not good". I help him, I help them all, to defend their idea. And then he discovers that north-African parents really want their children to behave properly, but they just don't manage to do it, because of modern-day life and such. So afterwards, the gardener thinks: "Ah but my children are also difficult. They also do pull pranks and I can't always manage, etc." So he speaks about all that and it changes his way of seeing things. He even thinks further and says: "but you know, in this neighbourhood, the city wants us to plant flowers for everything to look nice but those plants with those children and those large families who can't take care of them, they just break everything, so it would be better not to put in such plants but rather a resilient kind of grass, and then some hills like that so that the children can play and so." And he adds: "But I'm not the one making decisions. They just call in an architect, and he doesn't have a clue, and he's the one who decided that we would put in plants and so." So we find out that this man has many ideas but he is powerless; nobody listens to him, so we work to give him some power, so first of all comes the meeting and then to rid him of his powerlessness. As far as I am concerned, violent people are powerless people. Violence is for them a counter-measure for powerlessness, so if we want them to stop being violent, we have to find a way to lose this powerlessness.

S: You have already mentioned prevention work. Are there any programs organised by the state to fight, reduce or prevent racism?

R: We now have programs against discrimination. Say if you send your résumé under an Arab name, for example, the company might refuse you because of the bad reputation of

people from the suburbs. There may not even be an interview, just because of the name. This is something I experienced in Germany as well, at the time when I was a guest worker there, I witnessed the same thing. So we now have laws which provide for anonymous résumés.

S: Are there also any programs on the pedagogical level?

R: No, because the current priority in France is not racism, but violence: violence from the youth in neighbourhoods of mainly foreign origin, because this violence is a cause for the rise of xenophobic sentiments and racism in the population. As far as I know, the pedagogical programs to counter violence are not many and they don't really work, but people have tried. This is what is called city politics. City politics are there to ensure that there are less social problems and problems of violence in those neighbourhoods.

S: And how do these city politics function?

R: There are programs which have been in place for now twenty years which aim to solve housing problems, to create a more balanced social mix in buildings, or to give the youth the means to organise animation activities. This was a failure, I think because it was too technocratic and didn't consider people's feelings, and you can't train teachers, policemen, social workers, to work with population groups who they themselves view as difficult. A policeman in France, for example, does not get trained to deal with foreign populations, which creates racism; a lot of racism through ignorance but also racism through fear.

S: And who are the main people responsible for these programs?

R: Public services: school, social workers, police, animation. They are very present in France, everywhere, as opposed to the United States or Russia where public services do not exist. In France, there is everything and everything works: busses, schools, elementary schools, hobby centres, all exist.

S: But these programs did not work, even if they had been in place for twenty years?

R: In my opinion, they don't work well. As far as the pedagogy of racism is concerned, I would say that there is simply nothing. There have been some training sessions for a few years now, and I am in part responsible for that. Seminars about discrimination in order to train professionals, for example those working in work placement offices, in order to train them to know the laws punishing racism, also to train them to greet foreign populations, it exists but it is all quite new.

S: Does anti-racist pedagogy play a role in school?

R: I think anti-racism is very present in France but anti-racism is one of protest, of indignation, but not of learning. That is, anti-racism is carried out in France through the spoken word, demonstrations against Le Pen during electoral campaigns but there is no pedagogical reflexion. In the IUFM's (Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres), teacher academies, there is simply nothing. In police academies, that's where I work, there is simply nothing. You hear such nonsense as policemen who say they need training, who work in a neighbourhood with a majority of north-African inhabitants and the police don't hesitate to ask an imam to come by and explain to them what Islam is all about. The imam

disserts about Islam, saying that it's all about love, peace and tolerance. The policemen listen and ask: "Mr. Imam, why do the young people then attack us and throw stones at us and so forth?" And the imam answers: "Ah but Islam is a religion of tolerance, peace and love." And that's it. That's what we call training. There is an absolute void of pedagogy. Maybe it's starting: there are a few things, but very little.

- S: Do we not define racism as being a violent phenomenon? Because, according to what you have said, there is no approach against racism but there was and is an approach against violence. And racism plays no role?
- R: Yes because we don't want to talk about ethnic problems in France. We don't want to say that there are ethnic problems: we say that they are social problems.
- S: Is there any research about ethnic problems?
- R: Let me think about those existing researches. Michel Wieviorka once carried out research about racism in France on a theoretical level. That is, it was research about sociologists who looked into the situation but I don't know much research about actual acts. I would even say that practical people aren't really taken seriously in France, as opposed to the United States, for example. Right now I realise how all that is practical and pedagogical is hardly present in France,
- S: Your social therapy is a very practical approach but on the other hand is not really therapy and is not really mediation. What practical experience have you made with this approach?
- R: I have gathered a lot of experience over the past seventeen years. I worked in many locations, in many cities, and realised that people really do lose their powerlessness when they wind up with people with whom they are not accustomed to spending time with and then, racism ceases to exist. Say when I, for example, get policemen with xenophobic tendencies to meet up with young foreigners, north-Africans, the fact that they understand each other, that they get to know how the others live, beyond bias, now that really helps to reduce racism.
- S: And through which means do you see this reduction of racism?
- R: That people manage to work together and acquire a sense of complexity. This means that people don't say: "The people in this neighbourhood are bad, they're all delinquents," but rather "yes, in this neighbourhood, there really are about a hundred youth who causes problems. A hundred perhaps but the rest are probably fine." This means that they get the feeling that reality is not black or white but more complex and that they avoid stigmatising an entire population just because there are problems with one part of it. That's the first step: a change in representation. The second step is a change of acts, which means that they become able to work with each other. Policemen would say: "We'd like to meet the parents of those delinquent children". We'd organise meetings, carry out a work of social therapy, and in the end, I see that I have succeeded when the policemen say to the parents: "We'd have to meet up more regularly, why don't we meet up to discuss our problems, ours and yours, maybe every two weeks or so."
- S: How often does this happen?
- R: It almost always happens.

- S: Even if the people with whom you work didn't really want to work together?
- R: Absolutely. What is important is that they aren't mere meetings where people discuss, but actual therapeutic work, which lasts at least two days, in order for people to try and create bonds, to get to know each other, and to ease fears; it's my work to help them out, to ease their fear so that they can talk to each other and really speak their minds. My theory is that there is violence or racism because there is no conflict.
- S: Does that mean we need more conflict?
- R: Yes, of course. But the problem is that we live in a society which seeks to avoid conflicts. We are afraid of conflicts so we resort to violence. And we have to organise these conflicts, allow people to be in a state of conflict, to listen to those who have something to say. If I worked in Eastern Germany, I would allow for young people, not leaders, not neo-Nazi activists, but young unemployed neo-Nazis, to say how they live, what is going on in their lives, why they're angry at outsiders, and then we'd have conflicts, and using these conflicts as a starting point, we could move on ahead together and there would be less violence.
- S: But you don't work with the leaders, the activists, who have a clear and stubborn mentality.
- R: Yes, because in my opinion, I work with people who suffer. I don't work with Le Pen. He doesn't have any reason to change. He has his position thanks to racism. On the other hand, racism out on the street comes from someone who suffers, someone with needs, it's someone who is unhappy. There are some truths in what this person has to say.
- S: But racism exists even if there are little or no foreigners, in some regions. There still is xenophobia and even more ...
- R: There still is, but there problem is fear, not necessarily reality. Fear is a reality, and it exists. I can feel fear, even if there is no danger. Fear sometimes has reasons other than danger. One can have a feeling of insecurity in life, which may cause some fear, even though there is no actual danger. Then there is also what people hear; the television, the news tell them what is going on so prejudices exist even when there are no foreigners.
- S: You have a number of training groups in the US, in Italy, in Germany and also in France. In which cities did you start and how is the program doing there?
- R: For now, I'm working in different cities: next to Paris, in Saint-Denis, in Nîmes, in Lille and we'll have an office in Paris in a few months too. I have worked in all the difficult spots, Toulouse, Marseille, all over the place. In a few days, I will be going to a large police academy in Rouen to work with the policemen. Or for example, I'll go to Russia: I recently worked in Beslan, where they had the situation with the hostages. From there, I'll move onto Grozny in Chechnya. I'm on the move every time or I have collaborators who do some of the work.
- S: And the communes call you to work with them? How does it happen?
- R: The communes or sometimes a ministry from the government, or sometimes a police academy, but sometimes, as it happened in Nîmes, for example, it's a bit different. There was a rather delicate situation in which a young Moroccan was killed by a constable, a po-

liceman, which caused quite uproar, a scandal. This boy's mother, also Moroccan, banded together with other women to demand justice, to find out the truth. But at the same time, these women said: "but this can't go on, with all this delinquency, our children who act up, who get killed, we have to do something." So they asked me to come, I talked to the women and we worked together for two days, in that neighbourhood in Nîmes. We worked like that and I met with some youth from that neighbourhood and I decided to set up a project which I proposed to someone in the city hall. This person showed it to a republic prosecutor. He found it interesting and showed it to the prefect. The prefect of a department is the state, the representative of the government. And they decided to allocate the funds for me to carry out the project in Nîmes.

I always try to obtain the approval of the authorities. In doing so, I make sure that everyone is involved in the work and I don't want the ones to work against the others, which means that my basic assumption is that they are the ones who are guilty. We then listen to and work with foreigners who complain of racism from the police but we will also work with policemen who complain about the foreigners' violence. That is a lot more efficient, pedagogically speaking. For example, what used to be done a lot, and that is why nowadays, in France, we don't do it anymore: We carried out stupid anti-racist pedagogy, stupid because we just explain foreign cultures: knowledge and information about the other, and other cultures. It didn't work with racist people, on the contrary, it even fed racism because they would just take the information which could strengthen their racist position. And moralising doesn't work either.

What works for me, is to work on the reasons which cause people to be racist: suffering, fear, anguish, real problems. Because there really are problems. I'm talking about someone who is racist, not about a racist politician, but a person who leads a difficult life and who is racist. My basic assumption is that everything what this person says, I myself can't tell, is false. I will bring this person into the company of others and cause conflict and debate and after that, that person is free to think what he/she wants to. But I myself cannot decide for this person. What this person says contains an important part of the information which needs to be heard, and when this person sees that this information is heard, he/she accepts to change and to have to do something. So it's very important to assume that all racists, foreigners, anti-racists, everyone has a part of the information and it's my work to organise the conflicts between all these people, without saying who's right and who's wrong. In my method, I don't tell the one who is more racist than the anti-racist: "you are the one who's wrong, you're right, you're good because you're anti-racist, you're not good because you're racist." I say: "You, go ahead, speak. You, go ahead, speak." So I give them the means to obtain some power and I help them work together and to be in conflict. That's what will change their way of seeing things. The idea is, little by little, to ensure that everyone gains a sense of complexity and that we manage to work together. But working together doesn't necessarily mean agreeing, it also means conflict, but these conflicts must be said. If not, the social worker just thinks: "oh that policeman is

a dirty racist!” and the policeman thinks: “oh that social worker is just an idealistic idiot who has no clue about real life”.

S: What is the main objective of social therapy?

R: The main objective of social therapy, as seen from a broad and megalomaniac point of view, is that there should be less murderous delusion and fanaticism and violence and racism and hate for humanity. On a smaller scale, the point is for people in a city to be able to live together and to work together, regardless of their origins and occupations.

S: Democracy is a recurring word in your books. Which role does it play in your approach?

R: Democracy is a government form which accepts difference. That means which accepts conflict. There is no conflict in totalitarianism. We accept to live with people who do not think as we do, who are different than we are. We should accept them and have rules to live together but people should also have a certain power over their own lives and not feel completely powerless. I consider that social therapy is a method of working; it is neither a way to fight violence, nor to fight racism, because racism and violence are the consequence of social illness. What's important is to see to being able to live together, then there would be less fears leading to racism and violence. They are the consequences of something else, at least for the majority of people - because there will always be people ill with hate and racism. What is important is that they remain a minority and not become a collectivity. That's the danger: when an entire collectivity follows violent or racist leaders. That there is a minority of racist people, that's not a problem, that's life. There will also always be assassins, there will always be criminals, there will always be jealousy, that always exists.

S: What does 'success' mean in your work? You said, for example, when a person speaks or pronounces in a more complex manner. And you confirmed that that is almost always the case. What would you say is the meaning of this success?

R: That is when people who are initially separated by hate or fear or distrust and/or prejudice manage to work together in concrete projects or in life. When people, for example, who are at first divided by fears and hate and have no yearning to do something together, when they just say: “hey, it would be nice if we worked together;” and they work together, for example in a city with a network originating from people who used to be enemies, or for example when a policeman, who used to be racist, tells a north-African woman explaining that she wants to set up a women's association where they can do sport together: “at my place, in my garage”. It's a small example but it has happened. “In my garage, I have sports equipment, rowers, things like that, and I don't use them. I'll give them to your association”. That is one small but very concrete thing which tells me, we've got it. Another example: we're in a group and there's this mother whose son was killed by the policemen. She talks a bit about this story and then begins to cry. She says: “I can't stay,” and leaves the room. I say to the group: “excuse me, I will go and talk to her,” and a policeman in the room says: “no, Mr. Rojzman, I will go”. He leaves the room, goes to talk to the woman, I have no idea what they say to each other, he returns with her, she regains her

seat, calmed, quiet. This from a racist policeman. As far as I'm concerned, I've succeeded, because that's how you can create human, fraternal relations between people.

S: And which results have you acquired while doing your work?

R: Personal results with people who have participated, that of course, but what is interesting is when people go into action and make changes in institutions. I think the institutions and the way they function are responsible for the fact that people become unhappy, fearful, that there is hate and racism. So I'm particularly interested in changing institutions, not only political but to change the way school works, the way the police works, the way social work is carried out.

S: Have you been able to observe this transformation after having worked with people in those regions and in those neighbourhoods?

R: Yes, of course. I was asked to work in a post office in a neighbourhood on the outskirts of Paris. It was in a city where they have a lot of problems at the post office. Employees would get insulted, aggressed, threatened to death by the users who were mainly of African origin. And the users said the post office employees were racist. The post office employees said the inhabitants were violent. They would call in the police, for example because some inhabitants didn't want to leave at closing time. They said they'd break everything. So we worked with the post office employees, the African associations, the inhabitants in that neighbourhood and the police. We had to work a lot to talk about what was going on at the post office. We found out about a lot of things which didn't work. An example: the post office required two pieces of identification in order to release cash. The inhabitants thought it was because they were black and had no trust in them. The reality was that there was a lot of theft of money orders from people who presented false identification. So in order to protect the inhabitants, two pieces of identification were requested so that the money orders didn't get stolen from the inhabitants. But there was no explanation. Another thing: poste restante (general delivery). An African gentleman comes and says: "I would like this letter, poste restante, for my wife". "Yes sir. If you want that, you need a written authorisation from your wife because we're only allowed to give it to your wife. That's the rule." But that African gentleman is from Africa, and that's not how his culture is set up. He says: "But my wife or myself, that just boils down to the same. My wife just doesn't have to get a letter if I can't pick it up for her." And: "No sir, I'm sorry." And the post office lady gets worked up: "No sir, no, you're not allowed." "How am I not allowed!" And so forth. "Bitch!" So we talked about all that. There were other problems. There was a very long queue, and the person who wanted his or her poste restante was told that he/she couldn't get it after already standing in line for two hours. The entire group talked about this and we made decisions. We decided that there were young people at the post office, they could go to the queues and ask right from the start what people were coming for and to explain them everything. So people were less worked up because if they didn't have their papers, they would just go and get them, and so on. We also found out that a post office employee receives a premium according to the number of opera-

tions carried out in one day. For example if he carries out fifty, or one hundred, he gets a bonus. It's like that in all of France. But in that neighbourhood, there are fewer operations because each operation with foreign people takes much more time. So the employees working in these more difficult neighbourhoods get less money than employees in easy neighbourhoods. We worked on all of that and it got changed in all of France. There was another institutional change which we initiated, and that was as we realised that the inhabitants just didn't understand the postal service. So we organised informative session in all African associations with one post office employee and one member of the African group. Together they discussed why two pieces of identification are necessary, it was explained how it works and after that there were a lot less problems. And after that, there was less racism.

Racism is a consequence of institutional processes having an effect on the individual psyche. So that's what social therapy is for. Not therapy. The people don't just get sick; they are made sick by the manner of functioning of society. So we have to change society's method of functioning, with the people, in order to have an effect on individual functioning. And that's where we see the example from the post office. Racism originates in mutual aggression between inhabitants and employees.

S: In general: Where do you see the need for developing and improving things?

R: A generalisation. That means that people be better trained, policemen, social workers, teachers. That they should receive the necessary training to help them understand better where we stand by getting to know themselves, understanding their fears, their feelings, and then being able to work with less fortunate foreign populations, and then setting up more actually democratic processes which would provide for people to speak more, to meet up with each other, and to solve problems together. So this means two directions: training on one side and applied democratic principles on the other.

S: And which role does a systematic evaluation play in your eyes? For your work, for the application of social therapy, in order to determine the exact facts and results?

R: It's important but it is true that we don't carry out much evaluation in France. I have already had some done, through researchers, and I think that it's very important that evaluations take place. They are not easy to carry out but it is important that they are done. In my opinion, evaluation takes place in acts, which means that I don't necessarily try to evaluate what people say but what people do, how they behave after this work, that is, are they really able to work with others after this work and to share their experiences in order to make projects together. That is the real evaluations for me.

S: Is there anything else which has not been addressed, which you would like to add?

R: I think that there are two forms of anti-racism. The one, which can be very dangerous, lies in viewing a foreigner only as a victim of racism, whereas racism to me is a complex, global and systemic phenomenon. That means that racism is a consequence, as I mentioned earlier, and there is a form of anti-racism which is dangerous because it is Manichean: it accuses only the person expressing those feelings, without regard for the globality of the

situation, which is also institutional, which lies in the relationship, against people, interaction, there you have it. That is what seems to me as being the most important: to say that systematic anti-racism can be dangerous and can contribute to reinforce racism.

S: Mr. Rojzman, I thank you very much for this discussion.

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